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ABSTRACT
This study contends that given the present-oriented
time reference of politicians, public sector employees, and
taxpayers, the natural trend will be toward increased bene-
fits and the postponement of needed reform in financing
public employee retirement systems. To correct for this,
the optimal solution would be the federal regulation of
public employee retirement systems. Constitutional ques-
tions of jurisdiction, however, make this solution unlikely
and necessitate consideration of other alternatives.
The study defines the scope and causes of pension
underfunding and based on these findings, evaluates both
the appropriateness and likely effectiveness of the proposed
federal legislation.
The study develops criteria for the documentation
of pension underfunding and analyzes the finances of state
and locally administered retirement systems in 1972 on a
state-by-state basis using state and local government finan-
cial aggregates specified separately by level of administra-
tion. The findings reveal substantial and pervasive under-
funding among locally administered systems.
An examination of the causes of pension underfunding,
using regression analysis, identifies generous benefits and
the failure to follow statutory funding requirements.
An analysis of the determinants of benefits does
not provide empirical evidence to support the frequent as-
sertion that funding constrains the proliferation of pension
benefits. In fact, the findings indicate that the method
of finance has little to do with benefit levels.
The study examines the history and arguments leading
to mandatory funding in the private sector, and considers
the likelihood that federal legislation-similar to that
governing private plans can be passed for the public sector.
We conclude that constitutional questions of federalism
and sovereign immunity render this a remote possibility.
In conclusion, we recommend the consolidation of all local
systems into a sample state administered plan with a facili-
tative federal role.
William Wheaton, Jr. Ph.D., Thesis Supervisor
Associate Professor, MIT
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
At the State and local level the overall
fiscal outlook for 1977 is significantly bet-
ter than it has been for the last 2 or 3 years
The one cautionary note to add to this
optimistic...outlook concerns the funding of
state and local retirement plans. These plans
have become an important part of the total
compensation package of State and local em-
ployees, and benefits are now paid to over
1.7 million individuals. Benefits have also
become exceptionally large in recent years
because they are not subject to a current
budget constraint or debt limitations. Most
State and local pension funds are not fully
funded, which means that the assets held by
the funds are not sufficient to cover the
present value of all promised benefits. Con-
sequently there is growing concern that some
of these funds--particularly in large cities
with a deteriorating economic base--will
eventually become insolvent as current con-
tributions fail to keep up with benefits.
Economic Report of the President
Transmitted to the Congress,
January 1977
In 1973, state and local public employee retirement
systems covered approximately 10.3 million full- and part-
time workers and paid benefits amounting to $7.5 billion to
1.7 million retired persons or their beneficiaries. Benefit
payments have been increasing at approximately 18 percent
annually, twice as fast as the increase in employer and em-
ployee contributions, and 4-5 percent faster than the in-
crease in total assets. As a result of these rate disparities,
1
2the ratio of assets to benefit payments -- a measure of a
system's capacity to pay future benefits -- has declined
from a value of 20 in 1970 to a value of 15.6 in 1975.1
This unfavorable trend, combined with the increasingly dif-
ficult financial burdens of state and local governments,
and the failure of many governments to fund properly --
set aside reserves to cover -- pension benefits, raises
the possibility of substantially increased future tax bur-
dens, decreased services, or reduced or lost pension bene-
fits.
In response to concerns about the potential loss
of pension benefits in the private sector, Congress enacted
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
This law protects the interest of participants and benefi-
ciaries of private employee benefit plans by requiring the
disclosure and reporting of financial information; establish-
ing rules of conduct for fiduciaries; setting forth minimum
standards for vesting; and safeguarding the financial under-
pinnings of the pension benefit by establishing funding
standards and termination insurance.
During the ten years of debate prior to the passage
of ERISA, Congress frequently considered the inclusion of
state and local retirement systems. In the final analysis,
these systems were exempted until the implications of
3setting federal standards for public employee pension plans
could be studied.
In July 1975, John Dent, Chairman of the subcommit-
tee on Labor Standards of the House Committee on Education
and Labor, introduced H.R. 9155, a bill extending ERISA
standards to public plans. Although the legislation touched
on many aspects of public plans, the funding provision drew
the most fire. State and local government officials charged
that it was unconstitutional for the federal government to
preempt state and local law with respect to pensions; that
the federal government was not in a position to provide
leadership when its major system, Social Security, was fac-
ing insolvency; that the application of stringent funding
standards would cause financial stress, and in many cases,
lead to plan termination.
On April 5, 1976, Chairman Dent introduced a re-
vised bill, H.R. 13040. This bill excludes the funding
requirement based on Chairman Dent's assessment that more
study is needed before federal funding standards can be
intelligently formulated.
There is, in fact, little information on which to
document the need for federal standards with respect to
funding. Federal standards, if enacted, would define the
financing arrangement of all state and local governments.
4Thus, it seems reasonable that such comprehensive legisla-
tion should be based on findings of systematic and substan-
tial underfunding among both state and locally administered
retirement systems.
Newspapers and periodicals, the most commonly avail-
able source of information on public retirement systems,
generally focus on the substantial unfunded liabilities of
large cities such as Detroit, New York and Philadelphia.
This gives the view that the problem may be peculiar to
large urban areas. If this is the case, national legislation
which would constrain the financing alternatives of all
state and local governments would be inappropriate. The
view of the problem as an isolated phenomenon to which the
federal government is overreacting was expressed in testi-
mony before the House subcommittee on Labor Standards as
the use of "a 90 millimeter cannon to kill an ant."2 If,
on the other hand, the problem is global, cutting across
all levels of government and all areas of the country, any-
thing less than federal legislation might be equivalent to
what a committee member described as "a peashooter to kill
an elephant."3
Scholarly research efforts on public employee re-
tirement systems have been of two types. Several exhaustive
and complimentary studies have been made which detail the
5administrative and benefit structures and alternative fi-
nancing arrangements of public employee retirement systems.
These works, while valuable as a guide for legislators and
others responsible for pension fund management, make no
attempt to define the scope of pension underfunding. 4
Smaller studies, generally of journal length, have
attempted to identify systems with potential problems stem-
ming from pension underfunding.5 These studies suffer one
or more limitations in terms of their usefulness as a basis
for the development of national policy. In some instances,
the sample is limited to large cities and, as such, too
small to draw general conclusions. In other instances, the
level of aggregation is too great to provide a clear defini-
tion of the problem. That is, either the data are combined
in a manner that obscures differences in state and local
financing patterns, or aggregated in a manner that makes it
impossible to identify underfunding with specific state or
local governments. Further, the measures used by such
studies to identify underfunded retirement systems -- the
ratio of payments to receipts and/or the ratio of payments
to assets above the national average -- are not definitive
but relative to an average which may or may not be a relia-
ble measure of funding adequacy.
6A second problem with the state of current knowledge
is that little is known about the causes of pension under-
funding. To the extent that policymakers can be knowledge-
able about causes, they can be specific about remedies.
Testimony before the House subcommittee on Labor Standards
suggests four factors contributing to pension underfunding:
the failure to abide by funding methods as prescribed by
statute; the liberalization of benefits without funds to
assure their ultimate payment; the use of general revenue
sharing funds which hide the cost of benefits to the taxpay-
er; and the abuse of fiduciary responsibilities.6 This
testimony is based on perception. To the extent that per-
ceptions about causes can be supported with empirical evi-
dence, recommendations for reform will stand on firmer
ground.
This study was undertaken in an effort to fill some
of the gaps in information necessary to make a determina-
tion of the need for federal intervention. It defines the
scope and causes of pension underfunding and based on these
findings, evaluates both the appropriateness and likely ef-
fectiveness of the proposed federal legislation.
Chapter 1 traces the growth of public employee pen-
sions from their inception in the latter part of the 19th
century to their present position today, covering virtually
7100 percent of all full-time state and local government
employees and holding one of the largest sources of insti-
tutional capital. It examines past failures and reasons
for present concerns.
Chapter II provides the background to understand
the different methods of financing public employee retire-
ment systems and therefore, the analysis of pension under-
funding that follows.
Chapter III develops criteria for identifying
pension underfunding sufficient to merit the need for
federal intervention. Three measures are used: substantial
underfunding, pervasive underfunding, and underfunding un-
accompanied by contributions in accordance with realistic
cost estimates. These criteria are applied to Census Bureau
data on the finances of state and locally administered re-
tirement systems, aggregated separately by level of admin-
istration. Four time periods are covered: 1957, 1962, and
1972. We use time series in order to identify funding
patterns, make generalizations about the relationship be-
tween past governmental contributions and current fund
viability, and avoid the error of drawing conclusions about
funding practices based on a single year's financial data.
Minimal funding adequacy is defined as the ability
of a state or locally administered system to meet its
8full obligation to currently retired members or their bene-
ficiaries under conditions of plan termination. All state
or local systems, in the aggregate, with a ratio of assets
to benefits equal to or greater than the actuarial factor
specified in the 1971 group annuity mortality as necessary
to protect retired employees are classified as "adequately
funded." All systems with a ratio of assets to benefit
payments below the specified actuarial factor, are classi-
fied as "substantially underfunded."
Pervasiveness is, based on a finding of substantial
underfunding in one-third or more of the systems at either
the state or local level of administration.
Underfunded systems were considered "absent a plan
of systematic contributions made in accordance with realis-
tic cost estimates" when the average ratio of government
contributions to benefit payments over the four time periods
(1957, 1962, 1967, 1972) was less than or equal to one.
Ratios at these levels indicate that the governmental em-
ployer is just meeting its obligation to current pensioners
and is not setting money aside for future beneficiaries.
In pension terminology, these systems are being financed
on a pay-as-you-go basis.
Chapter IV uses the criteria of substantial under-
funding, pervasive underfunding and underfunding accompanied
9by contributions made in accordance with realistic cost
estimates to identify specific underfunded state and local-
ly administered retirement systems.
Based on these criteria, the locally administered
retirement systems of 25 states were substantially under-
funded in 1972. This determination was based on an assumed
retirement age of 60, the most common for locally adminis-
tered systems. Twenty of the 25 underfunded systems
exhibited pay-as-you-go financing, i.e., average government
contributions over a 15 year period were less than or just
equal to benefit payments. Using our criterion of perva-
siveness, underfunding in one-third or more of the states,
it can be said that underfunding is pervasive among locally
administered systems.
Underfunded locally administered retirement systems
are geographically dispersed. While they do include some
of the more frequently cited areas, e.g., the District of
Columbia, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, they
also encompass such states as Idaho, Maine, Mississippi,
Minnesota, Washington and Wyoming. Surprisingly, perhaps,
the local systems of California, Michigan and New York are
not underfunded.
Underfunding among state administered systems is
not pervasive. The retirement systems of only six states
10
were underfunded in 1972. This was based on a determina-
tion of systems with insufficient funds to protect retired
employees under conditions of plan termination given an
assumed retirement age of 65, the most common retirement
age for state administered systems. Of the six underfunded
state systems, four were being financed on a pay-as-you-go
basis: Delaware, Indiana, Massachusetts and Oklahoma.
Underfunding declined among locally administered
systems from thirty-two in 1957 to twenty-five in 1972,
and increased among state administered systems from two in
1957 to six in 1972.
In Chapter V, we explore the causes of pension
underfunding. To do this, we use a series of linear re-
gression models applied to aggregate state data to examine
the influence of a specified set of factors on 1972 fund-
ing levels as measured by the ratio of assets to benefit
payments.
The hypotheses developed here to explain interstate
differences in funding are cast in terms of five interre-
lated factors: (1) variations in workforce maturity, i.e.,
the ratio of active to retired employees; (2) variations
in the level of benefits, i.e., average annual benefits
per beneficiary; (3) variations in the structure of author-
izing pension statutes; (4) variations in fiscal capacity
11
as measured by state percapita income; and (5) variations
in state supervision as measured by the percent of public
employees in the state administered system.
First, the findings indicate that legal require-
ments to fund and statutory provisions specifying funding
arrangements have little bearing on the behavior of politi-
cal officials. Six variables were entered which described
the statutory arrangements relating to pension plan financ-
ing and enforcement procedures. Of these, only one was
significant, the variable specifying the degree to which
the pension benefit is protected against statutory change.
Second, states with highly centralized pension sys-
tems are no more likely to be well funded than states with
decentralized systems.
Three factors do make a difference: fiscal capacity,
maturity, and the level of benefits. High state percapita
income is positively associated with fund viability as is
a high ratio of active to retired employees. The positive
effect on fund viability of high ratios of active to re-
tired employees serves as a caution against comparing
states solely on the basis of their assets relative to
benefit payments. This measure can be misleading unless
accompanied by consideration for maturity. Systems with
high ratios of active to retired employees can appear well
12
funded because of high cash inflows relative to outflows.
This factor may obscure inadequate employer contributions.
Our analysis of the relationship between the bene-
fits and funding provides clear evidence that systems with
high benefits over time are generally less well funded than
systems with low benefits. This indicates that if sound
funding is to be established, control must be gained over
factors that propel benefits higher.
In Chapter VI, we examine the determinants of bene-
fits. One objective was to determine if there is empirical
evidence to support the frequently esvoused theory that
pay-as-you-go financing leads to higher benefits, or its
corollary that funding constrains benefit proliferation.
A second objective was to identify factors associated with
high benefits and, by this, to indirectly identify factors
that have a bearing on impaired fund viability.
Four factors were examined relative to their ef-
fect on benefits in 1972: (1) variations in fund viability,
controlling for maturity; (2) variations in state fiscal
capacity; (3) variations in state supervision; and (4)
variations in the degree of labor force organization.
Since benefits received in 1972 were determined by
factors existing at a prior time, we lagged the independent
variables first five and then ten years.
13
Our findings do not provide evidence to conclude
that funding constrains benefit proliferation. In fact,
the evidence suggests that the method of finance has lit-
tle to do with benefit levels. Perhaps this is because
state and local governments have been lax in following ac-
tuarial funding schedules and, as a result, we do not have
adequate data to test this hypothesis.
Similarly, fiscal capacity and state supervision
appear to have little bearing on average state-wide benefit
levels.
There is a strong correlation between labor activity
in 1972 and benefits in 1972. However, full data on
organized labor in the public sector was not kept prior to
1968. As a result, we were not able to examine the causal
link between 1972 benefits and earlier labor demands. An
accurate analysis of the impact of organized labor on
benefits will have to await the retirement of workers
operating under newly negotiated contracts.
Chapter VII examines the history and arguments
leading to mandatory funding in the private sector and con-
siders the likelihood that ERISA type legislation can be
enacted for the public secotr.
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, the federal
government utilized federal tax laws and Labor Department
laws governing financial disclosure to encourage private
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sector employers to meet desired pension plan objectives.
The failure of these laws to protect employees against
the loss of benefits led to agitation for pension plan re-
form.
ERISA was ten years in the making. Several factors
contributed to the bill's long gestation period. First,
the bill had little popular support. While a considerable
number of workers had lost pension benefits, they repre-
sented only a small percentage of the total private sector
work force. Business leaders were actively hostile because
of the potential for increased costs. Labor was afraid
that more stringent funding regulations would limit their
ability to bargain for more liberal benefits. Second, there
was little in-depth knowledge of private plans and even
potential supporters felt the need for further study to
investigate the implications of federal standards for pri-
vate plans.
Similar factors have surfaced with respect to the
potential federal regulation of public plans. The primary
stumbling block, however, is the questionable constitution-
ality of federally mandated standards for state and local
public employee retirement systems. The Tenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution reserves for the states all
powers not delegated to the federal government. It is on
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this basis that the federal power to regulate state and lo-
cal systems is being contested. A June 1976 Supreme Court
decision voided the application of federally mandated mini-
mum wage and overtime requirements to employees of state
and local government. One reading of this decision is that
federal regulations would be prohibited only if the effects
are extremely burdensome.
Nevertheless, the constitutional question of federalism
and sovereign immunity appears to be the reason for the
scaled down April 1976 House bill which excludes a funding
requirement and limits federal regulation of public employee
retirement systems to the reporting, disclosure and fiduciary
areas.
The rationale for regulations with respect to dis-
closure is that participants, with sufficient information
about the nature and operation of their plans, will be able
to detect mal practice and take proper action. This did
not work in the public sector. Although federal regulation
may be the only means of insuring adequate funding the
centrality of the constitutional question necessitates
the consideration of other alternatives.
Chapter VIII considers two alternatives: (1) strict
regulation by states of locally administered systems; and
(2) consolidation of all locally administered systems into
a single state administered system. We conclude that
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consolidation is the only viable alternative. Based on re-
gression analysis findings in Chapter V, we make specific
recommendations with respect to the legal and structural
aspects of consolidation and attendant considerations rela-
tive to benefits, collective bargaining and the taxpayer's
role. We also suggest several roles for the federal govern-
ment relative to financial assistance, federally sponsored
research, and federally supported court action.
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CHAPTER I
PAST HISTORY AND PRESENT CONCERNS
Conceived in the latter part of the 19th century and
given definition in the first quarter of the 20th century,
state and local employee retirement systems were nurtured
in growth and given legitimacy during the years between 1910
and 1950. Now approaching maturity, these systems are enter-
ing a period where they will be called upon to deliver to
increasing numbers of pensionsers. Between 1960 and 1970,
state and local employment rose 59 percent, from 6.4 million
to 10.0 million employees. The bulk of these workers will
reach retirement age between the mid-1980s and the year 2000.
For many cities, this increase coincides with a tax base de-
cline and, for systems that have not funded their pensions,
the question remains, "Who will pay the cost?"
Historical Perspective
The first pensions granted by a public body in the
United States appeared during the Revolutionary War. They
were granted and paid by the states to soldiers and seamen
disabled in military service, and to widows or orphans of
deceased officers. This responsibility was taken over by the
federal government under an Act of Congress in 1790. Other
acts of Congress of a like nature provided pensions for
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officers and soldiers disabled in the War of 1812, the Mexican
War, and the Civil War. The promise of pensions in the event
of disablement was offered as an inducement to soldiers to
promote enlistments.
New York City established the first retirement system
of a nonmilitary nature in 1857.2 It covered only policemen
and was seen as recognition for the special hazards they
faced. The limited number of additional plans established
prior to 1900 were specifically designed for police and fire-
men. The objectives of these plans were similar to those of
their military forerunners, i.e., to encourage entry into a
hazardous profession, and to protect workers and their fami-
lies against the ignominy of destitution in the event of dis-
ability or death suffered in the line of duty. The plans
were largely informal. No attemnt was made to set up clearly
defined benefit and eligibility structures.
During the early 1900s, the pension concept was ex-
tended to include service retirement benefits, and to cover
teachers and other categories of workers. In 1911, Massa-
chusetts became the first state to adopt a plan for its
workers. Following that, an increasing number of cities be-
gan to set up plans (Pittsburgh and Philadelphia were among
the earliest). However, the concept of retirement unrelated
to disability was slow in gaining public acceptance. Records
on the pros and cons relative to the establishment of public
employee retirement systems are scanty. The National
Educational Association series on statutory decisions related
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to teachers' retirement plans is informative to the extent
that it can be considered illustrative of attitudes of the
time.3 These records indicate that most states held consti-
tutional restrictions against the use of public funds for
gifts of money, property, or additional compensation to indi-
viduals. These restrictions were interpreted as prohibiting
the grant of pensions. Where such restrictions existed,
legislative action had to be taken to exempt pensions.
Missouri and Texas passed amendments in 1934 to remove such
restrictions. A similar amendment was defeated in Missis-
sippi. In that same year, 32 states considered some form of
retirement legislation, and 23 actually advanced proposals,
but no action was taken.
Legislative consciousness grew during the years from
1935 to 1940. The depression that began in the early thirties
stripped many people of their livelihood, wiped out savings,
and left even the most prudent without a source of income in
their declining years. Where the American credo had been
self-sufficienty, individuality, and hard work, this linger-
ing economic catastrophe awakened the national consciousness
to the need for collective, or social, security.
One of the primary foci of economic reform was the
establishment of a program that would maintain persons who
had worked regularly in their old age. The Federal Old-Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), created by the
Social Security Act of 1935, was designed to provide a floor
of protection for the elderly. Following on the heels of
21
the Federal Social Security legislation, which excluded pub-
lic employees, state legislative barriers began to fall, and
there was a rapid increase in the number of states that ap-
proved retirement legislation. Some states where statewide
legislation did not succeed in passing authorized cities over
a certain size to start their own plans. 4
The acceptance of pensions for public employees was
consolidated in the 1940s. During World War II as a result
of governmental policies prohibiting wage increases, employee
pressure began to focus on "fringe benefits," an expression
coined during that period to refer to benefits on the peri-
phery of wages.5 As a result, benefit improvements were
granted in lieu of salary increases, and the concept of pen-
sions as earned but "deferred" compensation gained legi-
timacy.
The period from 1950 to 1972 was a time of continued
expansion and benefit improvement. Membership more than
tripled, increasing from 2.6 million to 9.1 million.
(Table 1.1)
22
TABLE 1.1
FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
AND MEMBERS OF STATE AND LOCAL RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
1957-1972
(persons in thousands)
Rate of Average annual
increase rate of increase
1957 1962 1967 1972 1957-1972 1957-1972
State-local
Employees 4,792 5,958 7,455 9,236 92.7% 4.9%
(Full-time
equivalent
Members 4,043 5,367 7,068 9,089 124.8% 6.2%
Percent 84.4 90.1 94.8 98.4 N.A. N.A.
covered
SOURCES: Bureau of the Census, Employer-Retirement Systems of State
and Local Governments, vol. 4, no. 1 (1957); vol. 6, no. 1 (1962); vol. 6,
no. 2 (1967); vol. 6, no. 1 (1972). Bureau of the Census, Compendium of
Public Employment, vol. 3, no. 2 (1967); vol. 3, no. 2 (1972) .
By 1957, with approximately 84 percent of all full-
time state and local government employees covered, employee
efforts began to shift from securing pension coverage to
liberalizing pension provisions, e.g., credit for military
service, exchange credits among states, more liberal vesting
provisions, more liberal disability and survivor benefits,
early retirement, and automatic post-retirement adjustments.
Each of these liberalizations brought with it a price tag,
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the cost of which often was not calculated,
or if calculated, not provided for by setting aside additional
moneys. The consequence of rapidly escalating benefits, even
for systems that tried to adhere to actuarially funded sched-
ules, was excalating unfunded liabilities. In Detroit, a
city that sets aside reserves, sharp increases in wages and
pension benefits left the city with an unfunded liability of
$1.01 billion in fiscal 1975-1976, compared with $275 million
in fiscal 1965-1966.6
Financing Problems
Problems in the finance of public employee retirement
systems became apparent as early as 1915. Plans had grown in
a varied and disorganized way. Benefits were granted without
thought of the ultimate cost. Service requirements usually
ranged from 20 to 25 years, and the retirement age from 50 to
60. Member contributions, where required, were a nominal 1
or 2 percent of salary. Municipalities generally contributed
a larger percent, but there was no systematic effort to fund
plans according to actuarial computations. Consequently, it
was only a matter of time before the reserves they had accum-
ulated were depleted.
Between the years of 1915 and 1920, New York, New
Jersey, Massachusetts, and Illinois set up special legisla-
tive commissions with the objective of "determining the finan-
cial implications of the established benefit schedules and
formulating a sound and constructive policy on this subject."7
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The findings of these commissions served as a guide for the
reorganization of existing plans and the establishment of
newly authorized plans. Their recommendations called for
clearly specified benefit schedules and actuarially deter-
mined employee and employer contributions. For the govern-
mental unit, this meant a switch from earlier patterns of
allocating money from the general fund only at the point
benefit claims became due (the pay-as-you-go method), to mak-
ing regular contributions sufficient to cover pension credits
as they were earned (the actuarially funded method). The
theoretical acceptance of this financial arrangement was a
reflection of the growing acceptance of the cost of pensions
as a part of employee compensation. However, the theory
often differed from the practice as plans either failed to
follow legislative guidelines, or fell behind because of an
inability to keep up with subsequent benefit improvements.
Social Security
Social security has represented an additional demand
on governmental revenues. In 1950 Social Security coverage
was granted on a permissive basis to employees of governmen-
tal units not covered by state and local plans. In 1954 this
coverage was extended to include workers covered by state and
local plans. By 1972 approximately 65 percent of all state
and local government employees were covered by both Social
Security and a staff plan.
Although many systems with dual coverage initially
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adopted a program in which members' normal retirement benefits
were offset in whole or in part by the amount of the Social
Security benefit, this practice, as early as 1965, had faded
into relative disuse. The consequence is that the two sys-
tems have developed in a parallel rather than an integrated
fashion,, with each improving its benefit structure with rela-
tively little attention to improvement in the other. The net
effect is often combined retirement benefits in excess of
after-tax preretirement income, and a combined burden on tax-
payers who must support the employer's share of the public
employee's membership in both systems. Table 1.2, reproduced
from an article by Bernard Jump, shows retirement income in
excess of 100 percent of preretirement disposable income for
Detroit, New York, and Philadelphia, cities with both a staff
plan and social security. Of this, Bernard Jump comments,
Surprisingly, if not inexcusably, most state and
local governments providing both a staff pension plan and
Social Security coverage have not designed their pension
plans so that the maximum total replacement rate is fixed.
As a consequence, it is practically certain that their
employees who retire after a long career of, say, 25 to
30 years, will receive retirement income that produces
replacement rates above 100 percent. Clearly, there is
something very wrong with such a result, particularly
when it is achieved at substantial cost to the taxpayer.
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TABLE 1 . 2 a
AiN"JAL SERVICE RETIR1ENT BEtEFIT (AFTER TAX) AND SOCIAL SECURITY
BENYEFIT (WHERE APPLICABLE) AS A PErCENTAGE OF DISPOSABLE
INCO>E N FINAL YZER OF ?LOYME:C FOR GEaEAL
E'LOYEES WITH 30 YEAS SErVICE ANID
$15000 FINAL YEAR'S SALARY,
SELECTED CITIES,a,b
AtlantaC
Chicagoc
Dallas C
Detroit
Los Angelesc
New York City
Philadelphia
Washington, D.C.c
Eastman Kodak
I14B
New York Telephone
Age 6 2 d
53% (46%)
61 (53%)
64 (57%)
106 (48%)
67 (600)
118 (58%)
118 (59%)
63 (54%)
90 (35%)
84 (28.7%)
88 (32.9%)
Ape 6 5d
5 45 (46%)
62 (53%)
64 (57%)
116 (48%)
68 (60%)
127 (585)
129 (59%)
64 (545)
101 (355)
94 (28.7%)
100 (33.65)
aDisposable income before retirement based on $15000 gross salary
less federal income taxes, pension contributions and sccial security contri-
butions (where applicable). Estimates for Nev York City and Washington
also reflect deductions for state and/or local income taxes.
Both before-and-after-retirement disposable income based on assump-
tion of married couple with no children, joint return, standard deduction,
and extra exemption at age 65.
b
Social Security payments are estimates for employees who work during
1976 and begin collecting benefits in 1977. Payments are inclusive of both
primary and spouse's benefit.
cEmployees are not covered by social security.
dpercentages in ( ) are gross pension benefits divided by $15000.
SOURCE: Plan descriptions for each city's and private firm's pension system.
aReprinted from Bernard Jump, Jr., "Compensating
City Government Employees," National Tax Journal,
vol. 19, p. 246.
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Present Concerns
The financial stress encountered by many state and
local governments in recent years has mobilized officials of
these governments to look more closely at the nature of their
financial commitments. This examination has surfaced concern
over a heretofore little noted budget item, the growing lia-
bilities of state and local governments for payments to pres-
ent and future beneficiaries of public employee retirement
systems. Benefit payments in 1975 were $7.5 billion, more
than double 1970 payments of $3.1 billion. Governmental
contributions to retirement systems totalled $9.1 billion in
1975, almost twice the 1970 levels of $4.6 billion. Since
many cities and states do not adequately finance their retire-
ment systems on a current basis, the latter figure, reflec-
ting governmental contributions rather than the value of ac-
cruing benefits, substantially understates the increase in
real costs.
Escalating pension costs should not be viewed in iso-
lation, but should be viewed within the context of the total
increase in costs facing state and local governments. For
many such governments, the recent escalation in pension costs
coincides with a long-term decline in their commercial and
industrial tax base. Consequently, they face a future of
diminished tax revenues. The lag between the time benefits
are granted and the time they become payable means that the
full cost of benefits granted today may not develop for 30
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years or so in the future., i.e., until all retirees have en-
joyed the new benefit. Therefore, even more important than
current benefit costs is that of future costs and the future
capacity of governments to meet them.
Even where state and local governments subscribed to
a funded method, few, if any such systems are fully funded,
that is, if those systems were to fold today, they would not
be able to meet their obligations to all active and retired
workers or their beneficiaries. Benefits have grown faster
than the ability of most governments to keep pace. Further,
there is the temptation for governments in stress to postpone
scheduled contributions. In 1971 the New York State legis-
lature permitted New York City to defer for two years $80
million in yearly contributions to the New York City Teachers'
Retirement System. In that same year, the Washington State
legislature suspended for two years that state's required con-
tribution to its State Teachers' Retirement System.10
The practice of deferring or making insufficient con-
tributions has led many governments to accumulate substantial
unfunded pension liabilities. In 1971 Philadelphia faced
unfunded liabilities of $911 million, a sum in excess of its
general fund bonded debt. McKeesport, another city in Penn-
sylvania, is so deeply in debt to its pension funds that it
would require the expenditure of the total city budget for
3-1/2 years just to catch up with what it owes its policeraen's
fund. New York City's estimated pension fund liabilities as
of June 1974 were close to $7 billion.1 1
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Some governments have moved to rectify their systems'
underfunding, and where they have, the annual payments are
often staggering. Los Angeles paid $84 million into its
retirement funds in 1972, approximately 40 percent of its
total property tax revenue. Detroit's expenditures for its
police and fire pensions in fiscal year 1975-76 represented
55 percent of those workers' wages. New York City's pension
contribution increased from $793.1 million in 1972 to $1.48
billion in fiscal year 1975-76, an increase of 87 percent in
three years. San Francisco and Oakland, formerly unfunded
systems, are now setting money aside. In 1976 San Francisco
paid 74 cents and Oakland paid 71 cents into its police re-
tirement fund for every dollar paid those workers in salary.1 2
In such situations, pensioner security and city finan-
cial stability hand in a precarious balance. If the condi-
tion is to be rectified, there looms the specter of sharply
increased taxes, decreased services, or both. If underfunding
is not rectified, there looms the troubling prospect of lost
or impaired pension benefits. Until recently, although sev-
eral cities temporarily defaulted on payments to pensioners,
this prospect was of little concern. It was assumed that
cities did not go bankrupt and could always raise taxes to
meet obligations. However, the New York City fiscal crisis
in 1975 and recent tax5ayer rebellions have forced a more
realistic appraisal of this assumption. In the face of im-
pending bankruptcy, New York City had to impose a moratorium
on the repayment of debt to bondholders, and confront the
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reality that tax increases above a certain level were counter-
productive.
Although the 1973 ACIR report on City Financial Emer-
gencies suggests that cities can avoid financial crisis with
careful financial management, some cities, e.g., New York and
Boston, find themselves faced with operating budget deficits
and uncertain access to financial markets. In the event of
bankruptcy, it is uncertain where pensioners stand in the line
of creditors.
The majority of states define pensions as gratuities
and limit pension claims to the fund.13 This means that once
the pension fund is exhausted, pensioners have no priority
lien on governmental revenues other than that assigned them
in the defaulting government's plan of composition. 4 Only
a small minority of states (New York and Massachusetts among
them) define pension obligations as contractual. In such
cases, pensioners, like general obligation debt bondholders,
would have an early claim on governmental revenues; how early,
has been thrown into question by the recently revised Federal
Bankruptcy Act.
The Federal Bankruptcy Act, as amended, and signed
into law on April 8, 1976, allows municipalities to give lower
priority to bondholders without their advance agreement.15
Prior to this act, bondholders held a first lien on govern-
mental revenues. The revised law places a higher priority on
the continuance of necessary duties such as police and fire
protection. Prior to any distribution to creditors, the
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defaulting government must make priority payments in the
following order:
1. the costs and expenses of administration,
2. debts owed for services or materials provided
within three months before the filing date of the
petition of bankruptcy,
3. debts owing to any person, which by laws of the
United States (other than this act) are entitled
to priority.
In New York, the state legislature passed a special
bill that assures current pension payments and provides a
measure of security for future payments. First, the bill de-
fines pension payments, along with police and fire protection,
as an essential city service. (This places payments to pen-
sioners before payments to bondholders.) Second, it guaran-
tees that pension fund assets will not be reachable by New
York City creditors in the event of city default. In the
absence of such specific legislation, which the New York City
Unions were able to negotiate in exchange for making pension
fund loans to the city, it is uncertain that current pension
payments would have been given such early priority status.
Clearly, in states where the pension right is defined as a
gratuity and the governmental liability is limited to the fund,
pensioners have no legal ground on which to compel pension
payments. In 1957, when the City of Lakewood, Ohio, defaulted
on payments to pensioners, the Court of Appeals in Ohio denied
the aggrieved pensioners' request for relief, stating, "The
Council of the City of Lakewood cannot be expected to impov-
erish other city functions to meet pension payments." 16
32
Because the pension benefit right is purely statutory
in the majority of states, and because contract status, even
where it exists, is of questionable enforceability under con-
ditions of financial emergency, the only security for the pen-
sion benefit appears to be that of an adequately financed plan.
Rubin G. Cohn, Professor of Law at the University of Illinois,
sums the situation up in the following statement:
In the last analysis, a vested or contractual right
in public pensions depends upon the financial stability
of the funds. There is little comfort and less sustenance
in a contractual right in a fund which is or may become
insolvent because of inadequate financing. State financed
funds which are determined to be contractual may in fact
create illusory and unenforceable rights under circum-
stances of financial stress. Given typical constitutional
grants of sovereign immunity and the legal impracticabil-
ity of compelling the legislature to make appropriations,
or to grant pensions to qualified annuitants where default
is threatened or has occurred, the contract right may turn
out to be the stuff of which dreams are made. On the
other hand, an adequately financed plan in which the em-
ployees' interests have been determined to be -gratuities
will have the quality of contractual or vested rights.
The critical factor is not the legal label which defines
the rights, but the extent to which the fu V can redeem
the statutory promises when they fall due.
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CHAPTER II
FINANCING METHODS
This chapter provides the background for understanding
the different methods of financing retirement systems and
therefore the analysis of pension underfunding that follows.
Finances for public employee retirement systems come
from three sources: employee contributions, employer contri-
butions, and income from investments. Almost all state and
local retirement plans are contributory, that is, a fixed per-
centage is withdrawn from the salary of members at regular
intervals and credited toward future retirement benefits.1
The balance of the retirement benefit is made up from employer
(government) contributions. Currently, the method by which
governments appropriate money to meet their share of the pen-
sion obligation varies from system to system. Most, however,
follow some form of funding, i.e., setting aside money against
future obligations. Other systems, however, known as pay-as-
you-go systems, appropriate only enough money to cover the
cost of payments to retirees. For this reason, pay-as-you-go
financing, also known as the current disbursement cost method,
might be more appropriately be referred to as pay-as-you-
retire financing.
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Pay-As-You-Go Financing Method
In any retirement system, members earn a portion of
their pension during each year of creditable employment. Thus,
a payroll expense is incurred in the present although benefits
are not disbursed until some point in the future. Pay-as-you-
go arrangements start paying on account of each person's
retirement benefits only after that person has terminated em-
ployment and has ceased rendering his employment services.
Consequently, pay-as-you-go systems must rely on annual appro-
priations from the general expense budget to meet their obli-
gations to retirees.
Typically, the only reserves of such systems are the
funds accumulated from the contributions of participating mem-
bers, with interest. These funds are held in trust and re-
leased only as the contributing employee becomes eligible for
benefits or terminates employment and withdraws his or her
accumulated contributions.
One way to conceptualize the retirement allowance in
this context is to think of it as consisting of two parts, an
annuity derived from the total accumulated contributions of
members, and a pension, derived from the appropriations of
the governmental unit. After accounting for the annuity por-
tion of the retirement allowance from these accumulated an-
nuity reserves, the pension benefit, the remainder of the
retirement allowance, is met by year-to-year appropriations.
Where governmental units hold employee contributions in trust,
the employer contribution is not affected by the current level
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of employee contributions and withdrawals. Rather, the net
employer cost is the gross payout for retirement allowances
less the portion of these allowances derived from the contri-
butions of retirants during their former years of employment.
During the early years under this arrangement, when
few employees are eligible for retirement, it is easy to ac-
cumulate substantial reserves just from member contributions
and earnings on investment. This pattern of asset accumula-
tion during the early years can obscure the absence of con-
tributions on the part of the government and give the illusion
of sounder financing than a closer examination would sub-
stantiate.
Massachusetts and all of the local governments of that
state finance their retirement systems on a pay-as-you-go
basis.2 As of January 1974, the combined assets of all state
and locally administered systems in Massachusetts totalled
$1.552 billion. While this looks positive on the surface, the
present value of that system's obligation to current and pro-
spective retirees is $8.948 billion, $7.396 billion in excess
of accumulated assets. Benefit payments for 1974-75 totalled
$270 million.
One way of looking at the relationship between the
assets of a system and its obligations is to estimate how long
a system would be able to make payments to its retirees if the
system were to be terminated immediately. Under these con-
ditions, the systems of Massachusetts would be able to meet
payments to pensioners for only five and one-half years.
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Some pay-as-you-go systems utilize the contributions
of active employees to make payments to current pensioners.
There are two variations of this general approach. One method
creates a fund from employee contributions, and draws on that
fund to pay retirees. Since contributions to the fund exceed
expenditures for benefit payments and refunds during the early
years, there is a period during which additional governmental
contributions are not required. As the system matures, how-
ever, and the ratio of active to retired employees declines,
contributions from active employees are no longer sufficient
to cover the retired population and governmental contributions
are required to make up the deficit. The difference between
this method and the first method is that the employer's share
is not reduced by earnings on the employee's accumulated
assets.
A separate method, one employed by Washington, D.C.,
does not create a special fund from employee contributions.
Instead, employee contributions go directly into the general
fund which is used to meet daily operating expenses without
recognizing the special purpose of those contributions. An-
nual appropriations are then made from the general fund to
cover annual benefit payments. The net cost to the employer
is found by subtracting employee contributions from the bene-
fit payments made to annuitants during any given year.3
Financing by a pay-as-you-go arrangement inherently
means cost will increase for many years to come. First, to
the extent that the size of the active membership increases,
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each year there will be more new pensioners than there are
deaths among existing pensioners on the rolls. In addition,
new pensioners receive higher levels of pension because their
retirement pay is higher based on higher salaries, which tend
to increase faster than the cost-of-living adjustments for
retired workers. Finally, since improvements in benefits are
implemented prospectively, the full cost of these improvements
may not develop for 20 or 30 years after enactment, that is,
until all retirees have enjoyed the new benefits.
Given the decline in the tax base of many urban areas,
there is no assurance that future generations will be able or
willing to tax themselves for services they never received,
especially when doing so may force them to forego a desired
level of current services. While there is no difference in
cost between pay-as-you-go and funding in present value terms,
there is the problem of intergenerational inequity, and the
possibility that revenues may not be available to meet sharply
rising pension costs without fiscal strain. Clearly the pen-
sion benefit is poorly secured when its only assurance of pay-
ment rests on the government's assumed ability to raise reve-
nues when needed. Funding attempts to eliminate both the
inequities and uncertainities of pay-as-you-go financing by
allocating the cost of benefits to the years in which employee
services give rise to them.
Actuarial Cost Financing Methods
Funding, as referred to with respect to pensions, is
an actuarial concept which attempts to anticipate the cost of
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future pension payments and to allocate those costs to the
years in which employee services give rise to the obligation.
It establishes a regular schedule of employer contributions
that results in the creation of a fund which earns investment
income, thus reducing the ultimate cost to the employers. In
order to estimate the appropriate level of contributions, it
is necessary to make assumptions about the future experience
of the system with respect to mortality, employee turnover,
disability rates, age at retirement, future salary schedules,
and rates of return on investments. Small differences in
assumptions can make a dramatic difference in the estimated
liability and therefore the necessary schedule of payments.
For instance, it has been estimated that a 1 percent
change in either direction in the interest rate assumption
alters the long-run cost estimate by about 20 percent.4 Simi-
larly, if the age at which employees retire is earlier than
anticipated, the period of time over which contributions are
made into the system is shortened and the number of years of
payout after retirement is lengthened.
When the actuarial experience is less favorable than
the underlying assumptions, the system experiences an actuar-
ial loss and additional funds are needed to make up the short-
fall. This will either increase the unfunded liability or
constitute an unanticipated current expenditure for the em-
ployer. Because of the sensitivity of costs to different
assumptions, it is possible for a particular system to appear
well funded under one set of assumptions when under a more
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realistic set of assumptions that system would be recognized
as having a serious deficit.
Funding seeks to achieve two objectives: "(1) to
accumulate assets sufficient to fulfill benefit commitments if
further contributions were to be discontinued, and (2) to level
the required contributions over a prolonged period of years." 5
The two most common actuarial cost methods used to achieve
these objectives are the "Aggregate Cost Method" and the
"Entry Age Normal Cost Method."
The Aggregate Cost Method
The aggregate cost method begins by determining the
excess of the present value of all future benefits over the
value of present plan assets. This excess, the unfunded lia-
bility, is then expressed as a percentage of the present value
of the future payroll of present participants. The employer
contribution is determined by applying this percentage to the
year's payroll. The result is a plan for the amortization of
total liabilities over the working life of employees in the
plan at the time of valuation. The required contribution rate
under the aggregate cost method starts higher than that under
entry age normal. However, after approximately 20 years, once
the liability for past service has been amortized, the con-
tribution rate drops to a level just sufficient to cover nor-
mal costs. The appeal of this method is that it conforms with
the principle that the funds required for pensions should be
accumulated by the time the employee retires.
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The Entry Age Normal Cost Method
The entry age normal cost method spreads the cost of
benefits to be provided an individual as a level percentage
of pay from the date of employment to the assumed date of
retirement. It separates costs into two components: normal
costs and unfunded past service costs (also referred to as
the unfunded accrued liability, the unfunded supplemental
liability, or simply the unfunded liability). The normal or
current cost component can be visualized as that portion of
the cost of the ultimate benefit earned during the current
year. The unfunded past service cost represents the amount
that would have been on hand as of the date of valuation if
contributions sufficient to meet the normal costs of the sys-
tem had been made each year in the past. It specifies the
extent to which existing assets are not sufficient to provide
for benefits that have accrued to date with respect to active
and retired members.
The separation of costs into normal and past service
costs provides a more flexible means of determining the rate
of employer contribution. Some employers assume a minimum
level of funding, that is, in addition to normal costs, they
attempt to keep constant the unfunded liability by assigning
as part of the annual appropriation an amount representing
the interest which the unfunded portion of the accrued liabil-
ity would have earned had it in fact been funded. It is the
opinion of one actuarial firm that "if contributions are made
on such a minimum level funding schedule, they are generally
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sufficient, assuming the plan itself is static (emphasis added)
and in circumstances do not change radically, to continue the
plan in perpetuity."6 Payments on account of the accrued lia-
bility that exceed the interest result in a reduction of the
liability.
The Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
which sets the funding standard for the private sector, requires
the amortization of the unfunded liability over a period of
40 years. Theoretically, at the end of that period, the sys-
tem would be fully funded, that is, the present value of
assets on hand would be equal to the present value of future
benefits.
In reality, this ideal is rarely achieved. In addi-
tion to past service costs, new liabilities can cocur whenever
benefits are improved retrospectively as well as prospectively,
or, as previously stated, when the actual experience differs
from actuarial assumptions. For instance, if benefits are
increased in the form of higher payments at retirement, or if
wages on which benefits are based increase at a faster rate
than anticinated in actuarial assumptions, this will raise
the cost of credits for past as well as future service.
Liabilities can also occur when a system underfunds,
that is, fails to pay full actuarial costs as they accrue.
This type of omission, while most severe in the case of pay-
as-you-go systems, also applies to systems which subscribe to
a funded method but do not conform to the actuarially deter-
mined schedule of payments.
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Short of actuarial studies, there is no way to accu-
rately determine the extent of pension underfunding. And yet,
estimates of the magnitude of the problem are needed in order
to weigh the necessity for federal intervention. We address
this issue in the next chapter by defining methods for esti-
mating pension underfunding.
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Footnotes: Chapter II
2.1 New York and Florida are non-contributory states. The
various New York State pension plans were formerly contri-
butory but in 1966 all state plans were made non-contribu-
tory. Contributions made prior to 1966 are considered as
increasing each employee's pension on retirement. The New
York City Plans are contributory. However, in 1960-61,
the city initiatied the ITHP or "increased take-home pay"
plan. Under it, instead of granting a pay increase, the
city offered to pay 2-1/2 percent of employee's salaries
toward their pensions. In 1965, the city raised this to
4 percent or 5 percent, depending on the union.
Under that arrangement, some city employees whose cer-
tified contribution rate fell below the city's contribu-
tion, paid nothing at all toward their pensions. Others
chose the option of paying the full certified rate, so
that the city's share was added on top of it. This plan
was enacted on a year-by-year basis and called for new
legislation each year. (The New York Times, Sunday,
16 November 1975). Under revised legislation in 1975,
the city's contribution was cut in half; a further revi-
sion recommended in April 1976 would cancel the city's
ITHP contribution. (The New York Times, 14 April 1976).
Employees in the Florida State Retirement System con-
tributed 4 percent of salary until 1975. Beginning in
1975, the system was made non-contributory for 95 percent
of the membership. (U.S. Congress, House, Committee on
Education and Welfare, The Public Service Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1975, Statement of
Yvonne Burkholz, Hearings before the subcommittee on Labor
Standards. 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1976, p. 150.)
2.2 Delaware and Connecticut, formerly pay-as-you-go states,
changed to a legislated policy of funding in 1970 and
1971, respectively.
2.3 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Retirement Financing:
What are the Future Cost Implications of Financing Alter-
natives for Police and Fire Retirement Systems? Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 1972.
2.4 Patrick J. Davey, "Trends in Pension Fund Administration,"
The Conference Board, Inc., Information Bulletin no. 1,
April 1975.
2.5 Martin E. Segal Company, Inc., Report to Massachusetts
Retirement Law Commission on Actuarial Valuations of all
Systems Under Contributory Retirement Law, Boston:
November 1971, p. 16.
2.6 Ibid., p. 24.
CHAPTER III
CRITERIA FOR ESTIMATING PENSION UNDERFUNDING
In this chapter we establish criteria for identifying
underfunded state and locallyr administered retirement systems,
and use these criteria to make a critical evaluation of methods
used in previous studies. We then describe the methodology
to be used in this study and provide the rationale for that
choice.
Criteria
Pervasive Underfunding
An important factor in the consideration for federal
regulation of state and locally administered retirement sys-
tems is the pervasiveness of pension underfunding. If, for
instance, underfunding is limited to the local systems of
older urban areas, then a solution can be found that addresses
the particular needs of these areas without resorting to
national legislation that will limit the financing choices
of all state and local governments. If, on the other hand,
there is systematic underfunding that cuts across state and
local levels of government and all areas of the country, a
federal plan to rectify the situation may be the only solution.
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Substantial Underfunding
A second factor in the consideration for federal
regulation is the degree of pension underfunding. Bernard
Jump, Jr. warns:
One of the most troublesome barriers to understanding
government pension obligations and one that is, at times,
the cause of needless alarm among public officials, tax-
payers, and members of the financial community involves
unfunded accrued liabilities (i.e., liabilities for which
there are as yet no assets). As a practical matter, most
pension plans will have some unfunded accrued liabilities
at various points in their evolution. And as such, the
existence of these liabilities does nog indicate fiscal
irresponsibility or impending trouble.
This suggests the need for a measure which flags systems that
are substantially underfunded, i.e., systems in current danger
of being unable to meet their obligation to pensioners.
Underfunding Unaccompanied by Evidence of Regular
Contributions Made in Accordance
With Realistic Cost Estimates
A third factor to be considered in evaluating the need
for federal regulation is alluded to in the April 1976 report
on the finances of New York City retirement systems. In that
report, the Mayor's Management Advisory Board wrote:
The existence of an unfunded accrued liability does
not necessarily mean the plan is underfunded. The method
of funding. . . the entry age normal cost method with
40 year funding of the supplemental liability . . . means
by its very nature . . . that during this 40 year period
of amortization the plan will show an unfunded accrued
liability. Accordingly, if contributions are made in
accordance with cost estimates based on realistic assump-
tions, there is in fact no underfunding for a continuing
plan.4 (Emphasis added.)
This means that documentation of underfunding must take into
consideration not only the existence of unfunded liabilities,
48
but evidence that contributions are not being made on a regu-
lar basis in accordance with realistic cost estimates.
Without the benefit of actuarial valuations, there is
no way to establish accurately the pervasiveness or degree of
pension underfunding in our state and locally administered
retirement systems. Therefore, estimates must be made on the
basis of publicly available data. Every five years, the
Bureau of the Census provides data on the membership, receipts,
benefit payments, beneficiaries, and financial assets of pub-
lic employee retirement systems. Statistics are shown on a
state-by-state basis for state and locally administered retire-
ment systems, aggregated separately.3 From these data, approx-
imations can be made of the relative funded status of state
and locally administered retirement systems.
Literature Review
In this section, we first describe the methodology used
to estimate retirement system underfunding in three studies,
and then analyze the degree to which these studies provide
data that meet our criteria for the documentation of retirement
system underfunding sufficient to merit federal intervention.
Description of Studies
A 1973 study conducted by the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations utilized census data to examine
the pension finances of 27 major United States cities.4 They
employed two measures to detect those with potential problems
stemming from pension underfunding: (1) the ratio of payments
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to receipts 10 or more points above the national average,
and (2) the ratio of payments to total fund assets 10 or more
points above the national average. The first ratio, payments
to receipts, measures cash outflows for benefits and with-
drawals relative to cash inflows from employee and employer
contributions and earnings on investments. The higher this
ratio, the fewer funds available for the accumulation of assets
to pay future benefits. The second ratio, payments to assets,
is a measure of a system's capacity to meet future benefit
payments. Of the 27 cities examined, 10 had ratios of pay-
ments to receipts or payments to assets which exceeded at
least one of the national averages by more than 10 percentage
points (See Table 3.1).
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TABLE 3.1
MUNICIPAL RETIREMENT FUNDING, LOCALLY ADMINISTERED
SYSTEMS, 30 SELECTED LARGE CITIES, 1970-71
($ millions)
Receipts
Benefits &
Withdrawal
Payments
Payments
As a % of
Receipts
Payments
As a % of
Assets Assets
National Total
New York
Chicago
Los Angeles
Philadelphia
Detroit
Houston
Baltimore
Dallas
Cleveland
Indianapolis
Milwaukee
San Francisco
San Diego
San Antonio
Boston
Memphis
St. Louis
New Orleans
Phoenix
Columbus
Seattle
Jacksonville
Pittsburgh
Denver
Kansas City
Atlanta
Buffalo
Cincinnati
Nashville
Minneapolis
$2,361.0
975.3
98.7
164.4
67.5
88.1
13.7
33.2
20.0
4.9
21.1
84.6
13.0
2.4
37.0
17.2
16.2
9.7
4.3
17.3
6.6
8.0
8.3
7.8
14.1
13.4
8.1
20.2
$1,166.0
463.2
52.0
71.8
44.8
42.3
3.6
16.7
4.6
No
5.0
5.6
34.6
4.9
.8
27.5
6.6
5.9
7.3
.7
No
10.4
5.6
7.6
4.6
1.8
8.4
4.7
5.4
11.2
49.4% $12,469.0
47.5
52.7
43.7
66.4
48.0
26.3
50.3
23.0
Local System
102.0
26.5
40.9
37.7
33.3
74.3
38.4
36.4
75.3
16.3
Local System
60.1
84.8
95.0
55.4
23.1
59.6
Not Available
35.1
66.6
55.4
5,940.8
616.7
737.8
135.3
457.5
63.6
290.8
100.7
9.3%
7.8
8.4
9.7
33.1
9.2
5.7
5.7
4.6
.2 +100.0
172.1
474.8
63.3
9.7
162.0
107.3
99.7
22.9
26.2
105.6
18.8
1. 5
24.5
36.0
3.2
7.3
7.7
17.0
6.1
5.9
31.9
2.7
9.8
29.8
+100.0
18.8
5.0
28.3 29.7
109.6
20.9
90.6
4.3
25.8
12.4
SOURCE: ACIR Table compiled from U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, Finances of Employee-Retirement Systems of
State and Local Governments in 1970-71.
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In a second studo,, researcher John Petersen applied
the same measures (payments to receipts and payments to assets) to
state and local government aggregates to develop "a broad gauge of
the margins upon which systems operate and estimate the magnitude
of change that would be required were they to move to fuller funding
and higher contribution levels." 5 Analyzing the distribution of
systems with payment to receipt ratios above the national average
in 1972, Petersen demonstrates that local systems tend to have a high-
er payment to receipt ratio indicating that a larger share of receipts
are flowing directly into payments as opposed to building reserves.
TABLE 3.2
PAYMENT AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL RECEIPTS FOR
STATE AND LOCAL ADMINISTERED RETIREMENT
SYSTEMS (STATE AVERAGES, 1972)
State Administered Local Administered
Number of Receipts Number of Receipts
Percentage States (billions) States (billions)
Under 19.9 2 $ .1 3 $ *
20 -- 34.9 26 5.3 9 .5
35 -- 49.9 15 3.4 12 1.3
50 -- 64.9 4 .4 11 1.2
65 -- 79.9 2 .1 8 .2
80 over 1 * 6 .1
Total 50 $9.3 49 $3.3
Item
National Average 35.3% 49.2%
SOURCE: John Petersen Table compiled from U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of tie. Census, 1972 Census of Governments,
"Employment-Retirement Systems of State and Local Governments."
*Less than $50 million
lNevada and Hawaii have no local systems. District of Columbia
is included in local units.
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Using the same method with the ratio of payments to assets
(a measure of the system's capacity to meet future benefit pay-
ments), Petersen finds that local retirement systems tend to work
on thinner margins, with the averages in several states clearly
indicating pay-as-you-go financing. He notes that the average
payments to receipts in private systems is 5.0, well below the
6.4 and 9.3 for state and locally administered systems, respectively.
TABLE 3.3
PAYMENTS AS A PERCENT OF ASSETS FOR STATE
AND LOCAL ADMINISTERED RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
(STATE AVERAGES, 1972)
State Administered Local Administered
Number of Assets Number of Assets
Percentages States (billions) States (billions)
Under 5 12 $ 6.9 4 $ .2
5 to 7.5 22 35.4 12 1.4
7.5 to 9.9 8 6.9 8 13.7
10 to 19.9 7 2.0 13 1.8
20 to 49.9 - - 6 .6
50 plus 1 * 6 *
Total 50 $51.2 49 $17.6
Item
National Average 6.4% 9.3%
SOURCE: John Petersen Table compiled from U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1972 Census of Governments,
"Employment-Retirement Systems of State and Local Governments."
*Less than $50 million
J. Richard Aronson, in a third study, develops a model of
pension fund financing that estimates a range of future retirement
system costs, given alternative assumptions regarding age at retire-
ment, interest rates, and the number of years of payroll growth.6
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Using 1972 Census Bureau data on cash and security
holdings, Aronson derives the annual payments needed to amortize
the unfunded balance for all state and locally administered retire-
ment systems in the aggregate by the year 2000, that is, over a
period of 27 years. Using the same methodology, Aronson also makes
state-by-state calculations of the difference between actual con-
tributions in 1972 and the level needed to amortize the estimated
unfunded liability by year 2000. (Table 3.4)
TABLE 3.4
ANNUAL PAYMENT TO RETIREMENT SYSTEM TRUST FUNDS 54
($ millions)
1972 1972
Actual Contribution
State Contribution Deficita
(1) (2)
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Uichigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
46.5
24.3
50.4
23.2
636.4
73.2
57.7
.5
116.0
66.2
32.2
15.5
246.6
32.7
31.7
32.5
34.6
41.6
2.1
85.0
58.6
298.9
49.8
24.1
68.4
11.3
12.8
18.6
7.1
128.4
17.4
569.3
122.5
7.8
312.9
19.7
49.3
196. 4
11.3
47.1
2.8
46.9
171.3
19.3
4.6
58.1
54.1
9.0
122.2
8.1
14.0
(5.0)
(4.1)
6.8
(328.5)
(25.7)
14.6
25.0
49.6
20.3
(22.8)
3.4
8.8
114.1
37.7
34.7
20.2
(.2)
16.9
(5.0)
108.2
(89.2)
(3.2)
19.8
28.2
6.2
38.0
(3.4)
5.2
(12.9)
8.3
(566.1)
(45.9)
11.2
(297.4)
43.3
11.0
(53.8)
7.0
(14.7)
20.9
36.2
40.7
9.3
5.2
52.1
23.0
26.5
(73.5)
3.9
1972
Contribution
Deficitb
(3)
357.7
86.1
279.6
165.4
3,417.7
310.0
422.8
105.3
948.6
536.2
125.2
85.4
1,614.1
699.5
392.6
313.1
334.9
439.8
123.3
589.2
927.2
1,320.4
569.3
220.9
560.7
102.1
230.5
88.9
82.7
994.7
151.0
3,189.5
545.2
84.9
938.9
316.4
330.8
1,306.5
124.2
246.3
103.8
467.6
1,301.6
146.2
62.6
595.8
578.9
210.9
559.1
59.2
SOURCE: J. Richard Aronson, "Projections of State and
Local Trust Fund Financing," in David J. Ott et al., State-
Local Finances in the Last Half of the 1970s, (Nashington:
American Enterprise Institute tor Public Policy Research,
1973) p. 82.
aLiberal assumptions. Parentheses indicate overpayments
bConservative assumptions
(3)
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Column (1) represents actual contributions in 1972.
Column (2) presents deviations from the required payments
based on the low estimate (retirement at age 65, a 6 percent
interest rate, and a 10-year period of growth in covered
payroll). The numbers in parenthesis represent the amount
of overpayment. All other figures indicate the amount of
underpayment. Column (3) presents deviations according to
the high estimate (retirement at age 60, an interest rate
of 4 percent, and a 15-year period of payroll growth).
Under the latter assumptions, all states are undercontri-
buting by a significant amount.
Study Findings and Critical Analysis Based on Criteria
Pervasive Underfunding
ACIR based their determination of underfunding on
a ratio of payments to receipts or assets 10 or more points
above the national average. In their analysis the retire-
ment systems of 10 of 27 major American cities (37 percent)
were underfunded.
The Petersen study based underfunding on ratios of
payments to receipts or payments to assets above the national
average. These measures, by definition place approximately
50 percent of both state and locally administered systems
in the underfunded category.
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Aronson combines the finances of state and locally
administered retirement systems, and computes underfunding
by state. Based on the gap between the net present value
of contributions required to achieve full funding by year
2000, and actual contributions in 1972, Aronson found the
systems in 33 out of 50 states underfunded by his most
liberal measure, and the systems of all states underfunded
by his most conservative measure.
These studies, specifying underfunding in slightly
more than a third to 100 percent of the systems examined,
indicate that underfunding is pervasive. However, they
have limitations in terms of their usefullness as a basis
for determining public policy. ACIR limits its examination
to 27 selected large cities. Thus, the findings could be
interpreted as peculiar to major urban areas and not suffi-
ciently representative to draw general conclusions. The
Petersen study deals with retirement system aggregates speci-
fied separately by level of administration. He does not
name states and therefore, it is not possible to make a
connection between underfunding and other attributes such
as size or geographic distribution. Aronson identifies
underfunding by state, and those so identified are distri-
buted throughout various regions of the country. However,
because his data is aggregated by state, he loses dif-
ferences in funding status that may exist between state and
local levels.
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Substantial Underfunding
Petersen and Aronson both give dollar estimates of
underfunding. By Petersen's estimates, the deficit in 1972
contributions was in excess of $1 billion. By Aronson's
estimates, given a goal of full funding by year 2000, 1972
contributions ranged from an excess of $632 million to a
deficit of $28.0 billion depending on assumptions re: in-
terest rate, years of payroll growth, and age at retirement.
(Aronson assumes only one plan covering all state and local
employees, and employee pension benefits equal to average
salary.) Estimated underfunding in accumulated assets was
$15 billion in Petersen's study, and from $229 billion to
in excess of $1 trillion in Aronson's study, depending on
assumptions.
Aronson warns that his estimates should be viewed
with extreme caution. Neither study attempted to achieve
accuracy. The objective of both was to provide broad gauge
estimates of the potential burden jurisdictions would face
were they to move to fuller funding. While this objective
was satisfied, the studies have several limitations in terms
of there usefulness as a base for the development of national
policy.
First, Petersen does not identify underfunding for
specific state or locally administered systems. Thus, there
is the absence of detail on which to draw anything other than
the most general conclusions. Aronson identifies underfunding
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by state but does not separate the finances of state adminis-
tered systems from those of locally administered systems, an
exercise which would give us a clearer definition of the
problem.
A second criticism of both works is that the magnitude
of underfunding is not given meaning. There is no indication
of whether current levels of underfunding are critical. Large
debts are always dramatic, but are only significant if they
cannot be repaid. Thus, the figures generated by Petersen and
Aronson would have greater meaning if placed in the context of
the jurisdiction's capacity to meet those debts. A further
limitation of the ACIR and Petersen studies is their use of
measures based on comparisons with the national average. While
the national average for the ratio of payments to receipts has
remained relatively stable over the years, the ratio of pay-
ments to assets has climbed steadily since 1966-67 and can be
expected to continue to do so as beneficiary rolls increase.
The average is not a definitive standard, and it is conceivable
that the time may come when even the average level of payments
to assets will be above a level that is acceptable in terms of
persioner security. Therefore, the use of ratios would be more
meaningful if accompanied by a definitive measure of underfunding,
one above or below which it could be said that pensioner security
is positively endangered.
Underfunding Absent a Plan of Regular
Contributions Made in Accordance With
Realistic Cost Estimates
This factor was not addressed by the ACIR, Petersen,
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or Aronson studies, and would not be satisfied by a compila-
tion of current actuarial assessments. Such assessments pro-
vide data on a pension plan's funded ratio, i.e., the ratio of
a pension plan's assets to its accrued liabilities. They do
not reveal whether the trend in that ratio is increasing or
decreasing. In order to substantiate adherence to a plan of
regular contributions made in accordance with realistic cost
estimates, it is necessary to follow systems over a period of
time. A history of increasing ratios would provide evidence
that contributions are probably being made in accordance with
realistic cost estimates. A history of decreasing ratios would
indicate the opposite. Plans with similar funded ratios at
a particular point in time may actually be moving in different
directions in terms of future fund viability.
Methodology for This Study
For our study of pension underfunding, we use Census Bu-
reau financial and membership data on state-by-state aggregates
specified separately for all state administered and all locally
administered systems. We use time series in order to identify
funding patterns, make generalizations about the relation-
ship between past governmental contributions and current fund
viability, and avoid the error of drawing conclusions about
funding practices based on a single year's ratios. The four
time periods covered are 1957, 1962, 1967, and 1972. Theee
include the first and last periods for which such Census
Bureau quinquennial data are available.
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In the text that follows, we make general statements
about the funded status of state and locally administered
systems. We recognize that this obscures differences be-
tween systems administered by the state, and between systems
administered by separate units of local government. We
also recognize that it obscures differences in the funded
status of systems covering different categories of workers
within a single jurisdiction.
A recent study by Robert M. Fogelson of the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology suggests that the public em-
ployee pension problem is basically a firemen's and policemen's
pension problem.7 In cities he has studied, these systems,
because of low retirement ages and liberal benefit structures,
carry unfunded liabilities that are close to three and four
times that of general employee retirement systems.
These differences are important, from the pensioners'
perspective, particularly where the authorizing statute
limits the state or city liability to the pension fund. In
such cases, the pensions of police and firemen are far less
secure than those of general employees. Where the ultimate
liability for pensions extends to the tax resources of the
responsible government, however, police and fire pensioners
would be protected despite fund limitations.
While we recognize the importance of a fine delinea-
tion of the problem, which -an analysis of underfunding by
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category of worker would give, this is not possible with
Census Bureau data. We do separate the finances of state
and locally administered systems, and to the extent that
policy formulation is based on the rule rather than the
exception, the loss of detail with respect to individual
plans may not seriously undermine the significance of the
findings.
We do not attempt to place a dollar figure on the
magnitude of pension underfunding. Rather, we choose a
method that identifies state and locally administered sys-
tems that are "substantially" underfunded.
Our first task is to select a measure of funding
that is appropriate for use with our data and, using this
measure, to identify a "number" that represents a minimal
acceptable level of funding, one below which there could
be relatively full agreement that the reserves of the
system are insufficient to provide minimal pensioner
security.
Our second task is to apply that measure to state and
local government aggregates, specified separately, to develop
a broad gauge estimate of the degree and pervasiveness of pen-
sion underfunding. Our third task is to examine the pattern
of governmental contributions to determine whether systems
identified as underfunded are also absent a plan of regular
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contributions made in accordance with realistic cost estimates,
and to identify systems which though not now underfunded will
become so in the future given current financing patterns.
A Measure of Minimal Funding
One measure frequently used to describe the level of
funding is the "funded radio," i.e., the ratio of a pension
plan's assets to its accrued liabilities. 8 There are two limi-
tations to this approach from our prespective: (1) it requires
the use of actuarial data which is not available, and (2) even
if such data were available, differences in actuarial assump-
tions could distort comparisons between systems.
A second measure of pension plan funding, "claimant
coverage,"describes the extent to which assets on hand cover
the accrued liaibility distributed into four major categories
according to nearness to retirement age.9 A system that is
fully funded is one which, if terminated immediately, would
have sufficient assets on hand to cover its obligations to all
claimants, i.e., current retirees and other beneficiaries,
eligible but not yet retired members, active and former mem-
bers with vested rights to benefits, and active employees with
accrued but not yet vested rights.
The division of claimants into separate categories is
appealing because it allows us to think of funding in terms of
assets available for identifiable claimant groups. Again,
however, the need for data from actuarial valuations arises.
In the absence of an actuarial valuation, it is not possible
to specify a system's liability for eligible but not yet
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retired members, active and former members with vested rights,
or active employees with accrued but not yet vested rights.
However, there are two conditions under which it is possible to
approximate the claim on assets for the group of current
retirees and other beneficiaries. One such condition is that
of the fully mature system. The other is that of plan
termination.
A fully mature system is one in which the number of
active and fully retired members has reached a maximum and has
stabilized. Each year the number of new members entering the
system is equal to the number retiring, and the number retiring
is equal to the number dying. Under these conditions, assuming
no change in life expectancy, the ratio of active to retired
employees would remain constant. If, in addition, we assume
no change in the rate of contributions, or level of benefits,
then the ratio of assets to benefit payments would also remain
constant. Robert Tilove, senior vice-president of the Martin
E. Segal actuarial firm, states that under conditions of full
maturity with retirements at age 62-65, "assets equal to about
8 or 8.5 times benefit payments would generally be sufficient
to match the liability for pensions."1 0
One advantage of this measure, assets to benefit pay-
ments equal to or greater than 8 or 8.5, is that the necessary
data is available from Census Bureau reports. A second ad-
vantage, since the ratio provides only for those already
retired, is that it meets our objective of the identification
of a "number" that represents a minimal acceptable level of
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funding, one below which we think there could be relatively
full agreement that the reserves of the system are insuf-
ficient to provide minimal pensioner security. A disadvantage
of this measure is that it is sufficient only for the special
case of the fully mature system.
There is one condition, however, under which a measure
of adequacy for a fully mature system would apply--that of
plan termination. If immediate plan termination were assumed,
any further increases in the number of annuitants would be
limited by definition and, depending on the assumed age at
retirement, the corresponding ratio of assets to benefits
would be sufficient to meet the system's obligation to all
retired persons. That is, the fund derived from drawing down
the fund's assets along with interest on the declining assets,
would be sufficient to cover the plan's liability to retirees
on roll at the time of plan termination.
A follow-up effort to determine the base from which
Tilove derived the 8 or 8.5 ratio reveals that the 1971 Group
Annuity Mortality Tables identifies an 8.5 ratio of assets
to benefit payments as the approximate present value of bene-
fits, for existing retired employees given a retirement age of
68 (not 62-65), and an assumed 6 percent interest rate on
invested assets. The same table indicates that a ratio of
assets to benefits equal to 9.3 is the present value of bene-
fits given a retirement age of 65; 10.6, given a retirement
age of 60; and ll.8,given a retirement age of 55. Given the
actuarial derivation of these ratios, they serve as
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appropriate measures to differentiate systems that have ade-
quate assets to cover already retired employees from those that
do not.
For the purpose of this study, a system with minimally
adequate funding is defined as one which, if terminated imme-
diately, would have on hand sufficient reserves to meet the
claims of all actively retired persons and other beneficiaries.
Under this assumption, all systems with a ratio of assets to
benefits equal to or greater than a given actuarial factor
(that is, the factor which specifies the ratio of assets to
benefit payments necessary to protect retired employees) are
classified as "adequately funded," and all systems with a ratio
of assets to benefit payments below a given actuarial factor,
are classified as "underfunded." As an example, assets equal
to 10.6 times benefits is the approximate present value of
future benefits for existing retired employees for systems
with retirement at age 60. This actuarial factor assumes a 6
percent return on fund assets; no cost-of-living increases;
and a first call on pension fund assets by retired employees.
First a word about our assumptions. With respect to
retirement age, the distribution of workers by eligibility to
receive normal benefits may differ by level of government
and/or category of worker. The most common normal retirement
age in order of frequency, regardless of level of government
or category of worker, is 60. The second most common age is
65, and the third is 55.11
To accommodate for the variation in normal retirement
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ages in our evaluation of funded and underfunded retirement
systems, we will provide three measures of fund adequacy given
different assumptions regarding age at retirement. The mea- -
sures that we will use are those associated with ages 65, 60,
and 55.
We assume a 6 percent interest rate on invested fund
assets. This is in keeping with the rate being assumed by many
plan valuations today. 1 2
With respect to a claim on pension fund assets in the
event of plan termination, most statutes where the liability
to claimant groups is spelled out, provide first for the return
of member contributions (both active and retired) and then for
the distribution of plan assets to retired employees.1 3 Bee-
cause this appears to be the norm, a ratio of assets to benefit
payments just equal to the specified actuarial factor is a
more minimal measure of asset adequacy than it initially appears.
This measure, despite its limitations, places underfunding in
a framework by allowing us to positively identify systems that
would not be able to meet their obligations to an identified
group of claimants under conditions of plan termination. How-
ever, there is a caveat. Twelve states make benefit payments
a general obligation of the government, and five additional
states are similarly obligated because of the contract status
accorded pension benefits. 1 4  However, under conditions of
bankruptcy, pensioners, like general obligation bondholders,
must wait until at least three other categories of governmental
obligations are met (see page 32) before being considered for
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payment under a plan of composition. These prior liens pose
uncertainties for the continuance of benefit payments under
conditions of a financial emergency. As such, it is not
unreasonable to include these states along with others in our
exploration of underfunding based on an absence of sufficient
moneys in the trust fund to protect retired employees.
Our next task is to determine whether systems iden-
tified as underfunded are also absent a plan of regular con-
tributions made in accordance with realistic cost estimates,
and to identify systems which though not now underfunded are
in danger of becoming so given established financing patterns.
To do this, we analyze the ratio of government contri-
butions to benefit payments over the 15-year period from 1957
to 1972. Where the ratio of government contributions to bene-
fit payments is equal to one, only employee contributions are
being set aside to earn interest and lower the cost to govern-
ment of future benefit payments. Where the ratio of govern-
ment contributions to benefit payments is less than one, a
share of current benefit costs is being met through employee
contributions. It is only when the government share is greater
than one that a portion of employer contributions, in addition
to employee contributions, can be set aside for future benefit
pavments. In our analysis, we average the ratio of government
contributions to benefit payments over the 15-year period.
We identify plans operating on a pay-as-you-go basis as those
where average governmental contributions as a percent of bene-
fit payments are less than or equal to one. Clearly, the
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governmental employer in such systems is not making contri-
butions in accordance with realistic cost estimates.
In summary, underfunding will be considered substantial
whenever the ratio of assets to benefits for a given retirement
age falls below the actuarial factor specified in the 1971
Group Annuity Mortality Tables as necessary to protect retired
employee benefits under conditions of plan termination. Per-
vasiveness is more difficult to define, for such a definition
embodies value judgments with respect to how much underfunding
is tolerable. From this researcher's perspective, substantial
underfunding in one out of every three retirement systems is
intolerable and indicative of a problem that must be attended.
Therefore, underfunding will be considered pervasive at either
the state or local level when one-third of the systems at that
level are found to be underfunded by the measure described
above. Systems will be considered absent a plan of regular
contributions made in accordance with realistic cost estimates
when the average ratio of government contributions to benefit
payments is less than or equal to one.
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wide.
3.13 See Chapter V of this study, section entitled "Enforcement
of Governmental Contributions."
3.14 See Chapter V of this study, section entitled "Resources
Securing Benefits."
CHAPTER IV
ESTIMATES OF PENSION UNDERFUNDING
In the data analysis that follows, our objective is
to determine whether there is evidence of underfunding suf-
ficient to substantiate the need for federal intervention.
In order to establish whether a need for a federal presence
eixsts, we must demonstrate that underfunding is substantial,
pervasive, and absent a plan of systematic contributions made
in accordance with realistic cost estimates. Underfunding
will be considered substantial whenever the ratio of assets
to benefits for a given retirement age falls below the actu-
arial factor specified as necessary to protect retired employ-
ees under conditions of plan termination, for, by definition,
ratios below this level are insufficient to provide minimal
pensioner security.
Underfunding will be considered pervasive at either
the state or local level of administration if one-third of the
systems at that level are found to be underfunded by the mea-
sure described. Underfunded systems will be considered absent
a plan of systematic contributions made in accordance with
realistic cost estimates when the average ratio of government
contributions to benefit payments over the four time periods
under examination (1957, 1962, 1967, 1972) is less than or
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equal to one.
Since systems exhibiting increasing government contri-
bution ratios and systems exhibiting decreasing government
contribution ratios can present similar average ratios, we
will also examine these ratios on a period-by-period basis to
determine increasing and decreasing trends in governmental con-
tributions. We will analyze the financial data from state and
locally administered plans separately, and then compare
findings.
Locally Administered Retirement Systems
When systems are new, few persons are eligible to draw
benefits. Therefore, the number of persons who are active and
contributing to the fund is high relative to the number re-
tired and drawing benefits. As a result, a high percentage
of receipts goes toward the accumulation of assets. As the
system continues, and the number of retired workers increases,
the inflow of funds from contributions declines relative to the
outflow of funds for benefit payments. The asset build-up
slows, and the ratio of assets to benefit payments, our measure
of the system's fund viability, falls.
Table 4.1 lists the ratio of assets to benefit payments
for all locally administered retirement systems in the United
States for 1957, 1962, 1967, and 1972. The general pattern of
increasing and then decreasing ratios of assets to benefit pay-
ments can be noted from the overall United States average.
However, when individual systems are followed on a state-by-
state basis, variation can be noted. The systems of some
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states are still in the asset building stage, while others
have peaked and are declining. This pattern of decline can
be altered when a system decides to correct for underfunding.
Utah is noticeable in this respect. After showing very low
ratios during the first three periods, Utah apparently
adopted a policy of fuller funding, with the consequence that
their ratio of assets to benefit payments jumped from 2.5
in 1967 to 31.2 in 1972.
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TABLE 4.1
RATIO OF ASSETS TO BENEFIT PAYMENTS
LOCALLY ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS,
1957-1972
Ratio of Assets to Benefits
State 1957 1962 1967 1972
United States 13.003 13.785 14.105 12.330
Alabama 8.700 12.638 16.190 16.866
Alaska ** ** 86.000 43.188
Arizona 20.594 32.741 44.717 44.257
Arkansas 4.659 5.948 6.388 6.682
California 20.523 19.162 18.475 16.824
Colorado 9.004 11.731 15.024 15.624
Connecticut 5.279 7.161 7.243 8.203
Delaware 3.225 3.148 1.051 0.861
District of Columbia 3.675 3.025 2.635 1.393
Florida 11.640 14.637 16.580 14.752
Georgia 3.351 3.919 4.911 7.007
Hawaii ** ** ** **
Idaho 8.051 7.361 9.408 9.084
Illinois 9.018 10.710 10.451 11.126
Indiana 0.457 0.516 0.447 0.223
Iowa 13.221 19.665 20.399 18.145
Kansas 5.963 7.100 7.701 8.743
Kentucky 4.923 8.187 10.186 9.872
Louisiana 9.698 10.099 10.617 4.633
Maine 1.143 0.500 0.437 0.817
Maryland 19.947 20.933 18.344 15.219
Massachusetts 9.749 8.758 8.280 6.805
Michigan 10.563 14.117 12.530 13.861
Minnesota 7.349 7.029 7.387 8.763
Mississippi 2.038 1.938 1.405 1.799
Missouri 17.586 16.878 17.958 20.649
Montana 5.647 3.919 3.736 4.272
Nebraska 8.826 11.108 17.052 21.747
Nevada ** ** ** **
New Hampshire 2.800 2.517 4.273 6.051
New Jersey 0.915 0.866 0.549 0.775
New Mexico ** 16.581 15.596 14.500
New York 17.513 17.326 17.661 13.545
North Carolina 12.827 14.393 12.234 14.102
North Dakota 13.472 16.649 20.845 23.683
Ohio 6.068 6.943 23.698 29.216
Oklahoma 10.743 10.407 10.719 9.522
Oregon 5.543 5.145 4.424 4.183
Pennsylvania 4.667 5.965 5.735 6.161
Rhode Island 17.748 19.094 16.943 10.496
South Carolina 6.637 15.021 16.703 20.930
South Dakota 9.890 11.976 14.118 15.462
Tennessee 7.082 9.473 9.792 10.127
Texas 15.410 19.229 20.351 22.505
Utah 3.468 2.248 2.503 22.505
Vermont 2.317 8.470 15.884 17.654
Virginia 21.544 25.999 30.858 24.593
Washington 12.485 13.572 15.073 10.253
West Virginia 3.562 3.712 4.064 3.880
Wisconsin 14.489 17.640 19.092 18.298
Wyoming 7.862 6.018 3.784 4.725
SOURCE: U.S. Deparment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Employer-
Retirement Systems of State and Local Governments, vol. 4, no. 1(195);
vol. 6, no. 1 (1962); vol. 6, no. 1 (1967); vol. 6, no. 1 (1972),
**Denotes no local system
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In Table 4.2 we identify underfunded systems in 1972
using actuarial factors associated with retirement at age 65,
60, and 55. Column 1 lists all systems classified as under-
funded given an assumed retirement age of 65. Column 2 notes
the underfunded systems that would be added given an assumed
retirement age of 60; and column 3 notes those that would be
added given an assumed retirement age of 55.
The locally administered retirement systems of 20 states
were underfunded in 1972 by our most generous measure, that
associated with retirement at age 65 (a ratio of assets to bene-
fits equal to or less than 9.3). When the assumed retirement
age is lowered to 60, 5 additional states are added, and when the
retirement age is lowered to 55, one additional state is added.
The percentage of states with underfunded locally admin-
istered retirement systems ranges from 41 percent, given an as-
sumed retirement age of 65, to 53 percent, given an assumed re-
tirement age of 55. The most common retirement age for
locally administered systems is 60. Under measures associ-
ated with retirement at age 60, 51 percent of the states
have locally administered retirement systems with insuf-
ficient assets to see current pensioners through retirement.
Delaware, Indiana, Maine, and New Jersey would not be able to
meet their obligation to pensioners for even one year. The
District of Columbia and Mississippi would be able to do only
a little better. The critical point is that these systems have
too few reserves to assure payments to pensioners in the event
of a financial emergency.
TABLE 4.2
UNDERFUNDED LOCALLY ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS :N~1972
BASED ON THE RATIO OF ASSETS TO BENEFIT
PAYMENTS GIVEN DIFFERENT RETIREMENT AGES
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Age 65 Age 60 Age 55
Actuarial Assets/benefits Assets/benefits Assets/benefits
Factor 49.3 S10.6 -1l.8
(1) (2) (3)
Arkansas 6.682
Connecticut 8.203
Delaware 0.861
Dist. of Col. 1.393
Georgia 7.007
Idaho 9.084
Illinois 11.126
Indiana 0.223
Kansas 8.743
Kentucky 9.872
Louisiana 4.633
Maine 0.817
Massachusetts 6.808
Minnesota 8.763
Mississippi 1.799
Montana 4.272
New Hampshire 6.051
New Jersey 0.775
Oklahoma 9.522
Oregon 4.188
Pennsylvania 6.161
Rhode Island 10.493
Tennessee 10.127
Washington 10.253
WTest Virginia 3.880
Wyoming 4.725
Number 20 25 26
Percenta 40.8 51.0 53.1
SOURCE: See Source, Table 4.1
a Hawaii and Nevada do not have local systems.
of Columbia is included with local systems.
The District
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In Table 4.3 we list underfunded systems in 1957
based on actuarial factors associated with retirement at age
65, 60, and 55. Even in 1957, age 60 was the most common nor-
mal retirement age. Normal retirement at age 55 was rare, but
offered by about 13 percent of the plans.1
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TABLE 4.3
UNDERFUNDED LOCALLY ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS IN 1957
BASED ON THE RATIO OF ASSETS TO BENEFIT
PAYMENTS GIVEN DIFFERENT RETIREMENT AGES
Age 65 Age 60 Age 55
Actuarial Assets/benefits Assets/benefits Assets/benefits
Factor '9.3 4 10.6 11.8
(1) (2) (3)
Alabama 8.700
Arkansas 4.659
Colorado 9.004
Connecticut 5.279
Delaware 3.225
Dist. of Col. 3.675
Georgia 3.351
Idaho 8.051
Illinois 9.018
Indiana 0.457
Kansas 5.963
Kentucky 4.923
Louisiana 9.698
Maine 1.143
Massachusetts 9.749
Michigan 10.563
Minnesota 7.349
Mississippi 2.038
Montana 2.647
Nebraska 8.826
New Hampshire 2.800
New Jersey 0.915
Ohio 6.068
Oklahoma 10.743
Oregon 5.543
Pennsylvania 4.667
South Carolina 6.637
South Dakota 9.890
Tennessee 7.082
Utah 3.468
Vermont 2.317
West Virginia 3.562
Wyoming 7.862
Number 28 32 33
Percent 58.3% 66.7% 68.8%
SOURCE: See Source, Table 4.1
1Alaska, Hawaii, and Nevada had no local systems in 1957. The
District of Columbia is included among local systems. Total number
is 48.
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The locally administered retirement systems of 28
states were underfunded by the most liberal measure, that
associated with retirement at age 65; and 33 by the most con-
servative measure, that associated with retirement at age 55.
By the measure associated with the most common age at retire-
ment, 60, the locally administered systems of 32 states were
underfunded.
The number of states with underfunded locally admin-
istered retirement systems based on the actuarial factor
associated with retirement at age 60, decreased from 32 out
of 48 (67 percent) in 1957, to 25 out of 49 (51 percent) in
1972.2
In Table 4.4 we select out underfunded systems in
1957 and compare them with underfunded systems in 1972 to
determine whether the particular states evidencing underfunding
have remained the same or changed over the years. Ten systems
underfunded in 1957 were no longer so in 1972. Three systems
not underfunded in 1957 had become so by 1972. Of the 22
systems remaining in the underfunded category from 1957, those
showing an increase in the ratio of assets to benefit payments
were balanced by the number showing a decline in this ratio.
The fact that there has been an overall reduction in the number
of states with underfunded locally administered retirement
systems (from 32 to 25) is evidence that for some systems, at
least, a self-correcting mechanism is in process.
80
TABLE 4.4
UNDERFUNDED LOCALLY ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS,
1957 COMPARED WITH 1972,
ASSUMED RETIREMENT AT AGE 60
1957
Age 60
Assets/benefits
10.6
(1)
1972
Age 60
Assets/benefits
10.6
(2)
Government
Contributions/
Benefits-Average
1957,1962,1967,1972
(3)
Alabama
Arkansas
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Dist. of Col.
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Montata
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Utah
Vermont
Washington
West Virginia
Wyoming
SOURCE: See Source-, Table 4.1
*Identifies systems not underfunded during that period
8.700
4.659
9.004
5.279
3.225
3.675
3.351
8.051
0.457
0.457
5.963
4.923
9.698
1.143
9.749
10.563
7.349
2.038
5.647
8.826
2.800
0.915
6.068
*
5.543
4.667
*
6.637
9.890
7.082
3?486
2.317
*
3.562
7.862
*
6..682
*
8.203
0.861
1.393
7.007
9.084
*
0.223
8.743
9.873
4.633
0.817
6.808
*
8.763
.799
4.272
*
6.051
0.775
*
9.252
4.188
6.161
10.493
*
*
10.127
*
*
10.253
3.880
4.725
1.493
1.334
1.555
1.259
0.976
0.827
0.908
1.309
0.985
0.917
1.050
1.262
1.046
0.868
0.791
1.551
1.036
0.857
0.948
1.700
0.778
0.764
1.250
1.513
0.778
1.017
1.171
1.562
1.474
1.292
1.795
1.990
1.075
0.884
0.780
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Our next task is to demonstrate that the locally admin-
istered systems identified as underfunded are also absent a
plan of regular contributions made in accordance with realis-
tic cost estimates. To do this, we average the ratio of govern-
ment contributions to benefit payments over the 15-year period
from 1957 to 1972. Table 4.5, column 2, shows states ranked
by this average. New Jersey is at the low end with an average
ratio of government contributions to benefit payments of 0.764.
Alaska is at the high end with an average ratio of government
contributions to benefit payments of 13.281. In column 1, we
list 1972 asset to benefit payment ratios. An "x" in column 3
identifies all systems underfunded in 1972 based on the
actuarial factor associated with retirement at age 60.
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TABLE 4.5
LOCALLY ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS
COMPARISON OF 1972 FUNDED STATUS WITH AVERAGE GOVERNMENT
CONTRIBUTIONS AS A PERCENT OF BENEFIT PAYMENTS
Average
Government
State Assets/benefits Contributions/ Underfunded
1972 Benefits 1972
1957-1972
(1) (2) (3)
United States 12.330 1.272
1. New Jersey 0.775 0.764 x
2. New- Hampshire 6.051 0.778 x
3. Oregon 4.188 0.778 x
4. Wyoming 4.725 0.780 x
5. Massachusetts 6.808 0.791 x
6. Dist. of Col. 1.393 0.827 x
7. Mississippi 1.799 0.857 x
8. Maine 0.817 0.868 x
9. West Virginia 3.880 0.884 x
10. Georgia 7.007 0.908 x
11. Indiana 0.223 0.917 x
12. Montana 4.272 0.948 x
13. Delaware 0.861 0.976 x
14. New Mexico 14.500 0.982
15. Illinois 11.126 0.985
16. Pennsylvania 6.161 1.017 x
17. Minnesota 8.763 1.036 x
18. Louisiana 4.633 1.046 x
19. Kansas 8.743 1.050 x
20. Washington 10.253 1.075 x
21. Rhode Island 10.496 1.171 x
22. Wisconsin 18.298 1.212
23. North Carolina 14.102 1.218
24. Ohio 29.216 1.250
25. Connecticut 8.203 1.259 x
26. Kentucky 9.872 1.262 x
27. Tennessee 10.127 1.292 x
28. Idaho 9.084 1.309 x
29. Arkansas 6.682 1.334 x
30. New York 13.545 1.341
31. South Dakota 15.402 1.474
32. Florida 14.752 1.478
33. Maryland 15.219 1.487
34. Alabama 16.866 1.493
35. Oklahoma 9.522 1.513 x
36. Michigan 13.861 1.551
37. Colorado 15.624 1.555
38. South Carolina 20.930 1.562
39. California 16.824 1.610
40. Missouri 20.649 1.697
41. Nebraska 21.747 1.700
42. North Dakota 23.683 1.727
43. Utah 31.286 1.795
44. Iowa 18.145 1.800
45. Texas 22.505 1.877
46. Vermont 17.854 1.990
47. Virginia 24.593 2.197
48. Arizona 44.257 3.672
49. Alaska 43.188 13.281
50. Hawaii
51. Nevada * *
SOURCE: See Source, Table 4.1
X denotes underfunded systems in 1972 by our measure of assets
to benefit payments less than or equal to 10.6
* Denotes no local systems
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Our baseline criterion for identifying systems absent
a plan of regular contributions made in accordance with realis-
tic cost estimates is government contributions just equal to
or less than benefit payments. Systems with this contribu-
tion pattern are operating on a pay-as-you-go basis and clearly
not making contributions in accordance with realistic cost
estimates. Using any fraction below 1.1 as the cut off
point, the locally administered retirement systems of the
first 20 states are operating on a pay-as-you-go basis. All
such systems, with the exception of New Mexico and Illinois;
are underfunded by our measure of assets to benefit payments
equal to or less than 10.6, the ratio necessary to protect
retired employees with retirement at age 60 under conditions
of plan termination.
While pay-as-you-go is our baseline measure, it is
apparent from this table that 24 out of 29 systems, with a
pattern of government contributions to benefit payments less
than 1.4, are underfunded. It is only when government contri-
butions to payments are above this level that systems are
consistently "adequately" funded. Oklahoma is the one
exception.
Since overall averages mask trends, we next examine
the finances of locally administered retirement systems on a
period-by-period basis. (Table 4.6).
84
TABLE 4.6
LOCALLY ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS,
RATIO OF GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO BENEFIT PAYMENTS, 1957-72
State 1957 1962 1967 1972
(1) (2) (3) (4)
United States 1.435 1.226 1.220 1.207
Alabama 1.332 1.341 1.803 1.494
Alaska * * 18.143 8.419
Arizona 2.692 4.032 3.872 4.091
Arkansas 1.301 1.445 1.415 1.174
California 2.032 1.441 1.371 1.597
Colorada 1.587 1.584 1.541 1.507
Connecticut 1.246 1.219 1.143 1.428
Delaware 0.983 0.739 1.122 1.058
Dist. of Col. 0.838 0.823 0.822 0.826
Florida 1.530 1.573 1.425 1.385
Georgia 0.873 0.884 0.618 1.255
Hawaii *
Idaho 0.821 1.157 1.173 2.084
Illinois 1.073 1.023 0.868 0.978
Indiana 0.888 0.920 0.904 0.956
Iowa 2.077 1.904 1.667 1.553
Kansas 0.959 0.906 1.055 1.281
Kentucky 1.237 1.267 1.365 1.177
Louisiana 1.186 0.923 1.077 0.998
Maine 0.968 0.811 0.537 1.155
Maryland 1.707 1.587 1.153 1.500
Massachusetts 0.724 0.821 0.779 0.838
Michigan 1.585 1.167 1.379 2.072
Minnesota 0.956 0.971 0.898 1.317
Mississippi 0.905 0.923 0.694 0.904
Missouri 1.735 1.525 1.703 1.824
Montana 0.913 0.869 1.038 0.974
Nebraska 1.627 1.490 1.688 1.996
Nevada * *
New Hampshire 0.520 0.448 1.212 0.932
New Jersey 0.714 0.728 0.756 0.857
New Mexico * 1.209 0.885 0.852
New York 1.587 1.356 1.421 0.998
North Carolina 1.466 1.103 1.183 1.121
North Dakota 1.783 1.261 1.626 2.239
Ohio 1.211 1.006 1.245 1.540
Oklahoma 1.869 1.093 1.800 1.289
Oregon 0.811 0.839 0.759 0.703
Pennsylvania 1.371 0.871 0.674 1.154
Rhode Island 1.383 1.314 1.181 0.806
South Carolina 0.637 1.309 1.818 2.485
South Dakota 1.982 1.423 1.277 1.215
Tennessee 1.333 1.292 1.283 1.260
Texas 2.002 1.849 1.684 1.972
Utah 0.987 0.702 0.850 4.643
Vermont 1.500 2.188 2.101 2.171
Virginia 2.428 2.096 2.264 2.001
Washington 1.276 1.034 1.112 0.879
West Virginia 0.990 0.823 0.931 0.794
Wisconsin 1.365 1.371 0.888 1.225
Wyoming 1.448 0.768 0.423 0.473
SOURCE: See Source, Table 4.1
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For systems that were underfunded in 1972, this exami-
nation reveals declining government contribution ratios for
Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming; and increasing govern-
ment contribution ratios for Idaho, and possibly for Connecticut,
Kansas, Maine, and Minnesota. For systems that were adequately
funded in 1972, this examination reveals declining government
contribution ratios for Alaska, Illinois, Iowa, New Mexico,
New York, and South Dakota.
Given a plan of government contributions based on a
level percent of payroll, a natural decline in this ratio can
be anticipated due to payments to an increasing number of bene-
ficiaries. However, a sharp decline in this ratio as in the
case of Alaska, or a decline to the level where government con-
tributions just equal benefit payments, as in the case of
New York, is probably a signal that the government employer is
not following an actuarial schedule of contributions. Such
governments face potential future underfunding. South Carolina,
Utah, Vermont, and possibly Ohio and Minnesota are among the
adquately funded systems showing increasing government
contribution ratios.
Turning back to Table 4.4, page 71, in column 3 we list
average government contribution ratios along side of the asset
to benefit payment ratios for underfunded systems in 1957 and
1972, From this, it is possible to get a picture of the dif-
ference in contribution patterns for systems that have remained
underfunded over the period, and those that have not. Gener-
ally speaking, systems with government contributions to benefit
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payments less than 1.4 have tended to remain underfunded,
while those with paymentp above that level have not. The
local systems of Illinois and Ohio are exceptions to this
general observation.
State Administered Retirement Systems
State administered retirement systems are generally
better funded than their locally administered counterparts
as indicated by the United States average of assets to benefit
payments. The average for state systems in 1972 was 18.992,
compared with 12.330 for local systems. (See Table 4.7
below for state administered systems, and Table 4.1, page 65,
for locally administered systems.)
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TABLE 4.7
STATE ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS
RATIO OF ASSETS TO BENEFIT PAYMENTS, 1957-1972
Ratio of Assets to Benefits
State 1957 1962 1967 1972
United States 22.703 22.319 21.610 18.992
Alabama 56.962 45.320 24.402 16.482
Alaska 29.264 57.170 87.694 48.546
Arizona 51.970 59.842 57.262 69.433
Arkansas 13.882 14.304 15.611 17.391
California 16.050 18.746 19.863 19.884
Colorado 41.945 38.961 32.582 31.148
Connecticut 14.386 17.808 17.889 12.117
Delaware 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000
Dist. of Col. * * * *
Florida 24.161 23.407 23.708 19.036
Georgia 39.731 35.125 30.301 24.024
Hawaii 52.711 61.777 29.517 16.332
Idaho 38.367 20.690 15.297 11.824
Illinois 12.944 13.004 12.775 13.453
Indiana 11.912 10.285 9.927 9.043
Iowa 18.752 34.850 36.706 28.317
Kansas 19.449 14.440 13.492 21.532
Kentucky 43.743 27.258 21.769 17.367
Louisiana 40.891 38.796 27.768 19.637
Maine 12.796 13.914 11.135 6.950
Maryland 59.121 53.485 45.969 29.505
Massachusetts 8.713 7.684 7.745 5.847
Michigan 16.419 17.895 17.753 20.610
Minnesota 17.471 18.414 22.467 30.218
Mississippi 16.161 14.547 18.874 15.727
Missouri 39.169 33.190 29.369 25.470
Montana 15.159 14.912 15.481 14.617
Nebraska 24.794 21.207 30.733 23.182
Nevada 18.762 23.568 21.357 21.026
New Hampshire 27.077 30.587 31.331 26.085
New Jersey 15.685 16.801 16.267 20.198
New Mexico 33.452 15.955 20.006 17.738
New York 33.465 27.655 28.945 21.117
North Carolina 99.429 56.803 47.404 33.011
North Dakota 9.763 21.855 16.700 16.639
Ohio 28.171 21.550 17.552 19.204
Oklahoma 20.786 18.012 13.724 8.993
Oregon 22.106 27.082 32.337 31.996
Pennsylvania 23.944 23.002 20.839 13.898
Rhode Island 14.686 13.596 12.587 9.927
South Carolina 63.882 39.752 38.691 33.324
South Dakota 18.328 103.694 71.056 47.314
Tennessee 40.488 49.755 31.491 19.491
Texas 33.361 30.276 28.668 22.338
Utah 18.343 22.102 22.725 21.663
Vermont 32.086 37.876 34.769 27.189
Virginia 34.233 37.640 29.163 24.747
Washington 15.810 18.032 22.505 18.605
West Virginia 24.353 19.706 14.399 6.333
Wisconsin 40.848 41.662 40.239 39.053
Wyoming 25.123 26.482 34.859 35.175
SOURCE: See Souxce, Table 4.1
* Denotes no state system
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In 1972 the state administered retirement systems of
six states were underfunded based on the actuarial factor
associated with retirement at age 65; seven, based on the
actuarial factor associated with retirement at age 60; and
eight based on the actuarial factor associated with retire-
ment at age 55. (Table 4.8)
TABLE 4.8
UNDERFUNDED STATE ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS IN 1972
BASED ON A RATIO OF ASSETP TO BENEFIT PAYMENTS
GIVEN DIFFERENT RETIREMENT AGES
Age 65 Age 60 Age 55
Actuarial Assets/benefits Assets/benefits Assets/benefits
factor i9.3 10.6 411.8
(1) (2) (3)
Delaware 0.000
Idaho 11.824
Indiana 9.043
Maine 6.950
Massachusetts 5.847
Oklahoma 8.993
Rhode Island 9.927
West Virginia 6.333
Number 6 7 8
Percenta 12.0 14.0 16.0
SOURCE: See Source, Table 4.1
aThe total number of states with state administered systems
is 50.
In 1957 only two state systems were underfunded based
on the actuarial factor associated with retirement at age 65,
and three based on the actuarial factor associated toith retire-
ment at age 60. There were no additions to this number when
assuming a retirement age of 55. (Table 4.9)
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TABLE 4.9
UNDERFUNDED STATE ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS IN 1957
BASED ON A RATIO OF ASSETS TO BENEFIT PAYMENTS
GIVEN DIFFERENT RETIREMENT AGES
Age 65 Age 60 Age 55
Actuarial Assets/benefits Assets/benefits Assets/benefits
factor -9.3 1 0.6 .11.8
State (1) (2) (3)
Delaware 0.000
Massachusetts 8.713
North Dakota 9.763
SOURCE: See Source, Table 4.1
Sixty-five is the most common retirement age for state
administered systems. Therefore, we use. the actuarial factor
associated with this age to compare systems underfunded in 1957
with those underfunded in 1972. Delaware and Massachusetts, the
two systems underfunded in 1957, remained so in 1972. (Table 4.10)
TABLE 4.10
UNDERFUNDED STATE ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS
1957 COMPARED WITH 1972,
ASSUMED RETIREMENT AT AGE 65
Actuarial
factor
Age 65
Assets/benefits
1957
9.3
Age 65
Assets/benefits
1972
6 9.3
Government
Contr./benefits
Average
'= 1957,1962,1967,1972
(1) (2) (3)
Delaware 0.000 0.000 0.922
Indiana * 9.043 1.015
Maine * 6.950 1.121
Massachusetts 8.713 5.847 0.909
Oklahoma * 8.993 1.033
West Virginia * 6.333 1.250
SOURCE: See Source, Table 4.1
*Denotes not underfunded in that year.
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of the six systems underfunded in 1972, four exhibited
pay-as-you-go financing based on our criterion of government
contributions equal to or less than benefit payments.
(Table 4.11, column 3.) The remaining two exhibit government
contribution ratios above that level, but below the 1.4 thresh-
hold associated with adequate funding in our analysis of
locally administered systems.
Three state systems, Montana, Illinois, and North
Dakota, though adequately funded in 1972, are functioning on
a pay-as-you-go basis and can anticipate future underfunding
given current financing patterns. (Table 4.11). Many of the
other adequately funded state administered systems show a down-
ward trend in their government contribution ratios, e.g.,
California, Hawaii, Louisiana, New Hampshire, New York, and
Washington. (Table 4.12). It is not possible to say how much
of this is due to higher beneficiary rolls and how much to
"ared down financing, but the trend is a warning that the
finances of these systems bear watching.
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TABLE 4.11
STATE ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS
COMPARISON OF 1972 FUNDED STATUS WITH AVERAGE GOVERNMENT
CONTRIBUTIONS AS A PERCENT OF BENEFIT PAYMENTS
Assets/benefits
1972
(1)
Average Government
Contributions/
Benefits
1957-1972
(2)
Underfunded
1972
(3)
Massachusetts
Delaware
Indiana
Oklahoma
Montana
Illinois
North Dakota
Maine
Rhode Island
Connecticut
West
Cali
Texa
Flor
New
Penn
Kans
Wash
Arka
Ohio
Mich
Minn
Hawa
Utah
Miss
New
Nebr
Idah
Verm
Oreg
Iowa
Neva
Virg
Wisc
New
Alab
Loui
Miss
Wyom
New
Geor
Tenn
Kent
Colo
Sout
Mary
Nort
Ariz
Sout
Alas
Dist
U
5.847
0.000
9.043
8.993
14.617
13.453
16.639
6.950
9.927
12.117
Virginia 6.333
fornia 19.884
s 22.338
ida 19.036
Jersey 20.198
sylvania 13.898
as 21.532
ington 18.605
nsas 17.391
19.204
igan 20.610
esota 30.208
ii 16.332
21.663
issippi 15.727
Hampshire 26.085
aska 23.182
o 11.824
ont 27.189
on 31.996
28.317
da 21.026
inia 24.747
onsin 39.053
York 21.117
ama 16.482
siana 19.637
ouri 25.470
ing 25.470
Mexico 17.738
gia 24.024
essee 19.041
ucky 10.367
rado 31.148
h Carolina 33.324
land 29.505
h Carolina 33.011
ona 69.433
h Dakota 47.314
ka 48.546
, of Columbia *
nited States 18.992
SOURCE: See Source, Table 4.1
*No state systems
State
x
x
x
x
x
x
0.909
0.922
1.015
1.033
1.037
1.065
1.068
1.121
1.181
1.219
1.250
1.397
1.447
1.469
1.471
1.474
1.528
1.547
1.556
1.693
1.761
1.806
1.819
1.892
1.908
1.943
2.017
2.041
2.046
2.069
2.164
2.179
2.212
2.266
2.302
2.317
2.480
2.614
2.614
2.701
2.709
2.953
2.956
3.089
3.222
3.334
4.071
4.537
7.111
9.136
*
1.672
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TABLE 4.12
STATE ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS
RATIO OF GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO BENEFIT PAYMENTS
State 1957 1962 1967 1972
United States 1.878 1.714 1.603 1.495
Alabama 3.983 1.930 1.714 1.639
Alaska 6.415 13.067 9.748 7.314
Arizona 5.491 4.707 3.470 4.479
Arkansas 1.422 1.439 1.630 1.734
California 1.571 1.535 1.347 1.137
Colorado 4.097 3.346 2.281 2.630
Connecticut 1.409 1.415 0.884 1.166
Delaware 0.873 0.937 0.918 0.960
District of Columbia * * * *
Florida 1.774 1.107 1.533 1.463
Georgia 4.131 2.595 2.463 1.647
Hawaii 1.266 3.562 1.350 1.099
Idaho 2.810 0.828 2.466 2.061
Illinois 1.077 1.117 0.945 1.121
Indiana 0.990 0.863 0.976 1.231
Iowa 2.133 2.658 2.256 1.609
Kansas 1.007 1.599 1.484 2.021
Kentucky 5.540 2.858 2.061 1.366
Louisiana 4.294 2.803 1.842 0.981
Maine 1.369 1.432 0.962 0.722
Maryland 6.728 3.030 2.079 1.499
Massachusetts 0.825 0.877 1.046 0.887
Michigan 1.319 1.634 2.066 2.027
Minnesota 0.595 1.907 2.136 2.586
Mississippi 2.868 1.561 1.713 1.489
Missouri 3.816 2.941 1.998 1.699
Montana 1.275 0.939 0.835 1.098
Nebraska 2.803 1.541 1.717 2.007
Nevada 2.529 2.365 2.009 1.813
New Hampshire 2.254 2.365 2.009 1.813
New Jersey 1.592 1.557 1.485 1.249
New Mexico 4.831 2.438 2.045 1.490
New York 2.393 2.169 2.457 2.189
North Carolina 6.876 3.280 3.480 2.648
North Dakota 0.903 0.923 0.566 1.879
Ohio 2.336 1.666 1.297 1.474
Oklahoma 0.702 1.267 1.183 0.981
Oregon 1.967 1.986 1.986 2.338
Pennsylvania 1.739 2.014 0.965 1.180
Rhode Island 1.402 1.220 1.144 0.957
South Carolina 4.765 2.396 3.484 2.243
South Dakota 0.000 19.639 5.894 2.912
Tennessee 4.678 3.485 2.068 1.583
Texas 2.202 0.450 1.706 1.428
Utah 1.639 2.321 1.664 1.943
Vermont 3.052 2.254 1.792 1.084
Virginia 2.624 2.670 2.079 1.476
Washington 1.670 1.639 1.823 1.056
West Virginia 1.633 1.556 1.023 0.790
Wisconsin 2.188 1.905 2.410 2.561
Wyoming 2.806 2.420 2.675 2.902
SOURCE: See Source, Table 4.1
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Summary and Comparison of State and Local
Retirement System Underfunding
The locally administered retirement systems of 25
states (51 percent of all states with locally administered
systems) were underfunded in 1972. The determination of
underfundingwas based on a measure of assets to benefit pay-
ments insufficient to protect already retired employees under
conditions of plan termination given an assumed retirement age
of 60. (Age 60 is the most common retirement age for locally
administered systems.) Using our criterion of pervasiveness,
underfunding in one-third or more of the states, it can be
said that underfunding is pervasive among locally administered
systems. On the bright side, however, the number of systems
with a ratio of assets to benefit payments below 10.6, the
actuarial factor associated with retirement at age 60, has
declined approximately 31 percent since 1957 indicating, at
least by this measure, that locally administered systems were
better funded on average in 1972 than they were 15 years earlier.
All underfunded locally administered systems, with the excep-
tion of Oklahoma, exhibited government contributions to bene-
fit payments less than 1.4, the ratio generally associated with
adequate funding. Twenty of the 25 underfunded systems ex-
hibited pay-as-you-go financing.
Underfunding among state administered systems is not
pervasive. The retirement systems of only six states were
underfunded in 1972 based on a determination of systems with
insufficient funds to protect retired employees under
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conditions of plan termination given an assumed retirement
age of 65. (Age 65 is the most common retirement age for
state administered systems.) Contrary to locally administered
retirement systems, however, there has been an increase in the
number of underfunded state systems. In 1957 there were only
two. In 1972 there were six. This number, however, repre-
sents only 12 percent of all state administered systems. Of
the six underfunded state systems, four were being financed
on a pay-as-you-go basis. The other two exhibit government
contribution ratios above the pay-as-you-go level, but below
that generally associated with adequate funding at the local
level. There would appear to be little correspondence between
the financial status of state administered systems and that of
their locally administered counterparts. Of the 25 states
with underfunded locally administered systems in 1972, only
five had state systems that were also underfunded.
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Footnotes: Chapter IV
4.1 Joseph Krislov, State and Local Government Retirement
Systems...1965, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, Social Security Administration, Office of Research
and Statistics, Research Report No. 15, 1966.
4.2 Hawaii and Nevada do not have local systems. The District
of Columbia is included with local systems.
CHAPTER V
DETERMINANTS nF FUNDING
Rene Dubos, the great biologist,
has said that it is easy to fail,
but hard to succeed, and we have
more to learn from studying ways
of succeeding.
Roy A. Schotland, Professor
of Law Georgetown Law
Center
There is limited information on how better funded
retirement systems are structured or on differences in the
political and economic environment that influence political
decisions to accept or delay the responsibility for funding
pension benefits. In this chapter we examine interstate
differences in fund viability as measured by the ratio of
assets to benefit payments in 1972. Our objective is to see
how much of the variation between states can be explained by
variables that would seem logically to affect funding behavior,
and from this to provide useful information for public offi-
cials who must make decisions on pension legislation.
The hypotheses developed here to explain the inter-
state variation in funding practices of public employee retire-
ment systems arecast in terms of five interrelated factors:
(1) variations among states in workforce maturity, i.e., the
ratio of active to retired employees; (2) variations among
states in the level of benefits, i.e., average annual benefits
96
97
per beneficiary; (3) variations among states in the structure
of the authorizing pension statute; (4) variations among
states in fiscal capacity as measured by state percapita
income; and (5) variations among states in the degree of state
supervision as measured by the percent of retirement system
participants covered by state administered plans.
Analytic Questions
We will use the data generated by our analysis of the
relationship between the aforementioned factors and fund
viability to answer five questions:
1. To what extent do differences in workforce maturity explain
interstate variations in fund viability?
2. Do generous benefits discourage a funded approach? That
is, do generous benefits which require high payments to
current retirees discourage additional appropriations for
future retirees?
3. Does the law matter? To what extent do authorizing pension
statutues guide the behavior of political officials with
respect to annual appropriations to the pension fund?
4. To what extent do funding patterns reflect state fiscal
capacity? Is underfunding symptomatic of resource-poor
states, or is underfunding symptomatic of fiscal
irresponsibility?
5. Are retirement systems, in the aggregate, better funded in
states where the administrative responsibility is more
highly centralized at the state level?
Data Limitations
Our data define our units of analysis. Census Bureau
data on the finances of state and locally administered systems
are reported by state for state administered systems, locally
administered systems, and for state and locally administered
systems combined. Census Bureau data on percapita income, :the
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variable we use as a measure of community economic capacity,
is reported only for the state as a whole. Therefore, when we
examine the relationship between state economic capacity and
fund viability, we must use retirement system data for state
and locally administered systems combined.
A similar problem is encountered with respect to pen-
sion statutes. Each state has a public employee retirement
system covering state workers and in most cases offering mem-
bership to the public employees of political subdivisions. In
such instances, all units belonging to the state system come
under a single pension law that specifies the benefit financing
and administrative structures to be followed by each. Although
state public employee retirement systems administer only 6.9
percent of the 6,076 plans maintained for state and local
government employees, over 83 percent of the membership and
seven-tenths of the receipts and assets are accounted for by
these state administered plans.2 The remainder of the systems,
operating under state enabling legislation, are administered
at the city, county, and township levels. Generally, these
systems are governed by local codes. They are so numerous and
varied that it would be impossible to assign a single repre-
sentative value for the variables included in this model.
Therefore, we limit our analysis of the impact of the pension
laws on fund viability to state administered plans. We con-
sidered the inclusion of a political variable, one that would
indicate the term of political office, and therefore the like-
lihood that a politican would assume a long- rather than a
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short-range view of fiscal affairs. However, the permutations
and combinations at the local level are infinite, and at the
state level, there is no way of controlling for reelection.
Further, even when politicians enjoy successive terms in office,
the deferred nature of pensions is such that they are not in
office long enough to suffer the negative effects of benefit
improvements they grant.
Author's Note
The primary source of information on laws governing
state administered retirement systems is the Annotated Statutes
of State Laws. The statutory provisions for the variables in-
cluded in the regression analysis were read several times to
check for accuracy of interpretation. However, since the
author is not a lawyer, these interpretations must be regarded
with caution. Where possible, other sources were used to check
interpretations, for example, a questionnaire to all state
retirement system administrators (see Appendix C); an analysis
of plans in Illinois, New York, and Hawaii included in an
Interim Report of Activities on the Pension Task Force of the
Sub-committee on Labor Standards (1976); a survey of State
Retirement Systems issued by the National Association of State
Retirement Administrators (1974). In the final analysis,
because of conflicts in information from these sources, I
relied most heavily on my own interpretation of the statutes.
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Defining the Model Variables
Maturity
In a strict sense, "maturity" refers to the point at
which the ratio of active to retired employees stabilizes,
i.e., the point at which deaths among the retired population
are approximately equal to the number of pensioners and bene-
ficiaries added to the rolls each year.
The maturation cycle of a retirement system begins at
its inception with a high ratio of active to retired employees.
This ratio gradually declines as more workers retire until
after about 40 years (the exact time period depends on the
age distribution of the workforce), a point of maturity is
reached. At maturity, the ratio of active to retired employees
is approximately 3 to 1 for systems with retirement at age 60,
and 4.5 to 1 for systems with retirement at age 65.3
The effect of declining ratios of active to retired
employees is most easily seen if we assume a stationary, i.e.,
nongrowth public employee population with a constant payroll
and a fixed benefit schedule. During the first years of a
retirement system's operation, few employees are eligible for
retirement. Consequently, contributions paid into the fund
by active employees are far greater than those paid out to
retired employees. As a result, assets build and the ratio
of assets to benefit payments is high. As the system continues
in existence, however, the numbers in retirement grow, benefit
payments increase, and the ratio of assets to benefit payments
declines. This suggests that we are looking at systems where
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the length of time a system has been in operation is a critical
variable in the analysis of fund viability, and that the varia-
bility between systems might narrow if the factor of maturity,
as reflected in the declining ratio of active to retired em-
ployees were controlled for.
Table 5.1 shows the ratios of active to retired employees
over time for state and locally administered systems for the
nation as a whole.
TABLE 5.1
RATIO OF ACTIVE TO RETIRED EMPLOYEES
STATE AND LOCAL NATIONAL AGGREGATES
1957-72
Ratios 1957 1962 1967 1972
All Systems 7.7 7.2 6.8 6.3
State Systems 10.6 9.5 8.5 7.2
Local Systems 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.7
While the ratio of active to retired workers has moved
steadily downward for all systems, it is important to note
that the ratio for state administered systems is almost twice
that of locally administered systems. There are two factors
contributing to this phenomenon. First, the most common retire-
ment age for state administered systems is 65, while the most
common retirement age for locally administered systems is 60.
This means that there is a faster movement of members onto
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retirement rolls in locally administered systems. Second,
local plans, especially those of large cities, are frequently
older than their state counterparts.
TABLE 5.2
RATIO OF ACTIVE TO RETIRED EMPLOYEES FOR
STATE AND LOCALLY ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS, 1972
Locally State Locally State
State Administered Administered State Administered Administered
1972 1972 1972 1972
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Dist. of Col.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
6.573
14.091
9.936
2.235
4.556
6.061
3.923
2.033
1.710
4.118
6.729
*
3.550
3.025
1.637
2.622
4.335
2.793
3.371
2.488
1.476
5.156
3.401
2.168
2.559
7.716
19.070
14.506
8.856
6.359
8.772
4.923
2.355
*
11.881
10.164
7.292
6.737
6.044
5.064
4.059
.634
9.623
7.379
4.677
13.286
5.833
7.843
9.452
13.492
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
4.885
1.661
5.362
*
4.839
2.446
2.522
3.656
4.348
5.336
3.097
3.721
3.626
4.189
3.026
6.906
4.018
5.296
5.450
7.857
3.929
8.993
2.557
2.117
3.245
4 000
6.430
5.676
8.131
11.590
7.269
6.517
10.222
6.848
10.307
8.955
5.616
5.493
5.823
5.898
6.660
14.166
6.931
7.306
8.726
7.825
5.022
12.074
6.376
5.078
6.696
6.817
Hj
0>W
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Table 5.2 provides a breakdown of 1972 maturity ratios
for state and locally administered retirement systems. These
figures reveal the wide variation within and between states.
Maturity ratios for state administered systems range from a
low of 2 in Delaware to a high of 19 in Alaska. This means
that in Delaware, only two workers are contributing to the
retirement plan for every one that is drawing benefits. In
Alaska, by contrast, 19 persons are contributing to the plan
for every 1 receiving benefits.
The ratio of active to retired employees for locally
administered systems ranges from 1 to 14. However, in 36 out
of 49 states the ratio of active to retired workers is 4 or
below, placing 73 percent of the locally administered systems
in the fully mature category for systems with retirement at
age 65. Twenty-seven out of 49 states (55 percent) have
locally administered system with three or fewer active workers
to each retired worker, placing them in the fully mature
category for systems with retirement at age 60. In the District
of Columbia, Indiana, Maryland, and Montana, there are as many
persons drawing pensions as there are earning them. By con-
trast, among state systems, only Delaware had fewer than three
active members to every beneficiary.
Systems with ratios below that which would qualify
them as mature might be called overly-mature. Such situations
occur when retirements are granted at very early ages (because
of disability or low age and/or service requirements) and
persons spend more years in retirement than on the job; or
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when, due to a loss of population, the flow of new entrants
into public employment is reduced; or when state systems
extend coverage to new employees of local jurisdictions and
membership in existing local plans is closed to future employees.
Low and declining ratios of active to retired employees
are not a concern for jurisdictions with fully funded systems
since the government liability is not tied to current contri-
butions. However, for systems dependent upon the contributions
of current employees to provide benefits for retired employees,
declining ratios are a signal that the government will have to
contribute increasing sums of money to meet future retirement
payrolls. Because of the natural tendency for the ratio of as-
sets to benefit payments to decline as the ratio of active to
retired employees declines, a more accurate assessment of a sys-
tem's funded status requires consideration for its maturity. We
anticipate a positive correlation between maturity and fund via-
bility,i.e., high (low) ratios of active to retired employees will
becorrelated with high (low) ratios of assets to benefit payments.
Benefits
A primary interest in studying the determinants of
funding is to examine the relationship between funding and
benefits. Assertions are frequently made about this relation-
ship, but none have been tested empiricially. The most fre-
quent assertion is that the failure to fund leads to high
benefits, i.e., state and local officials use benefits to
appease labor because they can postpone the burden of paying
for them until current workers retire and the actual payments
106
become due. In this argument, the direction of causation goes
from failure to fund to high benefits. However, we argue that
the opposite is just as likely, i.e., generous pensions create
a current financial burden that makes it difficult to set
money aside for future benefits and causes systems that start
out funding to become increasingly pay-as-you-go. In this
argument, the direction of causation is from generous benefits
to pay-as-you-go. (We use pay-as-you-go as the extreme.) We
will examine each of these theories, first by examining the
relationship between benefits and fund viability in this chap-
ter, and then by examining the relationship between viability
and benefits in the next.
Benefits are defined in this study as the average
annual payment per beneficiary. Generally, the pension award
is determined by multiplying the number of years an employee
has worked by a percentage of "final average salary." In
most systems, final average salary is the average of an em-
ployee's five highest paid years in his or her last 10 years
of service.4 Benefits vary tremendously from state to state.
They also vary within state by level of government and category
of worker. Local (large-city) systems pay higher benefits on
average than state systems. Systems covering teachers alone
pay the highest benefits; police and firemen rank second, and
general employees, last.
An examination of benefits paid in 1972 (Table 5.3)
shows that the United States average for locally administered
systems was approximately 31 percent higher than state
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administered systems ($3.379 annually compared with $2,588).
These data also show that while benefits are generous in some
states, they are far from adequate in others. For example,
among local systems, the average annual benefit was only $600
in South Dakota compared with $6,620 in the District of
Columbia. Among state administered systems, benefits ranged
from a low of $388 annually in South Dakota to a high of $6,122
in Delaware. It is of note that the District of Columbia among
locally administered systems, and Delaware among state adminis-
tered systems, pay the highest benefits. The systems of
Delaware were unfunded prior to 1971. Those of the District of
Columbia are still unfunded. It is important to remember that
benefits paid retirees in 1972 represent past benefit arrange-
ments and prior salary levels. They do not represent current
statutory benefit levels, the full impact of which will not be
realized for 20 to 30 years into the future.
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TABLE 5.3
AVERAGE BENEFITS IN 1972 BY
LEVEL OF ADMINISTRATION
State Locally
State Administered Administered
United States $2,588 $3,379
Alabama 2,728 2,414
Alaska 4,513 3,545
Arizona 1,092 1,633
Arkansas 1,662 1,721
California 3,165 4,076
Colorado 2,250 2,912
Connecticut 2,985 3,341
Delaware 6,122 3,136
District of Columiba * 6,620
Florida 2,672 2,498
Georgia 2,645 2,252
Hawaii 5,987 **
Idaho 1,500 2,375
Illinois 2,491 2,549
Indiana 2,133 3,614
Iowa 611 2,608
Kansas 792 1,938
Kentucky 2,170 2,308
Louisiana 3,592 2,391
Maine 2,705 1,732
Maryland 4,303 853
Massachusetts 4,519 3,546
Michigan 2,243 3,171
Minnesota 1,390 2,973
Mississippi 1,355 2,233
Missouri 1,700 1,608
Montana 1,753 2,852
Nebraska 788 1.976
Nevada 3,172 **
New Hampshire 1,924 1,903
New Jersey 3,016 4,183
New Mexico 2,521 600
New York 3,472 4,873
North Carolina 1,956 1,605
North Dakota 1,286 1,599
Ohio 2,439 1,582
Oklahoma 2,088 2,031
Oregon 1,027 3,723
Pennsylvania 3,776 2,631
Rhode Island 3,531 3,026
South Carolina 1.597 2,126
South Dakota 388 1,915
Tennessee 1,557 2,678
Texas 2,099 1,979
Utah 1,337 1,000
Vermont 1,901 1,627
Virginia 1,807 1,854
Washington 2,067 3,202
West Virginia 2,748 2,075
Wisconsin 1,363 2,338
Wyoming 925 2,844
NOTE: *No state system
**No local system
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Table 5.3 reflects only the differences in cash bene-
fits, not the difference in provisions affecting age at retire-
ment. To this extent, the benefit variable does not reflect
the full burden of cost to the system. Benefits affecting age
at retirement shorten the time members have to pay into the fund,
and extend the period the system has to pay out. It has been
estimated that if the retirement age is reduced from 62 to 57,
systems will experience a 50 percent increase in costs. 5
For the unfunded system, the implications are two-fold: First,
annual employer contributions must increase rapidly to meet
the accelerated increase in numbers retired. Second, since
the unfunded system depends on the contributions of active
employees to help meet payments to those in retirement, the
magnitude of governmental contributions must be substantially
higher at the point of maturity. This is because the ratio of
active to retired employees is lower than the 3 to 1 average
for systems with retirement at age 60.6
Benefit liberalizations that result in early retirement
fall into three general categories: (1) full benefits.at an
early age; (2) early retirement without commensurate loss in
benf its; and (3) disability retirement.
(1) Full benefits at an early age. Normal retirement
refers to the benefit payable upon nondisability retirement
without reduction on account of age, i.e., the highest benefit
available to the employee giving consideration to salary and
years of service. Most public employee retirement systems
make full benefits available at age 60, with 10 or more years
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of service; or age 65 with no minimum service requirement.
Some systems allow retirement at "any age" provided a certain
number of years of service have been completed. Most systems
of this type require 30-35 years of service. Some systems,
however, have either very low age and service requirements, or
have no age requirement and only a very low service requirement.
This type of generous pension is most often associated with
pensions for police and firemen. For example, firemen and
police in New York City, Los Angeles, and the District of
Columbia can retire after 20 years of service without regard
to age. Ohio requires 25 years of service. Almost all local
governments in Pennsylvania allow retirement for police and
firemen at age 50 with 20 years of service. In the early 1970s
Detroit ended half-pay pensions for police and firemen after
25 years of service without any minimum retirement age. The
new system has a minimum age of 55. Representative Martha
Griffiths has pointed out the effects of reduced service
retirements:
Suppose you permit local employees to retire after
20 years on half pay, one could then be in the position
of supporting two employees, in effect, for every one
one that was working, assuming a 40-year work life. Thus,
you would be paying out the equivalent of two full
employee salaries for each job performed. This would
virtuaily double payroll within a measurable period of
years.
(2) Early Retirement. Eighty percent of all public
employee retirement systems today include provisions for early
retirement with a reduced benefit. The most common practice
is to make the reduced benefit available beginning at age 55.
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In most cases, the benefit is reduced actuarially, which
amounts to approximately 6 or 7 percent a year for each year
the retiring employee is younger than the normal retirement
age.9 For some systems, however, the percentage reduction is
less than the actuarial equivalent, an arrangement which makes
early retirement more attractive.
(3) Disability Retirement. This type of retirement
is most common among police and firemen. Persons can become
eligible for retirment due to permanent and total disability
usually after 10 years of service. Generally, the benefit is
calculated in the same way as the normal pernsion, but with a
floor. About one-third of the systems make special provisions
for disabilities that are job connected, and in such cases, the
service required is minimal and the benefits equal to from 50
to 75 percent or more of the employee's salary. 1 0 There is
growing evidence in some cities that disability retirements
are being abused. Sixty-four percent of the payments New York
City makes to former firemen is for disability. In Seattle,
that figure is 60 percent. In the District of Columbia in
1970, 241 out of the 247 retirements among police and firemen
were for disability.1 1
There is no direct way to measure the impact of early
retirements on funding when dealing with retirement system
aggregates. However, early retirements accelerate the rate
at which the ratio of active to retired employees declines.
To that extent, the impact of early retirements is measured
indirectly through the variable maturity.
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The Pension Statute
Generally speaking, the objectives of a public employee
retirement system are to provide:
1. a reasonable base income to qualified employees who have
been employed by a public employer and whose earning
capacity has been removed or has been substantially
reduced by age or disability;
2. an orderly method of promoting and maintaining a high level
of service to the public through an equitable separation
procedure, which is available to employes at retirement or
upon being disabled;
3. a system which will make government employment attractive
to qualified employees to remain in government service for
such periods of time as to give the public employer full
benefit of the training and experience gainedlgy these
employees while employed by public employers.
Toward this end, pension statutes detail provisions regarding
membership eligibility; years of creditable service required
for benefit eligibility; benefit entitlements for disability,
superannuation and death; administration of the system; manage-
ment of the funds; and the method of financing benefits, in-
cluding member and employer contributions.
Although the basic areas listed above are covered in
all statutes, there is considerable variability among states
in the degree of specificity with which they treat each.
Specificity is of particular importance with regard to finan-
cing, for where a plan clearly articulates that a system is to
establish and maintain an actuarial reserve adequate to meet
current and future pension liabilities, and where such provi-
sion is accompanied by procedures which mandate how these ob-
jectives are to be achieved, the plan provides more entry
points for enforcement, and fewer for legislative discretion
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or judicial interpretation.
Legislators, even those operating under the most
specific statutes, are subject to competing demands from tax-
payers for current necessities, e.g., a certain level of police
protection, and a desired standard of education; or from organ-
ized public employee groups for higher wages and improved bene-
fits. Faced with cost-escalating demands on the one hand, and
limited and sometimes shrinking resources on the other, legis-
lators often look for items in the budget for which expendi-
tures can be cut or postponed. Pensions are such an item, for
although pension benefit claims are earned throughout an em-
ployee's work career, these claims are not collected until
sometime after retirement.
Given the deferred nature of the pension obligation,
we hypothesize that the less specific the law with regard to
actuarial funding and enforcement procedures, the more vulner-
able the plan to evasion of the funding responsibility. That
is, legislators operating under vague statutes have room to
maneuver without breach of the law. In contrast, legislators
operating under statutes that are specific with regard to
financing must frequently act to modify or undo existing legis-
lation before an exception can be made. This makes their task
more difficult, for where a decision has been made to adopt
a systematic mode of funding, with clearly articulated methods
of enforement, the budgetary implications have baen thoroughly
considered, and the decision taken only after considerable
deliberation. Consequently, when a legislature thereafter
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seeks to enact provisions of either a temporary or permanent
nature which have the effect of modifying the system's funding
objective, these provisions are more open to public scrutiny
from without, and legislative debate from within.13 This
vulnerability makes these systems less likely to seek either
formal or informal ways of circumventing funding requirements
as a means of managing competing demands for limited resources.
The statutory variables included in the model are
those which appear to have a direct bearing on fund viability:
(1) the contributory or non-contributory nature of the plan;
(2) actuarial and non-actuarial methods of computing govern-
mental contributions; (3) the legal security behind the prom-
ised benefit; (4) the financial resources behind the promised
benefit; and (5) powers to enforce governmental contri-
butions.
Contributory and Non-Contributory Plans
No matter what financing scheme is decided upon, pay-
as-you-go, or actuarial cost, a decision must be made regarding
what is an equitable share of the total system cost to be borne
by employees. Nationwide, state and local employee retirement
contributions equalled 28 percent of all public pension system
revenue in 1972. Employee contributions are required in all
states except five: Florida, Michigan, Missouri, New York, and
Oklahoma. 14
Among the 45 contributory states, the method for com-
puting empoyee contribution rates varies. The most common
method is a single uniform percentage of salary. Other methods
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include the step-up rate formula with a lower percentage on
the salary base taxed by Social Security, and a higher per-
cent on salary above that level (e.g., Tennessee), a variable
percentage of salary yielding a lower percent on lower than
higher salaries (Nebraska, South Carolina); rates based on
age and sex at the time of enrollment (New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Oregon, Vermont); a single rate, but with a maximum
on total salary taxable.15 Rates also vary depending on the
category of worker. In Alabama, for example, the contribution
rate is 3.5 percent for general employees and teachers, but 7
percent for state police. The median rate for systems where
workers are also covered by Social Security is from 4 to 5 per-
cent, and for systems without Social Security, from 7 to 8
percent.16 Once the rate is determined, it is automatically
withdrawn from employees' salary.
Ideally, we might use actual employee contribution
rates as a determinant of fund viability; however, the varia-
bility described above makes it difficult to identify a speci-
fic employee contribution rate for many states. In addition,
the rate in the statute is the most recent rate, and may
or may not correspond with the rate in effect in 1972
or the years prior to that. In view of these limitations, we
use the variable "employee contributions" as a categorical
variable denoting either a contributory or non-contributory
system.
We expect this variable to be positively associated
with fund viability, but not significant as an explanatory
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variable since 46 states take the contributory value.
(Florida did not become non-contributory until 1975.)
Governmental Contributions: Actuarial
and Non-Actuarial Formulae
Funding for the purpose of this analysis means
the obligation to contribute to the pension trust fund moneys --
that when supplemented by employee contributions and earnings
on investment -- will be sufficient to pay all benefits
required and accrued.17
For the purpose of delineating systems that are funded
by statute from those that are not, we classify systems that
are "funded" (in terms of statutory intent) as those for which
the statute spells out actuarial methods of computing govern-
mental contributions. We classify as "unfunded" those systems
using any other method.
The determination of the governmental share of the
pension cost utilizes both actuarial and non-actuarial compu-
tational methods. Actuarial formulae are usually stated in
terms of the necessary costs to be funded, such as current
costs and unfunded liabilities. Non-actuarial methods, on the
other hand, include a variety of computational formulae in-
cluding employer contributions equal to employee contributions;
employer contributions as a multiple of employer contributions,
e.g., at least 1.50 times employer contributions; employee
contributions equal to or greater than the annual average of
the projected expenditures over the next 10 years; governmental
contributions sufficient to cover the projected expenditures
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for the next year; no prescribed method, but a prescribed
amount. Some of the non-actuarial methods may originally have
been determined actuarially. For example, employer contribu-
tions equal to 1.50 times employee contributions may have been
based on actuarial computations which showed that this was the
required level for safe reserves. However, since the intent
is unclear where it is not stated, all systems that did not
use language prescribing actuarial methods of funding were not
considered to be actuarially funded. Systems that adopted a
policy of funding just at, or after 1972 (Delaware and Connec-
ticut) were not considered funded since our analysis relies
on financial data generated prior to that date.
Governmental Contribution Rate Specified
Many statutes specify actuarial funding, but do not
specify the employer contribution rate. Rather, they simply
provide that "employer contributions shall be sufficient to
cover current cost and amortize unfunded "liabilities" over
a specified number of years. Other statutes,in addition to
using actuarial language, specify the actual percentage of
employees' salary that the government is to contribute. One
of our hypotheses is that the more specific the statute with
regard to its funding intent, the more likely the statute is
to be followed. Therefore, in addition to the funded/unfunded
variable, we include a variable to indicate whether or not the
governmental contribution rate is specified. Our hypothesis
is that where the statute specifies actuarial funding and also
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specifies the actual percentage of salary the government is to
contribute, the plan is more likely to be adequately funded
than a plan where the statute prescribes actuarial funding,
but specifies no contribution rate.
Vesting: The Legal Security
Behind Promised Benefits
Vesting, for the purposes of this analysis, refers to
the point at which a person, operating under the statutes of
pension coverage, earns by dint of age, service, and contri-
butory requirements, the unforfeitable right to a pension as
provided for in the statute at that point; a right that cannot
be abrogated or modified downward by future legislative change.
Membership in and contributions to a pension plan do
not assure participants of a "right" to receive a pension.
In fact, federal court decisions support the general rule that
"a pension granted by a public authority is not a contractual
obligation, but a gratuitous allowance, in the continuance of
which the pensioner has no vested right; accordingly, the pen-
sion is terminable or alterable at the will of the grantor."
1 9
Judicial interpretations of state laws on this point
are numerous and varied. They reflect the tortuous evolution
of the concept of pensions from gratuitous offerings in which
the recipient has no legal right, to pensions as a part of com-
pensation to which the employee is as much entitled as to the
wages earned for work performed. Where the plan is non-contri-
butory, courts have ruled, almost without exception, that
employees covered "have no such vested pension rights as will
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bar modification or repeal of the pension statute either before
or after a particular pension has been granted."20 In the
greater number of jurisdictions, the same rule applies to plans
calling for contributions on a compulsory basis. However, a
growing number of courts are ruling that upon fulfillment of
the requirements for the grant of the pension, "the pension
rights. . . vest, thereafter being immune from abolition, if
not from adverse change of any kind." 2 1
Courts are most frequently brought into the picture
when the law is not specific on the issue, that is, where the
statute does not spell out the nature of the employee's interest.
However, even when the law is specific on the issue, the extent
of the employee's interest is subject to challenge. In 1952,
the Illinois Supreme Court held that public employees had no
vested rights under statutes calling for compulsory contribu-
tions even where the pension statute expressly described the
right as vested. A vested interest, the court declared, was
not a contractual interest and did not preclude necessary
changes and amendments of the act commensurate with changing
economic conditions. The true meaning of the act, the court
ruled, was that participants had a vested right "to share in
the fund in the manner and on such terms as the legislature
may, from time to time, determine best serves the welfare of
the participants and the people of the state." 2 2
New York removed the question from the judicialarena
in 1940 by passing a constitutional amendment granting contrac-
tual status to pension benefit rights. The effect of this
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amendment was to secure employees against any reduction in
benefits existing at the time of enrollment into the system,
and to lock in any statutory improvements enacted thereafter.
Similar constitutional amendments have since been enacted in
Illinois, Hawaii, and Alaska. Massachusetts provides for
contractual status in its pension statute.
Professor Rubin G. Cohn states:
The issue [with respect to employee pension rights]
is generally drawn as legislatures, concerned with
achieving a reasonable balance between benefits and costs,
and faced with substantial problems of financing funds
whose fiscal condition is frequently precarious, seek to
impose more stringent qualifying age or service conditions
applicable both to current and future employees, or in
other ways modify accrued 'rights' or 'equities' to the
apparent disadvantage of employees or annuitants. At this
point the 2 egal nature of the employees' interest becomes
critical.
The need is to protect reasonable employee expecta-
tions against the abuse of governmental power on the one hand,
while maintaining the legislative flexibility to deal with
issues of fiscal management on the other. Contract status
removes that flexibility and imposes an obligation with respect
to benefits that precludes revision even where economic cir-
cumstances make such revisions imperative for the protection
of the employee and the taxpayer. Between the extremes of pension
rights as purely statutory and subject to change either before
or after fulfillment of conditions for retirement, and pension
rights as a binding contractual agreement, there is a range of
conceptual interpretations. That range is reflected in Table 5.4
listing states by the level of benefit security. The 35 states
included in the table are those for which judicial decisions
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have been rendered, or where the legal relationship is clearly
spelled out in the state constitution or pension statute.
Where statutes have not been subject to judicial interpreta-
tion, and where statutes do not clearly specify the nature of
the legal relationship, the general rule of pensions as
purely statutory is presumed to exist.
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TABLE 5.4
LEGAL STATUS OF PENSIONER RIGHTS
PENSION RIGHTS ARE PURELY STATUTORY
No vesting before or after retirement. The terms and conditions
rest in legislative policy and hence may be changed except
insofar as the state constitution specifically provides otherwise
Alabama
Connecticut
District of Columbia
Kansas
Michigan
Minnesota
New Jersey
Texas
VESTS AT RETIREMENT BUT NOT AS TO AMOUNT
Florida
Oklahoma
VESTS ABSOLUTELY UPON FULFILLMENT OF ALL REQUIREMENTS
FOR RETIREMENT
Colorado
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Louisiana
Missouri
Nebraska
Nevada (at 10 years or entitlement, whichever comes first)
North Carolina
Ohio
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
Utah
South Dakota
VESTS AT EMPLOYMENT
A right to rely on the level of benefits existing at the time
the employee entered service; however, some states reserve'the
legislative power to make reasonable modifications. Rights
vest absolutely upon retirement.
Arizona
California (subject to reasonable modification)
Georgia
Idaho (subject to reasonable modification)
North Dakota (subject to reasonable modification)
Washington (subject to reasonable modification)
CONTRACT STATUS
A contract right to the level of benefits existing at the time
the employee entered service; a right specified in the state
constitution or pension statute; a right which cannot be
abrogated or modified downward.
Alaska
Hawaii
Illinois
Massachusetts
New York
SOURCE: "Vested Rightcf Pensionser to Pension," Annotated
52 American Law Reports 2d, pp. 437-482 (1957)
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We hypothesize that where the status of the pension
benefit right is clearly unalterable, systems are less likely
to accede to demands for expensive benefit liberalizations.
This is presumed because lengthy debate always precedes the
enactment of a constitutional guarantee of pension benefits and
in that process, the consciousness of legislators is raised
around issues of benefit costs. Since the enactment of the
constitutional provision in New York State, it has been cus-
tomary for the state legislature to enact benefit improvements
only one year at a time, thus giving itself some leeway if a
provision turns out to be unworkable. In 1973 the opinion of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was sought regarding
allowable changes in pension benefits in view of that state's
contract clause. The Court, using New York as an example,
advised that while the legislature could not revoke existing
benefits, it had the means of preventing a given increase of
benefits from becoming vested if it took "due precautions." 2 4
If our hypothesis is correct that securely vested pen-
sion rights depress benefit liberablizations, and if we are
correct in assuming that low benefits aid the goal of funding,
then we would expect vesting to be positively related to
funding.
Financial Resources Securing Benefits
While low benefits may make funding easier, and while
laws that stipulate actuarial methods of computing governmental
contributions may make realistic contributions more likely,
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and while contract rights may protect the actual and poten-
tial retiree against benefit loss through legislative change,
none of these assures the employee that the money to pay his
or her benefit will be available when due. The statutes of
seven states define the government's obligation to make bene-
fit payments as limited to the pension fund. This means that
once the fund is exhausted, the government has no further obli-
gation. Ten states make benefit payments a general obligation
of the government, which like other general obligations may be
enforced by a suit to compel payment. One state differentiates
between active and retired members, i.e., the claim of active
members is limited to the fund, but that for retired members
is a general obligation of the government. The nature of the
obligation is unstated in 25 out of 50 states. (Table 5.5)
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TABLE 5.5
FINANCIAL RESOURCES SECURING PENSION BENEFITS
OBLIGATION LIMITED TO FUND
Alaska
Arizona
Georgia
Louisiana
Mississippi
New Mexico
North Carolina
North Dakota
South Carolina
Tennessee
Vermont
Virginia
A GENERAL OBLIGATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
California
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Maryland
Massachusetts
Montana
New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania
SOURCE: State Revised Statutes
NOTE: In the single case of Alabama, the obligation for
active members is limited to the fund, but that for retired
members is a general obligation of the government.
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Enforcement of Governmental Contributions
At present, there appears to be two general means to
enforce the timely remittance of governmental contributions as
required by statute: (1) the imposition by the state of late
penalties on participating subdivisions; (2) the existence of
a special directive to the appropriate officer of the state
or local unit which can be used by employees to institute a
court proceeding to compel contributions as stipulated by law.
(1) Late Penalties. The statutes of 12 states provide
the authority for the state to impose interest charges on late
payments. In most instances, these charges are substantial.
In Arizona, Iowa, and Pennsylvania, the charge is 6 percent;
in Nevada, 7 percent; and in Wyoming, 8 percent. Nine states
are authorized to withhold state aid in the amount of the con-
tribution until the delinquent payment is made. Three states
are authorized both to withhold funds and to charge interest.
Seven states recognize that compulsory, timely payments may
impose a hardship, and provide for the declaration of default with
the dissolution of the system and the allocation of plan assets.
The default alternative has potential dire consequences
for employees and pensioners. The first obligation such systems
recognize is the return of contributions to members and to
pensioners less their share of benefits received. Where assets
are insufficient for the return of all contributions each share
is reduced prorata. Once the return of contributions has been
satisfied, the future benefit entitlement of pensioners and
those eligible to retire is calculated. If assets are
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insufficient to satisfy these claims, each share is reduced
prorata. After all such shares are satisfied, the remainder,
if any, is apportioned among active members to cover accrued
benefits. The default clause for the State of Tennessee is
reproduced in Appendix A under the state heading. Table 5.6,
below, lists states by the type of penalty prescribed.
TABLE 5.6
STATES BY TYPE OF LATE PENALTY
INTEREST CHARGE
Arizona New Ham
Colorado New Jer
Florida New Yor
Idaho Pennsyl
Iowa Utah
Nevada Wyoming
WITHHOLD STATE AID
Arkansas Oregon
Georgia Rhode I
Minnesota South C
Montana West Vi
North Carolina
INTEREST CHARGE AND WITHHOLD STATE AID
California
Ohio
South Dakota
DISSOLVE SYSTEM
Alabama Tenness
Alaska Vermont
New Mexico Virgini
North Dakota
SOURCE: Revised State Laws
pshire
sey
k
vania
sland
arolina
rginia
ee
a
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(2) Legally compellable governmental contributions.
In addition to the statutory leverage given some states to
compel contributions from political subdivisions, the lan-
guage controlling the finance of certain systems is phrased
in mandatory terms and provides a basis for employees to ini-
tiate a suit in mandamus to compel the responsible person(s)
to make contributions as provided by statute. 2 5 For example,
the statute might read, "Before October 2nd every year the
board of trustees shall certify to the governor the appro-
priation necessary to pay the various funds. . . such amounts
shall be included in the general appropriation bill when it is
presented to the legislature for final passage." 2 6 In addition,
where a contract securing benefits is said to exist, or where
the pension benefit is made a general obligation of the govern-
ment, the employee has legal grounds to pursue payment through
a court of competent jurisdiction. Table 5.7 lists states
where contributions and benefits appear to be compellable.
TABLE 5.7
STATES IN WHICH CONTRIBUTIONS AND BENEFIT
PAYMENTS APPEAR TO BE LEGALLY COMPELLABLE*
Alaska Maryland Oregon
California Massachusetts Pennsylvania
Colorado Montana Rhode Island
Hawaii Nevada South Carolina
Idaho New Hampshire South Dakota
Illinois New Jersey Tennessee
Indiana New Mexico Texas
Iowa New York Washington
Kansas North Carolina West Virginia
Louisiana Ohio Wyoming
SOURCE: State Revised Statutes
*The basis for selection rests with mandatory language regarding
contributions and benefit payments; or the designation of benefits
as part of a legally enforceable contract; or benefits as a
general obligation of the government.
129
In the absence of the legal provisions referred to
above, there is no way to compel the legislature to appropriate
funds. In 1957 retired policemen and firemen in the City of
Lakewood, Ohio, petitioned the court to compel the city to
appropriate money from its general fund to pay past due pension
awards. The Ohio statute provided that where funds were insuf-
ficient to meet current payments, legislative authority "may"
appropriate sufficient moneys from the general fund to make up
the deficit. The court ruled that the "may" was permissive
and imposed no mandatory duty to appropriate moneys to meet
pension payments.27
Even where contract status and other assurance exist,
the court has not always interpreted this as a right to compel
the level of funding stipulated in the statute. In 1970, by
constitutional amendment, membership in any retirement system
of the State of Illinois was made an "enforceable contractural
relationship the benefits of which shall not be diminished or
impaired." In addition, the pension statute makes benefit pay-
ments and contributions a general obligation of the state.
The benefit is further secured by a directive to the comp-
troller to issue warrants in the amount of the state's obli-
gation to the plan, and to the treasurer to pay on those war-
rants from the general treasury of the state. Despite these
assurances, the governor, in 1974, reduced certain appropriations
to the pension funds.
In response, the Illinois Federation of Teachers and
the American Association of University Professors brought suit
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challenging these reductions and charging that they had a con-
tractual right to a financially sound retirement system. The
statute, they stated, specified the amount of annual payments
and contained no provision to make the amount of the state con-
tribution "subject to the political or fiscal exigencies of the
Governor's budgetary priorities." The Supreme Court of Illinois
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that "neither the con-
stitutional provision. . . nor the Pension Code established a
contractual right to enforce a specific level (emphasis added)
of funding or preclude the governor from reducing appropriations
to the pension fund." 2 8
Fiscal Capacity
Percapita income is used as our measure of state fiscal
capacity. It gives an indication of the amount of money the
state can potentially raise by taxes to conduct the affairs of
government. The actual amount available will depend on the tax
system and the level and distribution of income and wealth
within the state. In general, however, the larger the per-
capita income, the greater the tax resources, and the greater
the capacity to finance public services,
governmental expenditures have escalated far more rapidly than
income. Annual percapita general expenditures which were $237
in 1957 rose to $809 in 1972, an increase of 240 percent.
Meanwhile, percapita income increased only 119 percent, from
$2,047 in 1957 to $4,492 in 1972. The growth imbalance between
expenditures and incomes means that taxpayers in many
communities are now carrying substantially heavier tax burdens.
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We hypothesize that low income states are more likely
to be hard pressed to meet current necessities, e.g., education
and public safety, and therefore are less likely to put money
aside for future benefit payments. For this reason, our expec-
tation is that state percapita income will be positively cor-
related with fund viability.
State Supervision
State supervision is defined in terms of the degree to
which the administrative responsibility. is lodged at the state
level. This is measured by the percent of state and local re-
tirement system participants enrolled in state administered plans.
There is considerable variation among states in the
degree to which the responsibility for the administration of
local retirement systems is lodged at the state level. Table
5.8 lists by state the percent of participants covered by
state administered plans. In 30 states, 90 percent or more
of all state and local plan participants are covered by a state
administered system. 30
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TABLE 5.8
PERCENT OF PENSION PLAN PARTICIPANTS IN
STATE ADMINISTERED PLAN, 1972
State Percent State Percent
Alabama
Alaska
Ari zona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
99%
95
92
97
77
79
81
25
91
80
100
99
70
93
95
91
96
88
99
72
49
75
98
98
68
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Source: See Source, Table 4.1
To understand some of the diversity between states,
it is helpful to know how systems originate. Article X of the
Federal Constitution reserves for the states all powers not
yielded to the national government. Thus, it falls within
the jurisdiction of the state government to pass authorizing
97%
71
100
99
97
99
67
97
96
98
87
93
77
84
99
92
75
91
99
96
85
89
97
83
99
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pension legislation. States handle this in a number of ways.
They may, through legislative statute, set up a unitary pen-
system covering all state and local government employees. In
situations such as this, membership in the state plan is man-
datory for all local units. Alternatively, they may set up a
state system in which membership of local units is optional.
In either case, all units belonging to the state system come
under a single pension law which specifies the benefit, finan-
cing and administrative structures. The state may serve as
administrator for all subsystems, collecting all employee and
employer contributions, investing moneys, and making benefit
payments; or alternatively, it may vest administrative respon-
sibility with the local units. In a third case, where the
state grants local units the power to establish retirement
systems, each unit creates its own benefit, financing and
administrative structure, subject to legislative ratification.
This practice leads to a multiplicity of plan structures.
In recent years, there has been a trend toward consol-
idation, i.e., the lumping of many of the small local plans
within a state into a broader state administered plan where
economies of scale can be realized in terms of administrative
costs and more flexible and diversified investments. However,
there continues to be a plethora of local plans. of the six
thousand plus plans estimated to be in existence in 1975, in
excess of five thousand were locally administered. Pennsyl-
vania alone has 1,414 separate plans. The majority of local
plans (3,552 out of the 5,205) are limited to police and
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firemen, but over 60 percent of the members of local systems
are enrolled in general coverage plans.3 1
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
in its 1974 report on City Financial Emergencies warned that
underfunded locally administered retirement systems pose "an
emerging threat to the financial health of local governments."
They recommended that locally administered retirement systems
should be strictly regulated by the states, or alternatively,
consolidated into a singe statewide system.
The question of to what level of government the respon-
sibility for regulating state and locally administered retire-
ment systems falls has emerged as a key issue between state
and federal government. The formal position of the National
Governors' Conference is that regulation of public pension plans
is the "sole responsibility of state government," and since
most states provide regulation, national regulation is not
necessary.32 The federal government's position, as articulated
by a member of the House of Representatives Pension Task Force
is that states have not been doing an adequate job of monitoring
either their own or locally administered systems. As evidence,
he lists the use of -revenue sharing funds by-some cities to
meet the city's contribution to pension plans; the refusal of
elected officials in some states to meet statutory funding levels;
instances of plans running out of cash; and the mishandling
of funds. 33
Leaving the constitutional question of jurisdiction
aside for the moment, if there were evidence that the finances
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of retirement systems were better managed where the state is
more centrally involved, this would provide support for the
states' position that federal regulation is not necessary.
One means of examining this question is first to determine
the degree to which the responsibility for administration is
centralized at the state level, and then to determine whether
centralized administration is positively related to fund
viability. We hypothesize that states provide closer super-
vision for systems they administer, and that this in turn
results in more soundly funded systems.
The Pension Fund Viability Probability Model
In summary, the level of funding is a function of:
V = a+blM+b2B+b 3 EC+b 4F+b 5GCR+b6 V+b 7P+b 8CGC+b 9 PCI+bl0STAD
where
V = Pension fund viability measured in terms of the ratio of
assets to benefit payments,
a = The constant or mean value of the independent variables
that are not included in the fund viability model,
M = Maturity, the ratio of active to retired employees,
B = The average annual benefit grant,
EC = Employee contributions, a dichotomous variable repre-
senting a contributory or non-contributory system
(l=contributory; O=non-contributory),
F = Fund, a dichotomous variable denoting statutes that
require actuarial funding (l=actuarial funding require-
ment; O=otherwise),
GCR = Government contribution rate, a dichotomous variable
indicating whether the actual government contribution
rate is specified (l=government contribution rate
specified; Q=government contribution rate not specified,
136
V = Vested, an ordinal variable scaled from least to greatest
legal protection of the pension benefit against statutory
change (=the statutes do not specify and there has
been no judicial interpretation or the interpretation is
unclear; l=purely statutory; 2=vested against abolition
upon meeting all qualifications for retirement, but
subject to modification; 3=vests absolutely at retirement;
4=modified vesting at employment, absolute vesting at
retirement; 5=benefit rights are contractual, immune from
impairment either before or after retirement,
P =.Penalties for delinquent payments, an ordinal variable
scaled from least to greatest penalty (O=no penalty;
l=interest charge; 2=withhold state aid in the amount
of contribution; 3-interest charge plus withhold state
aid; 4=dissolve system),
CGC = Compel governmental compliance: the existence of a basis
for employees to seek governmental compliance with
funding requirements through a writ of mandamus issued
by a court of competent jurisdiction. CGC is a dichotomous
variable (l=basis for mandamus to compel payments;
O=otherwise),
PCI = State percapita income,
STAD = The percent of state and local retirement system parti-
cipants covered by state administered plans.
Next, we use the identified variables in a series of
linear regression models to determine the likelihood that a
state or locally administered retirement system with a specified
set of characteristics will have an adquately funded plan.
Table 5.9 presents the list of independent variables associated
with each model along with the analytical questions under
consideration.
TABLE 5.9
DETERMINANTS OF FUND VIABILITY IN 1972
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE LIST AND
ANALYTIC QUESTIONS
Unit of Analysis Independent Variables Analytic Questions
Equation 1
All state administered systems
Equation 2
State and locally administered
retirement systems combined
maturity 1972
benefits 1972
contributory/non-
contributory
funded
specified governmental
contribution rate
vested
penalty
compel
maturity 1972
benefits 1972
percent state
administration 1972
percapita income 1972
Primary question:
-- Does the law matter?
Secondary questions:
-- What is the effect of
maturity?
-- Do generous benefits dis-
courage a funded approach?
Primary questions:
-- Do funding patterns reflect
community fiscal capacity?
-- Does centralization of
administration at the state
level result in sounder
financing?
Secondary questions:
-- What is the effect of
maturity?
-- Do generous benefits
discourage a funded
approach?
H
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Determinants Analysis: An Interpretation of Cross-Section
Regressions on 1972 Fund Viability Data
We use two equations to analyze the aforementioned
questions. In equation 1 we use 1972 cross-section data on
state administered systems to examine the degree to which
state laws influence funding behavior. In equation 2, we
use 1972 cross-section data on state and locally administered
systems combined to explore the statistical relationship
between selected structural, economic, and administrative
variables and funding in 1972.
In equation 1, as a first approximation, a multiple
regression model with eight independent variables was con-
structed. (See Table 5.9, equation 1, for variable list.)
The number of explanatory variables was reduced to three by
the use of a preliminary stepwise regression procedure. 3 4
139
TABLE 5.10
REGRESSION OUTPUT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON THE FUND
VIABILITY OF STATE ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS, 1972
Equation 1
Explained Coeffs. F-ratioa Significance
variation
Total R2  0.506
maturity, 1972 0.303 2.060 26.745 0.001
benefits, 1972 0.149 -3.998 15.614 0.001
vested 0.054 1.288 5.045 0.030
constant 12.035 (sig. 0.007)
degress of freedom 46
model (sig. 0.001)
aThe F-ratio provides a measure of the statistical confidence
for each independent variable. It is the equivalent of the
t-statistic squared. The associated significance factor is the
same as for the t-statistic.
We show the final output from the regression model in
Table 5.10 above. Fifty-one percent of the variation in funding
among state administered systems in 1972 is explained by three
variables: maturity, the ratio of active to retired employees;
the average annual benefit per retiree; and vested, the degree
to which the benefit is secured against statutory change. All
variables are significant at the .03 level or better, and the
model is significant at the .001 level, indicating that there
is less than 1 chance in 1,000 that the results of this equation
were obtained by chance. The signs of the coefficients are
consistent with expectations. High benefits are negatively
correlated with fund viability; and high ratios of active to
retired employees are positively correlated, as are strongly
secured benefit rights.
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The primary question under consideration in this
equation was, "Does the law matter?" We entered six variables
to test the effect of statutory provisions relating to pension
plan financing and enforcement procedures. These variables
included:
the contributory or non-contributory nature of the
plan;
the specification of actuarially computed governmental
contribution formulae;
the specification of the governmental contribution
rate;
the legal security behind the promised benefit;
the penalties available to the state to enforce
timely employer contributions;
the avenues available to employees to compel
contributions by a writ of mandamus.
Of these six variables, only one was significant, the
legal security behind the promised benefit, i.e., the degree
to which the benefit is vested or protected by contractural
status against statutory change.
The fact that the legal requirement to fund according
to actuarial formulae is not significant, even when that
requirement is accompanied by a stipulation as to the amount
of the governmental contribution; and the fact that neither
state nor employee powers to compel contributions is signifi-
cant, leads us to conclude that pension laws specifying funding
arrangements and enforcement procedures have little bearing on
the actual behavior of political officials.
The second equation uses 1972 cross-section data for
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state and locally administered retirement systems combined.
Since the statutory variables are not applicable to local
systems, they are not used in this equation. We initially
entered four variables. (See Table 5.9 for variable list.)
One was eliminated through the stepwise regression procedure
described in footnote 5.34. The final output is presented
in Table 5.11.
TABLE 5.11
REGRESSION OUTPUT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON THE
FUND VIABILITY OF STATE AND LOCALLY ADMINISTERED
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS COMBINED, 1972
Equation 2
Explained
variation Coeffs. F-Ratio Sig.
Total R2  0.584
maturity, 1972 0.384 2.448 48.834 0.001
benefits, 1972 0.098 -5.293 20.552 0.001
PCI, 1972 0.099 0.007 10.836 0.002
constant -15.313 (sig. 0.093)
degrees of freedom 46
model (sig. 0.001)
Fifty-eight percent of the variation between states
in the level of funding for state and locally administered
systems combined is explained by three variables: maturity,
benefits, and percapita income. Each variable is significant
at the .001 level.
The primary questions for consideration in this
equation were: (1) Do funding patterns reflect community
economic capacity? and (2) Are retirement systems better funded
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in states where the administrative function is more highly
centralized at the state level?
The economic capacity of states is positively corre-
lated with fund viability as anticipated. This indicates
that retirement systems in higher income states tend to be
better funded than those in lower income states. With regard
to the second question, state supervision, we had hypothesized
that states would provide closer supervision for systems they
administer and that this in turn would result in higher state-
wide funding ratios. The data do not support this hypothesis.
Our proxy for state supervision, the percent of state and
local plan participants covered by state administered sys-
tems, was not significant. Thus, these data do not provide
empirical evidence to support the position of the Conference
of Governors that states can manage the affairs of the local
retirement systems in their state.
The secondary questions considered in each of the
above eguations were: (1) To what extend do differences
in maturity explain variations in fund viability? and (2) Do
generous benefits discourage a funded approach?
(1) The effect of maturity on fund viability. In
both equations, maturity accounts for the largest portion of
explained variation in fund viability. The effect of maturity
on fund viability comes as a result of two processes. One is
the natural process over time of a declining number of active
participants paying into the fund relative to the number of
retired participants receiving benefits. The second, and less
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visible effect come as a result of plan benefits that result
in early retirements. Early retirements have the effect of
accelerating the decline in the ratio of active to retired
employees and therefore the decline in moneys paid into the
fund relative to those paid out. Secondly, early retirements
create a situation where benefits are paid to larger numbers
for longer periods.
(2) Do generous benefits discourage a funded approach?
This is an important question because of the considerable
discussion surrounding the relationship between benefits and
funding. In this analysis, we examined the theory that high
benefits lead to fund deterioration. Each of the equations
provides evidence that states that pay high benefits are more
likely to have funding problems than states that grant
less generous benefits. High benefits in 1972 were
correlated with low fund viability in 1972 for both state
administered systems, and state and locally administered
systems combined.
While it is possible that impaired fund viability in
1972 could be the result of high benefit payments in that year,
it is much more likely that impaired fund viability in any
given year comes about as a result of high benefit payments
over time. In the absence of evidence of a historical rela-
tionship, the most we can say safely is that there is a nega-
tive statistical relationship between benefits and fund via-
bility. If, on the other hand, we can show a negative relation-
ship between historically high benefits, for example, high
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benefits in 1967 and low fund viability in 1972, we would be
on safer ground in identifying high benefits as a cause of low
fund viability. We pursue evidence of such a behavioral rela-
tionship be lagging the benefit variable first 5 and then 10
years (benefits in 1967 and 1962, respectively). If the nega-
tive correlation holds between benefits and fund viability,
the condition for asserting a negative causal relationship
between benefits and fund viability will be satisfied.
Table 5.12 presents the list of independent variables
associated with each model, along with the analytic questions
under consideration. Maturity and percapita income are not
lagged for two reasons. First, we want to focus on the rela-
tionship between benefits and fund viability. Second, and more
to the point, it is the current ratio of active (paying) to
retired (receiving) workers and the current fiscal capacity
of the state to contribute that affects current viability most
dramatically. A case in point is Utah (See Table 4.1). With
increased contributions, the ratio of assets to benefit pay-
ments for Utah's local systems went from 2.503 in 1967 to
31.236 in 1972.
TABLE 5.12
DETERMINANTS OF FUND VIABILITY IN 1972
WITH LAGGED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Unit of Analysis Independent Variables Analytic Questions
Equation 3 Primary question:
State and locally administered
retirement systems combined
maturity 1972
benefits 1967
pci 1972
-- Do prior benefit
levels affect current
(1972) fund viability?
Equation 4
State and locally administered
retirement systems combined
maturity 1972
benefits 1962
pci 1972
Primary question:
-- Do prior benefit
levels affect current
(1972) fund viability?
Equation 5
State and locally administered
retirement systems combined
viability 1962
maturity 1972
benefits 1972
pci 1972
Primary question:
-- Is the effect of
high benefits on fund
viability negative
irrespective of prior
funding level?
H-
IV&a
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In Equation 3 we use benefits in 1967 as an independent
variable. (Table 5.13.)
TABLE 5.13
REGRESSION OUTPUT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON THE FUND
VIABILITY OF STATE AND LOCALLY ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS IN
1972 WITH BENEFITS IN 1967 AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Equation 3
Explained
variation Coeffs. F-Ratio Sig.
Total R2  0.585
Maturity 1972 0.322 -9.724 20.247 0.001
Benefits 1967 0.153 2.221 39.922 0.001
PCI, 1972 0.109 0.008 11.866 0.001
constant -12.930 (sig. 0.154)
degrees of freedom 45
model (sig. 0.001)
This equation explains 58.5 percent of the variation
in fund viability, virtually the same percent as that explained
by equation 2, with benefit payments in 1972 as the independent
variable. Moreover, benefits in 1967 is highly significant
(0.001) and accounts for a higher portion of the explained
variation in fund viability than benefits in 1972 (15.3 percent
compared with 9.8 percent).
In Equation 4 we lag the benefit variable 10 years,
using benefits in 1962 an an independent variable. (Table 5.14.)
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TABLE 5.14
REGRESSION OUTPUT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON THE FUND
VIABILITY OF STATE AND LOCALLY ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS IN
1972 WITH BENEFITS IN 1962 AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Equation 4
Explained
variation Coeffs. F-Ratio Sig.
Total R2  0.477
Maturity 1972 0.342 2.235 32.048 0.001
Benefits 1962 0.066 -8.633 6.821 0.012
PCI 1972 0.069 0.006 5.986 0.019
constant -12.452 (sig. 0.227)
degrees of freedom 45
model (sig. 0.001)
While equation 4 explains only 47.7 percent of the
variation in fund viability, and benefit payments in 1962
account for only 6.6 percent of the variation in 1972 fund
viability, the variable is still significant (0.012) and nega-
tively correlated with fund viability in 1972. In the absence
of consideration for the income of a jurisdiction, high bene-
fits might be seen as resulting in low fund viability because
of the inability of the jurisdiction to afford the level of
benefits chosen. However, a strong negative relationship
between benefits and fund viability occurs even when income is
controlled for. Thus, all models--both the one using current
(1972) benefit levels as well as those using historical bene-
fit levels--substantiate a significant negative correlation
between benefits and fund viability in 1972. These results
provide strong support for the theory that high benefits are
a cause of impaired fund viability.
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To conclude our analysis of the relationship between
high benefits and impaired fund viability, we control for
historical differences in fund viability. Our rationale for
doing this is that the effects of high benefits on fund via-
bility may differ depending upon how well funded a particular
system is to begin with. Theoretically, systems that are well
funded are in a position to meet increases in cost due to
benefit improvements and still put money aside for future bene-
ficiaries because the cost increases are marginal. In con-
trast, poorly funded systems which must meet almost the full
cost of benefit payments with few savings toward that end are
likely to feel so hard pressed by the current benefit payout
that they have little to set aside for improved future bene-
fits. Therefore, it may be that only marginally funded systems
suffer deteriorating effect of high benefits. To test for
the differential effect of high benefits depending on whether
the system starts well or poorly funded, we control for fund
viability in 1962 by including it in Equation 5 as an inde-
pendent variable. (Table 5.15.)
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TABLE 5.15
REGRESSION OUTPUT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON THE FUND
VIABILITY OF STATE AND LOCALLY ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS IN 1972
WITH FUND VARIABILITY IN 1962 AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Equation 5
Explained
variation Coeffs. F-Ratio Sig.
Total R2  0.834
Viability 1962 0.504 0.531 68.323 0.001
Maturity 1972 0.074 1.230 21.137 0.001
Benefits 1972 0.153 -6.200 67.991 0.001
PCI 1972 0.102 0.007 27.664 0.001
constant -17.147 (sig. 0.004)
degrees of freedom 45
model (sig. 0.001)
Equation 5 explains 83 percent of the variation in
fund viability. The high percentage of total variation
explained by fund viability in 1962 (50 percent) suggests that
the method state and local governments initially choose to
finance their retirement systems is of critical importance.
The very strong evidence from this analysis is that systems
that start behind stay behind.
The continued significant negative relationship
between benefits and fund viability, even when controlling for
fund viability in 1962, suggests that high behefits have a
deteriorating effect on viability whether systems begin well
or poorly funded.
Summary
Our objective in this chapter was to learn more about
how better funded retirement systems are structured, and more
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about the political and economic circumstances that influence
political decisions to accept or delay the responsibility for
funding pension benefits. To do this, we identified five
interrelated factors and used them in a series of linear re-
gression models to see how much of the variation in funding,
as measured by the ratio of assets to benefit payments, could
be explained by variables that would seem logically to affect
funding behavior. We then analyzed the results within the
framework of specific questions.
The first question we sought to answer was, "Does the
law matter?" To examine this question, we entered six variables
which describe statutory arrangement relating to pension plan
financing and enforcement procedures. Of the six variables,
only one was significant, the variable relating to the degree
to which the pension benefit is protected against statutory
change. The fact that legal requirements to fund and provisions
specifying the amount of annual contributions were not signi-
ficant; and that neither state nor employee powers to compel
contributions were significant, leads us to conclude that laws
specifying funding arrangements and enforcement procedures
have little bearing on the actual behavior of political officials.
The second question, "Do funding patterns reflect
community capacity?" revealed that retirement systems in higher
income states tend to be better funded than those in lower
income states.
We next asked, "Are retirement systems better funded
in states where the administrative responsibility for local
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systems is more highly centralized at the state level?" This
question was aimed at identifying the degree to which states
take supervisory responsibility for the local systems they
administer. This is a very important question, since evidence
of a positive correlation between state administration and
better funding would provide support for the position that
states can manage and that federal regulation is not necessary.
Unfortunately, the data do not support this position. There
is no significant difference in the fund viability of retire-
ment systems in states where the administration for local
systems is highly centralized at the state level.
In our fourth question we asked, "To what extent do
differences in workforce maturity explain interstate variations
in fund viability?" Our analysis shows that differences in
workforce maturity explains a substantial portion of interstate
differences in fund viability. Maturity is positively corre-
lated with fund viability--high (low) ratios of active to re-
tired employees are correlated with high (low) ratios of assets
to benefit payments--and generally explains from 30 to 40
percent of the variation in fund viability. We conclude from
this that much of the between state difference in fund via-
bility is not the result of sounder funding practices, but
the result of some states having higher cash inflows relative
to outflows due to higher ratios of active (contributing) to
retired (receiving) employees.
Finally, we considered the question, "Do generous
benefits discourage a funded approach?" To answer this ques-
tion, we looked at the relationship between current (1972) as
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well as past (1967 and 1962) benefit levels and 1972 fund
viability. We did this in order to go beyond the documentation
of a statistical relationship, which 1972 correlations
give us, to an investigation of a causal relationship between
benefits and fund viability. We reasoned that while high
benefit payments in 1972 might be negatively associated with
low fund viability in 1972, this was not sufficient evidence
to assert a causal relationship. We therefore sought to sub-
stantiate a linkage between past benefit levels and current
fund viability by lagging the benefit variable first 5 and
then 10 years. Our findings show a highly significant nega-
tive correlation between benefits and fund viability for all
years, and the negative correlation holds whether systems start
well or poorly funded. This provides supportive evidence for
the assertion that high benefits are a cuase of low fund
viability.
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A computer program developed at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology provides a series of routines that
allows the user to build his or her own stepwise regression
procedure, and through the use of quadratic sweep opera-
tors, experiment with it interactively. In this analysis,
variables were entered sequentially in order of their im-
portance to the theoretical model. All variables with a
significance factor equal to or less than .10 were retained
in the model. All others were eliminated. All variables
included in the final output were entered simultaneously.
"The algorithm implemented here is presented by
Dempster as one form of Gaussian elimination for a linear
system; and systematically exploited for statistical cal-
culus by Beaton. It was previously described by Efroymson.
The sweep operator as defined by Dempster is slightly dif-
ferent from Beaton's"...(Consistent Systems; Handbook for
Programmers; Laboratory of Architecture and Planning,
Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1976).
For references pertaining to quadratic sweep operators
and their relative computational accuracy, the reader is
referred to: Beaton, A.E. "The Use of Specified Matrix
Operators in Statistical Calculus," reprinted in Educational
Testing Service Research Bulletin 64-51, Princeton, N.J.,
1964; Dempster, A.P. Elements of Continuous Multivariate
Analysis, (Massachusetts: Addison 'Wesley, 1969);
Efroymson, M.A. "Multiple Regression Analysis," in
Mathematical Methods for Digital Computers. Edited by
A. Ralston and H.S. Wils. (New York: Wiley, 1960).
CHAPTER VI
DETERMINANTS OF BENEFITS
In this chapter we examine interstate differences in
average benefits paid retired public employees in 1972. We
have two objectives in trying to understand more about the
determinants of benefits. First, we want to see if there
is empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that pay-as-
you-go financing leads to high benefits, or its corollary,
that funding constrains benefit proliferation. Second, we
want to identify other factors significant in their asso-
ciation with benefits. Since low (high) benefits are con-
sistently associated with better (poorer) funding, to the
extent that we can identify factors associated with the level
of benefits, we indirectly identify factors that have a
bearing on funding. Our hypotheses concerning interstate
differences in the level of benefits are cast in terms of:
(1) variations in fund viability; (2) variations in wages;
(3) variations in state fiscal capacity; (4) variations in
the degree of state supervision and (5) variations in the
degree of labor force organization. Our unit of analysis
is state and locally administered retirement systems com-
bined. This unit assures data compatability.
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Analytic Questions
In pursuing our analysis of the determinants of bene-
fits, we want to answer five questions:
1. Does funding constrain benefit proliferation?
2. Is there a trade off between benefits and wages?
3. Do states in which retirement system administration is
highly centralized have lower overall statewide bene-
fits levels?
4. Does a highly organized labor force result in higher
benefits?
5. To what extent are current benefits a function of prior
benefit levels?
Defining the Model Variables
Fund Viability
Fund viability as defined in this model is the ratio
of assets to benefit payments, controlling for maturity.
Fund viability is the cornerstone of this model since our
primary interest is to test the assertion that pay-as-you-
go financing leads to high benefits. The reasoning behind
this assertion has to do with an interplay of forces involv-
ing politicians, militant work forces, and irate taxpayers.
The scenario is one in which short-sighted politicians with
a vested interest in remaining in office agree to pay higher
benefits because higher benefits, unlike higher salaries,
do not have to be met with an.immediate outlay from the
general expenditure budget. In this way, politicians, caught
in the stress of wage and benefit negotiations, are able to
buy peace with labor and current taxpayers at the expense
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of future taxpayers who must pay the cost of those generous
benefits when they become due. From this it is reasoned
that if politicians had to consider each benefit improvement
in terms of its immediate budgetary and tax consequence
such improvements would be kept within limits the community
could afford. Based on this logic, the expectation is that,
all things being equal, more fully funded systems will have
lower benefits than systems functioning on a less well-
funded or pay-as-you-go basis.
Maturity
The variable maturity is defined as the ratio of active
to retired employees. It is included in this model to cor-
rect for the distortions that would occur in an analysis of
the effect of fund viability on benefits in the absence of
consideration for differential maturities. It is not our
intent to analyze the separate effect of maturity on benefits.
Wages
Wages are defined as the average wage per public em-
ployee by state. Since retirement benefits represent only
a portion of the total compensation package, there is the
possibility that a part of the interstate difference in bene-
fits can be explained by different relative portions attribu-
table to pension benefits versus wages. That is, higher
benefits may be shifted backwards onto the employee in the
form of lower wages.
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Contrary to shifting theory, however, higher average
wages are expected to have a positive impact on benefits.
First, benefits are generally tied to wages. In most in-
stances, the factor, e.g., 1.5 times final average salary,
increases up to a maximum with additional years of service
beyond the minimum retirement age. Thus, not only do bene-
fits increase with wages, but they increase more than pro-
portionately if it can be assumed that there is a simultane-
ity between wages and longevity. Second, Bahl and Jump in
a study of pension costs found that costs are higher in
states where income is higher and union strength is greater.
State Fiscal Capacity
State fiscal capacity is measured in terms of per-
capita income. Our hypothesis is that benefits will be
higher in high income states for three reasons: First,
salaries are generally higher in high income states and
benefits are almost always pegged to salaries, i.e., they
are determined by multiplying a percent of final average
salary by the number of years of service. Second, high
income states are generally high cost-of-living states and
to the extent that efforts are made to provide a measure
of after retirement income adequacy, benefits will be high-
er in such states. Third, high income states have greater
available resources and therefore are more likely to be
generous in terms of the way they spend them.
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State Supervision
We define state supervision in terms of the percent
of state and local plan participants covered by state ad-
ministered systems. (See page 134 for the earlier develop-
ment of this variable.)
Benefits vary tremendously from state to state. They
also vary within state by level of government and category
of worker. Large city local systems pay higher benefits on
average than state systems. Systems covering teachers alone
pay the highest benefits, police and firemen rank second,
and general employees, last.1 The practice of setting dif-
ferential benefit levels has led to competition between
systems to gain parity. This practice, known as "leap-
frogging", has been one of the factors contributing to the
upward climb in benefits. One way of controlling this dy-
namic is to consolidate all systems into a single statewide
system and provide a uniform benefit structure. The Ohio
legislature, for example, has avoided this seesawing of
benefits among pension funds by insisting that pension
benefits be uniform, among teaching and non-teaching per-
sonnel and other public employees, at the state and local
levels. Benefits for uniformed employees, though distinct
from non-uniformed employees, are kept in line with each
other. 2
We anticipate that aggregate benefit levels will be
lower on average in states where the administrative function
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is highly centralized because the generally lower benefits
of state administered systems will depress overall state
averages.
Labor Organization
We use three variables to indicate the degree of
labor force organizations: (1) the percent of full-time
state and local government employees enrolled in employee
organizations; (2) the percent of governmental units within
each state that engage in collective negotiations and/or
meet and confer discussion; (3) the number of public em-
ployee strikes within the state between October 1971 and
October 1972.
(1) Enrollment in Employee Organizations
For the purpose of this study, an employee organiza-
tion is defined as "any association, organization, or fed-
eration which has as a primary purpose the improvement of
wages, hours, and conditions of employment for its member-
ship."3 Of the 8.6 million full-time state and local
government employees in October 1972, 4.3 million, or 50.4
percent, belonged to employee organizations. Table 6.1,
column 1, presents 1972 data on public employees enrolled
in employee organizations by state.
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TABLE 6.1
DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR ACTIVITY BY STATE, 1972
Full-time state and Governments which Work stoppages
local employees in engage in CN and/or October 1971 to
State employee organizationsa MC discussionsb October 1972c
Percent Percent Number
(1) (2) (3)
United States 50.4 13.7 381
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
41.0
53.2
36.5
35.7
66.2
38.9
73.9
53.2
34.0
24.1
25.2
83.2
37.8
45.2
29.2
38.6
28.0
31.2
28.5
58.3
52.5
58.8
67.1
50.7
17.5
38.4
41.7
34.4
43.9
40.8
50.4
32.6
74.2
46.8
37.1
47.6
36.7
57.8
63.1
73.4
27.3
41.0
36.1
45.1
53.1
45.3
44.1
59.8
31.9
57.0
43.0
2.7
14.9
18.9
2.8
30.7
7.2
39.4
18.2
66.7
7.0
2.1
20.0
10.4
11.3
8.1
12.5
5.4
3.6
5.3
19.4
7.7
46.9
29.3
16.3
6.5
6.4
13.7
6.6
14.1
10.4
40.5
9.4
29.9
1.2
4.1
17.7
8.7
18.7
16.6
33.6
1.9
6.3
3.4
3.1
8.9
13.7
8.8
22.2
5.7
21.2
9.1
11
2
0
0
18
1
8
4
1
5
9
3
1
29
10
3
2
4
0
1
1
7
29
2
1
8
1
0
0
1
22
3
27
3
0
34
0
2
77
10
2
0
7
7
0
0
2
6
5
12
0
Census, 1972 Census
Local Governments,
and Confer
SOURCE: aU.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
of Governments, Management-Labor Relations in State and
vol. 3, no. 3, Table 2.
blbid., Table B; CN-Collective Negotiations; MC=Meet
cIbid., Table 3
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(2) Collective Negotiations and/or
Meet and Confer Discussions
Collective negotiations refer to a "method of public
sector negotiations in which both management and employee
representatives are equal legal parties in the bargaining pro-
4
cess and decisions are mutually binding." Individual govern-
mental units may engage in both collective negotiations and
meet and confer discussions. Meet and confer discussions refer
to "public sector negotiations in which the public employer
consents to discuss conditions of employment with represen-
tatives of the employee organization. The public employer is
not legally bound to enter into these discussions, nor to
abide by any resulting memorandum of understanding."5 Of the
78,268 state and local governments identified by the Census of
Governments, 10,737 governments, or 14 percent, had policies
which provided for collective negotiations and/or meet and
confer discussions in 1972. (Table 6.1, column 2). These
methods of involving workers in contract decisions were much
more common at the state level. Sixty-eight percent of all
state governments engage in collective negotiations, compared
with only 8.8 percent at the local level. Eighty-six percent
of all state governments engage in meet and confer discussions
compared with only 12.4 percent at the local level. 6
Labor organizations have played a significant role in
the rapid improvement of public sector salaries and beneifts.
Public sector unions began to appear in the 1950s, but remained
a small force until the 1960s. Their growth was given impetus
by President Kennedy's Executive Order 10988 in 1962. This
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Order established the basic pattern in labor-management rela-
tions for federal workers and helped to create a climate in
which state and local government workers could demand recog-
7
nition of their unions and gain collective bargaining rights.
Exact figures on public employee labor organizations are not
available for the period prior to 1968, but between 1968 and
1974, organizational membership grew from 2.5 million to 3.9
8
million. As union membership grew, the character of the
organizations changed from social and professional organizations
to militant unions determined to improve every type of benefit
for their members. One of the initial rationales for higher
benefits in the public sector was that public sector employees
received lower wages and therefore should be rewarded with
after retirement security. In 1955 pay for state and local
employees was only 91.8 percent of that for private sector
employees. By 1965 pay comparability had almost been reached,
and by 1970, pay for state and local employees exceeded that
of their private sector counterparts by 5 percentage points. 9
(Table 6.2)
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TABLE 6 .2a
Private and Public Sector Wages, 1955-1973
Average Annual Earnings Per Full Time Employee
1955 1%0 1%5 1970 197
Per cent
increase
3 1955-1973
All industries
Private industries
Agriculture, forestry &
fisheries
Mining
Contract construction
Manufacturing
Transportation
Electric gas & sanitation
services
Wholesale and retail trade
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Finance, insurance & real
estate
Services
General civilian governmerTt
Fedra)
State and local
Public education
Non-school
Government enterprises &
military
$3,851
3,882
1,376
4,689
4,388
4,356
4,823
4,704
3,755
4,844
3,329
4,051
2,831
3,863
4,589
3,562
3,608
3,523
3,474
$4,743 $5,710 $ 7,571 $ 9,106 136.5
4,759 5,708 7,471 8,900
1,658
5,676
5,443
5,352
6,185
2,053
6,785
6,595
6,389
7,485
3,255
9,259
9,294
8,153
9,988
4,053
11,448
10,694
9,758
12,740
5,992 7,292 9,680 11,743
4,597 5,436 6,895 8,053
6,047 7,238 9,458 11,246
4,015 4,721 5,912 6,855
5,030
3,513
4,875
5,895
4,532
4,752
4,327
6,055
4,295
6,072
7,614
5,632
5,847
5,407
8,035
5.932
8,354
18119
7.843
8,140
7,512
9,525
7,115
10.089
1Z,984
9,446
9,624
9,248
4,280 4,952 7,001 9,589 176.0
Government Earnings as a Percentage of Private Industry Earnings
General civilian government
Federal
State and local
Public education
Non-school
Government enterprises &
military
Private
Federal general civilian government
State-local general government
Public education
Non-school
99.5
118.2
91.8
92.9
90.8
102.4
123.9
95.2
99.9
90.9
89.5 . 89.9
106.4
133.4
98.7
102.4
94.7
86.8 93.7 107.7
Private-Public Wage Gains: 1955-1973
129.3
182.9
165.2
166.7
162.5
SOURCE: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations staff compilations based on Department of Commerce
Survey of Current Business, various years tNational Income Account).
aReprint from Neal R. Pierce, "Federal-State Report/Public
Worker Pay Emerges as Growing Issue, National Journal,
August 23, 1975, p. 1199.
Industry
129.3
194.5
144.1
143.7
124.0
164.2
149.6
114.5
132.2
1.05.9
135.1
151.3
161.2
1SZ.9
165.2
166.7
162.5
112.2
140.8
105.0
109.0
100.5
113.4
145.9
106.2
108.1
103.9
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Union demands have been increasingly accompanied by
strikes. Work stoppages, which averaged only 25 a year be-
tween 1950 and 1964, increased to an average of 376 a
year between 1970 and 1974. As politicians experience the
increased militancy of union, they move to settle labor dis-
putes as expeditiously as possible. Benefit liberalizations
are a means politicians can use to appease labor and hide
from the taxpayer the full cost of settlement.
The Benefit Probability Model
Based on the above factors which logically would seem
to influence the level of benefits, we define the pension
benefit probability model as follows:
B = a+b V+b M+b-WPE+b PCI+b STAD+b SLUN+b CNMC+b Strike1 2~ 3 4 5 6 7 8
where
B = the average annual payment per beneficiary
a = the constant or mean variable or the independent varia-
bles not in the model
V = pension fund viability measured in terms of the ratio
of assets to benefit payments
M = maturity, i.e., the ratio of active to retired employees
WPE = average wage per public employee
PCI = state percapita income
STAD = the percent of retirement system participants covered
by state administered plans
SLUN = the percent of full-time state and local government
employees organized
CNMC = the percent of governments within each state that en-
gage in collective negotiations and/or meet and confer
discussions
Strike = the number of work stoppages between October 1971
and October 1972
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Methodology
We use four equations to examine the determinants of
benefits. Table 6.3 lists the independent variables associated
with each model along with the analytical questions under con-
sideration. In equation 1, we use 1972 cross section data to
analyze the statistical relationship between benefits and
selected independent variables. In equations 2 and 3, we give
recognition to the fact that benefits received in 1972 were
actually determined during earlier periods and lag all inde-
pendent variables, first 5 years, and then 10 years. In equa-
tion 4, we look at the relationship between historical and
current benefit levels by including the variable benefits in
1962 as an independent variable.
TABLE 6.3
DETERMINANTS OF BENEFITS IN 1972, INDEPENDENT VARIABLE LIST,
AND ANALYTIC QUESTIONS
Equation Unit of Analysis Independent Variables Analytic Questions
Equation 1
Equation 2
State and locally
administered,
retirement systems
State and locally
administered
retirement systems
viability 1972
maturity 1972
WPE 1972
pci 1972
percent st. admin. 1972
percent organized 1972
percent cn/mc 1972
strikes 1972
viability 1967
maturity 1967
WPE 1967
pci 1967
percent st. admin. 1967
Primary question
- Does funding constrain
benefit proliferation?
Secondary questions
- Is there a trade off
between benefits and
wages?
- Do benefit levels re-
flect state fiscal
capacity?
- Are benefits lower in
states where the admin-
istrative function is
highly centralized?
- Does a highly organized
labor force result in
higher benefits?
same as for equation 1
H
0
TABLE 6.3--Continued
Equation Unit of Analysis Independent Variables Analytic Questions
Equation 3
Equation 4
State and local
State and local
viability 1967
maturity 1967
WPE 1967
pci 1967
percent st. admin. 1967
benefits 1962
WPE 1962
viability 1962
maturity 1962
pci 1962
percent st. admin. 1962
same as for equation 1
to what extent are
current benefits a
function of prior
benefit level?
H
H
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Determinants Analysis: An Interpretation of
Cross-Section Regressions on 1972 Benefits Data
In Equation 1 we initially entered eight variables
(see Table 6.3 for variable list). Three variables were elim-
inated through the stepwise regression procedure described in
footnote 5.33. The final output is presented in Table 6.4
TABLE 6.4
REGRESSION OUTPUT OF 1972 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
ON AVERAGE PAYMENTS PER BENEFICIARY IN 1972
Equation 1
Explained
variation Coeffs. F-Ratio Sig.
Total R2  0.630
Viability 1972 0.106 -0.060 28.699 0.001
Maturity 1972 0.054 0.202 22.921 0.001
PCI 1972 0.065 0.001 7.933 0.007
CN/MC 1972 0.404 0.034 15.365 0.001
constant -2.004 (sig. 0.015)
degrees of freedom 45
model (sig. 0.001)
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Equation 1
Sixty-three percent of the interstate variation in
benefits is explained by the four variables:
viability, maturity, percapita income, and the extent of labor
involvement in the negotiations process. All coefficients are
significant at the 0.01 level or better, and the signs are
in the anticipated direction. Fund viability is negatively
correlated with average payments per beneficiary. Percapita
income and the extent of labor involvement in the contract
process are positively associated with benefits.
In equation 1 we sought to answer questions related
to the influence on benefits of funding, employee wages,
economic capacity, state supervision, and labor organization.
The results of equation 1 indicate that benefits are lower
on average in states with more fully funded systems, and
higher on average in states with higher incomes and an
active labor force. Public employee wages and state super-
vision, as measured by the percent of employees in the
state administered system, were not significant.1 0
174
Despite the high percent of interstate variation in
benefits explained by equation 1, it is not possible that the
1972 values of the independent variables could have determined
1972 benefit levels because benefits received in 1972 were
determined during prior periods. Since there is a lag between
the time decisions are made about benefits and the time they
are received, we must lag the independent variables in order to
explore the true relationship between average benefits received
in 1972 and variables felt to determine that amount.
In order to determine which year's data to use in such
an analysis, we examined actuarial tables on longevity. Accor-
ding to these tables, persons who retire at age 60 can expect
to live 18.34 years; and persons who retire at age 65 can expect
to live 15 years.12 If we assume that each person lives the
expected length of time and expires, then, based on these fig-
ures and assuming a retirement age of 60 or 65, all persons
receiving benefits in 1972 would have retired under benefit
structures existing anywhere from 0 to 18.3 years earlier.
This means that if we were to look at the 1972 retire-
ment profiles, we would find some employees who had just re-
tired and a few who had retired a full 18 years earlier. How-
ever, most would have retired at a midpoint between these
extremes, around 1962 for persons retiring at age 60, and 1965
for persons retiring at age 65. To capture this general range
of years, we lag the independent variables first five years
and then 10 years, using 1967 and 1962 data, respectively. We do
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not include the labor variables because these.datawere not collected
prior to 1968. The 1962 data should provide the most accurate
picture of the relationship between the independent variables
and benefits in 1972 because it is closest to the midpoint
during which the majority of persons receiving benefits in
1972 are assumed to have retired.
Equation 2 using 1967 data for the independent variables
explains 46 percent of the interstate variation in 1972 bene-
fit levels. (Table 6.5)
TABLE 6.5
REGRESSION OUTPUT OF 1967 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
ON AVERAGE PAYMENTS PER BENEFICIARY IN 1967
Equation 2
Explained
variation Coefficients F-Ratio Sig.
Total R2  0.457
viability 1967 0.008 -0.035 8.365 0.006
maturity 1967 0.103 0.107 14.055 0.001
pci 1967 0.302 0.001 12.634 0.001
st. admin. 1967 0.044 -0.017 3.545 0.066
Constant 1.170 (sig. 0.336)
Degrees of freedom 44
Model (sig. 0.001)
Fund viability is still significant, but explains less
of the variation in benefits (0.8 percent as contrasted with
10.6 percent) than when using 1972 data. Percapita income
our measure of state fiscal capacity, not only increases in
significance when using 1967 data but explains more of the
interstate variation in 1972 benefits than when using 1972
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data, 30.2 percent compared with 6.5 percent. (Percapita
income, in this case, may be capturing some of the association
registered between labor and benefits in equation 1.) The state
administration variable, which was not significant in equa-
tion 1, is negative and significant here at the .07 level.
When using 1962 data (Table 6.6), the explained varia-
tion drops to 34.1 percent. Fund viability and percapita in-
come are no longer significant. The state administration
variable continues to be negative and increases in signifi-
cance to the .01 level.
TABLE 6.6
REGRESSION OUTPUT OF 1962 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
ON AVERAGE PAYMENTS PER BENEFICIARY in 1972
Equation 3
Explained
variation Coefficients F-ratio Sig.
Total R2 0.341
viability 1962 0.016 -0.011 0.731 0.397
maturity 1962 0.066 0.031 4.459 0.040
pci 1962 0.157 0.000 2.503 0.121
st. admin. 1962 0.103 -0.023 6.860 0.012
Constant 3.052 (sig. 0.016)
Degress of freedom 44
Model (sig. 0.001)
We next analyze these data within the framework of
our questions. Our first question is, "Does funding constrain
benefit proliferation?" The measure of fund viability in this
analysis is the ratio of assets to benefit payments, control-
ling for maturity. If funding does indeed limit benefit
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proliferation, we should see a significant negative relation-
ship between fund viability and benefits during all periods
under examination. This link should be particularly strong
between past funding levels (1962 and 1967) and benefits in
1972, because it was during earlier periods that 1972 benefit
levels were determined.
An examination of the findings shows that this is, in
fact, not the case. Fund viability in 1967, while negative
and significant as a determinant of benefits in 1972, explains
less than 1 percent of the variation in 1972 benefits. When
we lag the fund viability variable 10 years, we find that the
relationship between fund viability and benefits is not at all
significant. These data lead us to conclude that there is
insufficient evidence to support the assertion that funding
constrains benefit proliferation or that pay-as-you-go finan-
cing encourages it. To the contrary, the evidence suggests
that the method of finance has little to do with benefit levels.
Perhaps this is because state and local governments are lax in
following actuarial funding schedules and, as a result, we do
not have adequate data to test this theory.
Our second question is, "Do benefit levels reflect
state fiscal capacity?" Percapita income, our measure of state
fiscal capacity, is highly significant and explains 30 percent
of the interstate variation in benefits when using 1967 data,
but is not at all significant when using 1962 data. Given
these ambiguous findings, the most we can say is that there is
a questionable positive relationship between percapita income
and benefits.
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Our next question is, "Are benefits lower in states
where the administrative function is highly centralized?"
Here, the data support a picture of lower benefits in
centrally administered systems. The variable representing
the degree of centralized administration is negative,
though of questionable significance (.07) when using 1967
data, but clearly significant when using 1962 data.
Our fourth question asks, "Does a highly organized
labor force result in higher benefits?" The only period for
which we have data on variables that represent the degree
of labor force organization is 1972. Based on the model
using 1972 variables, we can make the following observations
about the relationship between labor force strength and
benefits in 1972.
The percent of employees enrolled in employee organi-
zations was not significant. On the other hand, the variable
representing governments that engage in collective negotiations
and/or meet and confer discussions is highly significant and,
moreover, explains 40 percent of the interstate variation in
benefits. This would seem to indicate that simple membership
in labor organizations is not a sufficient condition to influ-
ence benefit related policies, but that formal recognition of
labor by management is required as well. The variable repre-
senting the number of strikes in 1972 was not significant.
However, since the use of strikes as a weapon to achieve wage
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and benefit goals is a recent phenomenon in the public sector
(strikes having increased sharply since 1970), the impact of
strikes on benefits may not become apparent until some years
into the future when workers operating under newly negotiated
benefit structures retire,
These findings,using 1972 values for labor, suffer the
same shortcoming as other findings using 1972 variables, namely,
theycannot be assumed to describe a behavioral relationship
since 1972 benefits were determined at an earlier date.
In equation 4 we examine a fifth question, which is,
"To what extent are current benefits a function of prior benefit
levels?" To answer this question, we control for 1962 benefit
levels by including the variable in equation 4 as an indepen-
dent variable. Sixty-two percent of the interstate variation
in benefits in 1972 is explained by this model. (Table 6.7)
TABLE 6.7
REGRESSION OUTPUT OF 1962 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
INCLUDING BENEFITS IN 1962
ON AVERAGE PAYMENTS PER BENEFICIARY IN 1972
Equation 4
Explained
variation Coefficients F-ratio Sig.
Total R2  0.620
benefits 1962 0.558 1.340 31.572 0.000
viability 1962 0.002 -0.004 0.175 0.068
maturity 1962 0.019 0.023 3.937 0.054
pci 1962 0.000 0.000 0.549 0.463
st. admin. 1972 0.041 -0.015 4.626 0.037
Constant 2.039 (sig. 0.038)
Degrees of freedom 43
Model (sig. 0.001)
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The level of benefits in 1962 explains 56 percent of
the variation. This would seem to indicate that current day
benefit levels are conditioned more than anything else by
prior benefit levels. This goes along with theories of incre-
mentalism in public finance, but also accords with the tradi-
tion that benefits once granted cannot be reduced. Thus, we
might anticipate that whatever the initial benefit, the direc-
tion will be gradually upward, and other factors will simply
retard or accelerate that direction.
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CHAPTER VII
FEDERAL REGULATION
Private Pensions: The Nature of the Public Interest
On September 2, 1974, Congress passed into law the
historic Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA).
What was the nature of the federal interest in private pension
plans that led to the enactment of federal standards with re-
spect to such plans?
In the year 1973, the year prior to the enactment of
ERISA, private pension plans covered 28 million workers and
paid $11 billion in benefits to 6.1 million retired employees
or their beneficiaries. Asset holdings totalled $179 billion.
Private pension plans were a major element in the economic
security of millions-of Americans; they were a growing source
of economic power; and an important factor operating on the
labor force, in that they tended to affect its mobility, its
employment prospects, and incentives.
In addition, qualified private pension plans were the
recipients of significant public encouragement through favor-
able tax treatment. In testimony before the Subcommittee on
Fiscal Policy in May 1966,, Stanlev S. Surrey, then Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury, had this to say about the estimated
federal tax expenditures on behalf of private pension plans:
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If the total amount contributed by employers to qualified
pension plans and the investment income of the funds were
taxable at the corporate rate, tax liabilities would rise
at current levels by about $3.8 billion per year. If the
amounts were taxable at individual rates, 2 the revenues
would rise by amount $1.4 billion a year.
Thus, the federal government had a material interest
in private pensions, as well as a number of practical concerns,
both relative to their economic power and relative to their
role as a source of economic security to retired Americans.
The History of Private Pension Plan Growth
In 1875, the American Express Company established the
first pension plan in the private sector. The plan was finan-
ced solely by the employer. Five years later, the Baltimore
and Ohio Raliroad Company established the first jointly (em-
ployer and employee) sponsored plan. However, it was not until
the 1940s that private sector plans began to assume any real
significance. Pressures for the establishment of such plans
came primarily from employees, but there were also benefits to
be realized by employers.
Several factors stimulated employee efforts to gain a
measure of after retirement income security. First, the de-
pression of the 1930s made Americans more security conscious.
A key federal response to the loss of income and savings during
the depression was the adoption of the Social Security Act of
1935. This act was designed to provide a floor of protection
for the elderly who had been regularly employed. The minimal
level of security provided by this act increased employee
pressure for the adoption of employer plans which, together
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with Social Security, would provide a greater measure of
after retirement income adequacy.
Second, the governmental wage freeze during World War
II increased employee pressure for improved fringe benefits
which were not subject to wage control.
Third, in 1948 the National Labor Relations Board ruled
that "wages" included any emolument of value and as such, the
provisions of pension plans were a condition of employment and
a proper subject for collective bargaining.3
From the employer's perspective, there were both pro-
duction and cost incentives to the establishment of employee
pension plans. On the production side, employers, operating
in the competitive wartime labor market saw pensions as an in-
centive to attract better employees and reduce turnover. At
the same time, pensions served as a morally and socially ac-
ceptable mechanism for the release of employees who had passed
beyond their most productive years of service.
On the cost side, the creation of pension plans was
given a stimulus by the Revenue Act of 1942. Under this act,
if a plan "qualified," i.e., met specified Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) standards relative to coverage and funding,
employer contributions were deductible as a business expense
for federal income tax purposes. In addition, earnings from
the investment of plan assets, including capital gains, were
exempted from taxation until disbursed in the form of benefits.
Today, nearly one-half of all workers in the private
sector in the United States are enrolled in a retirement plan.
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In 1975, private plans covered approximately 30 million workers,
paid benefits exceeding $12 billion to over 7 mil.lion recipi-
ents, and held assets in the realm of $200 billion.5
Federal Regulation of Private Pension Plans
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, the federal govern-
ment utilized two vehicles to encourage private retirement
plans to meet certain objectives: federal tax laws and
financial disclosure.
Early tax laws, though not specifically directed
toward private pensions, provided that reasonable payments
were deductible as a business expense for federal income tax
purposes.6 These laws, however, did not exempt contributions
toward the payment of past service costs. The Revenue Act of
1928 provided for "reasonable" deductions toward this end for
the "qualified" trust.
However, this act lent itself to abuses and inequities.
In order to qualify for special tax treatment, a plan needed
only to benefit "some or all" employees. As a result, owners
often voted generous pensions for themselves and a few favorite
employees, while leaving the bulk of the employees uncovered.
Through this subterfuge, owners were able to provide a trust
for themselves, gain an immediate tax write-off for the cor-
poration, and avoid any immediate personal tax due to increased
income. In addition, the act did not require that the trust
be irrevocable. Thus owners were free, at any time, to uni-
laterally recall pension benefits.
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This combination of abuses led to the more stringent
Revenue Act of 1942. In order to qualify for special tax ad-
vantages under this law, the business had to meet specified
standards designed to provide greater equity with respect to
coverage, benefits, and the financing of private pension plans.
The act was amended and reenacted in the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954. This act, as refined over time, continues to be the
primary statutory guide for the tax treatment of private plans.
Responsibility for the enforcement of the provisions is left
to the Internal Revenue Service. One significant IRS amend-
ment stipulated that in order for a plan to retain its quali-
fied status, it had to maintain minimum funding standards, i.e.,
contributions equal to current costs, plus interest on the un-
funded liability. This stipulation made a strong contribu-
tion to the relatively adequate funding of qualified private
pension plans even prior to ERISA.
Although the IRS monitored funding, there were no
legislative standards with respect to fiduciaries, and evidence
of the financial abuse of pension funds began to surface. In
response to mounting complaints, Congress passed the 1958
Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act. The hope was that
adequate disclosure of pension plan finances would be suf-
ficient to maintain the integrity of pension plan funds. The
rationale was that if participants had sufficient information
about the nature and operation of their plans, they would be
in a position to detect malpractice and seek proper protection
under existing state and federal laws. The responsibility
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for managing the operational aspects of reporting and dis-
closure was placed under the jurisdiction of the Department
of Labor. In 1962 the act was amended to make certain fidu-
ciary abuses a criminal offense. The Justice Department, in
cooperation with the Labor Department, was given responsibil-
ity for bringing appropriate legal action. Thus, the burden
of proving malpractice was shifted from plan participants to
government agencies.7
Despite IRS and Labor Department monitoring, complaints
continued to flow in. Many centered around severe age and
service requirements before eligibility for pension benefits;
instances of corporate dismissals just prior to workers qual-
ifying for vested pension rights; and termination of plans
without funds to cover accrued benefits. In addition, there
were continued instances of fund diversion for private pur-
poses.
Issues of equity, protection of the pension benefit
right, and fiduciary responsibility were of sufficient concern
to stimulate President Kennedy to appoint a special Cabinet
level committee in March 1962 to "review legislative and ad-
ministrative practice relating to private pension plans."8
That committee'sreport, made under President Johnson in 1965,
recommended specific federal standards for vesting and funding.
It was almost 10 years later that a bill which both the House
and Senate could support was reported out.
There were several reasons that a bill to regulate
private plans was so long in finding approval. First, the
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issue had little popular support. While a considerable number
of workers had lost benefits even after many years of service,
9
only a small percentage of plans had actually failed. For
this reason, only a relatively small number of persons expres-
sed interest in the legislative objectives.
Second, business leaders and union officials were
actively hostile. Business leaders were afraid of the increased
cost. Labor was afraid that more stringent funding regulations
would limit their ability to bargain for more liberal benefits.
Further, there was little indepth knowledge of private plans,
and even potential supporters felt that a period of study was
needed to investigate the implications of federal standards for
private pensions. In the years that followed, considerations
for costs played a major role in the deliberations, and in the
final analysis, was the central factor in deciding which stan-
dards to include. 1 0
On Labor Day in 1974, the Employee Retirement and
Income Security Act was signed into law. The Act provides
for the disclosure and reporting to participants and benefi-
ciaries of financial information, establishes standards of
fiduciary conduct, and improves the equitable character and
soundness of private plans by setting standards for vesting
11
and funding and requiring plan termination insurance. It
should be noted that the law does not require private employ-
ers to establish a pension plan.
The "Average" Private Retirement Plan
Although the benefit provisions of retirement plans
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are extremely varied, an "average" system can be defined by
setting forth a most common practice package of benefits.
This job is made somewhat easier by the passage of ERISA,
which establishes minimum standards with respect to vesting,
pre-retirement death benefits, and funding responsibilities.12
Benefit formula
Most plans in the private sector relate benefits to
the employee's compensation earned either over the employee's
entire career (career average) or over the employee's final
years of service (final average pay plans). There has been
an increasing trend toward final pay formulas, and a shorten-
ing of the final pay period.from ten to five years. The
average retirement compensation in the private sector is be-
tween 36 percent and 40 percent of final average salary,
excluding Social Security. This equates with a benefit for-
mula of approximately 1.25 times the designated salary base
multiplied by the number of years of service.
Cost-of-Living Adjustment
During the highly inflationary years between approxi-
mately 1968 and the present, corporation managers have taken
several measures to cope with the eroding effects of inflation
on purchasing power of the retirement dollar. These have in-
cluded increasing benefit rates and shortening the base on
which benefits are figured, e.g., moving from career average
to final average and shortening the final average period from
ten to five years. For persons already retired, pensions are
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generally adjusted by management decision. Automatic post
retirement adjustments are almost nonexistent.
Retirement Age
Normal retirement age is the term used in the typical
pension plan to describe the age at which an employee can re-
tire and receive a full accrued pension. The compulsory
retirement age is the age at which an employee must retire.
For most plans in the private sector, normal and compulsory
retirement ages are the same. The normal retirement age is
65. Where years of service are also required, the usual num-
ber is five years or less.
Vesting
Vesting is the right of an employee to leave the ser-
vice of his or her employer prior to normal retirement without
forfeiting his or her accrued pension benefit. ERISA sets
three alternative vesting schedules: full vesting after ten
years; partial vesting after five years, gradually increasing
to full vesting after 15 years of service; and the rule of 45,
a combined age plus service formula.
This provision received more consideration than any
other during the formulation of ERISA. Prior to the passage
of federal regulations, 23 percent of conventional plans either
imposed vesting requirements of 25 years or more, or of age 55
or older (regardless of service requirements). The effect of
prolonged service requirements and/or high age requirements
before vesting was to: (1) impede workforce mobility by tying
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employees to jobs at the risk of losing pension benefits;
(2) create the likelihood that an employee with two or three
job changes would end up with great bulks of employment for
which no pension credits were earned; (3) provide no security
for employees in the event of separation from service, even
though such separation might be involuntary. Extended vesting
provisions saved money for the employer since employer paid
contributions were forfeited when the employee failed to meet
the pension plan vesting rule.
Disability Benefit
This is not a universally held benefit. Twenty-nine
percent of the corporate plans surveyed by Bankers Trust during
their '65-'70 study did not have a disability provision. Many
companies do not include disability as part of their pension
contract, but cover it under separate disability insurance
plans. The type of disability most commonly covered under
pension plans is total and permanent disability. Benefits are
generally equal to full accrued benefits or somewhat higher.
Eligibility for disability benefits usually requires 10 to 15
years of service.
Death Benefit
Employees who are within 10 years of normal retirement
may choose a smaller pension, in return for which the spouse
will receive a lifetime pension if the employee dies before
retiring. The pension payable to the survivor would amount to
50 percent of the full accrued benefit.
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Employee Contributions
Employee contributions to private employer pension
plans are becoming more and more rare. In the '65-'70 Bankers
Trust study of corporate pension plans, 55 percent of the plans
neither required nor permitted employee contributions. This
percentage is up from 45 percent in their '55-'59 study. In
those plans where contributions are permitted on either a vol-
untary or mandatory basis, the contribution is usually between
3 percent to 4 percent of pay.
Social Security
All employees in the private sector are covered by
Social Security. Although some employers account for the dual
coverage by offsetting a portion of the Social Security bene-
fit against the staff plan benefit, such plans are becoming
less rather than more common.
Under the provisions of ERISA, plans may not use in-
creases in Social Security benefits or wage base levels to
reduce employee plan benefits that are already being paid.
Funding
ERISA sets minimum funding standards as contributions
sufficient to cover normal cost plus amortization of the past
service liability over 40 years for plans existing as of January 1,
1974, and 30 years for those coming into existence after January 1,
1974. Increases in the unfunded liability arising as a result
of benefit improvements must be amortized over a period of 30
years; investment losses over 15 years, and losses resulting
from changes in actuarial assumptions over 30 years.
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In the event of substantial business hardship, the IRS
may waive the funding requirement. The amount waived (plus
interest) must be amortized in equal installments over a per-
iod of 15 years.
Termination Insurance
To protect employees against the loss of benefits due
to business failure, ERISA creates a Pension Guarantee Cor-
poration. It is funded through annual employer contributions
of $1 per worker. The annual employer premium is for the pur-
pose of closing the gap between a terminating plan's assets
and the amount necessary to pay all vested benefits. A maxi-
mum is set on the amount of benefits that will be insured for
any single individual. Employers who terminate plans are
liable for insurance payments made by the Corporation up to
30 percent of their net worth.
There has not been a comprehensive evaluation of ERISA
to date. Some parts of the plan, i.e., rules regarding parti-
cipation and vesting, did not go into effect until December 31,
1975. However, John Dent, chairman of the subcommittee to
study public pensions, and one of the drafters of the private
pension legislation, comments:
Congress has learned a great deal from its 2-1/2
years of experience with ERISA. Congress is very much
aware. . . that ERISA has produced too much paperwork,
especially for small plans. Likewise, the experience with
three agencies (Treasury, Labor, and Justice) adminis-
tering the law has clearly proven unsatisfactory, and impor-
tant efforts are now underway to remedy these problems.
The problems of ERISA compel Congress to make certain that
any public plan legislation is workable and realistically
balances the needs of p ticipants, plan sponsors, and
everyone else involved."
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State and Local Pensions: The Nature of the Public Interest
In a statement before the House Subcommittee on Labor
Standards, Roy A. Schotland, Professor of Law at the
Georgetown Law Center in Washington, D.C., observed,
If self-serving abuses, unexpected disruptions, and
personal suffering were to occur among state and local
pension systems and beneficiaries as they did occur among
private systems, it is inconceivable we yguld not enact
at least as full a regulation as ERISA.
The issues facing public pension plans today are simi-
lar in many respects to those which led to the formulation of
federal standards for private plans: millions of employees
are dependent on them for after retirement income; they are a
critical factor in the economic growth and stability of the
nation; they are an important supplement to the retirement
benefits of the Social Security system.
Contrary to private pension plans, however, there have
been few complaints relative to benefit levels and vesting.
As of January 1972, benefit levels of public plans were, on
average, approximately double those offered in private indus-
try. One reason for this margin of superiority is that pub-
lic plans, with few exceptions, require employee contribu-
tions, while private plans are largely non-contributory.
Ho',ever, even after adjusting for the value of employee con-
tributions, public plans provide an average level of benefits
that is somewhat higher than those of private industry.15
The "average" public plan described below was ab-
stracted by J. Richard Aronson from Robert Tilove's study on
state and local retirement systems. As in the case of private
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plans, there is great diversity from this central model.16
Benefit formula. An employee's annual pension is
determined by multiplying the number of years he has worked
by 1.67 percent of his final average salary. This means
that an individual who has worked for thirty years retires
with a pension equal to 50 percent of his final average
salary. Final average salary is an average of the em-
ployee's five highest-paid years in his last ten years
of service.
Cost-of-living adjustment. Pension benefits are guar-
anteed to increase with the consumer price index up to a
maximum of 3 percent a year.
Retirement age. The normal retirement age is 60
if the employee has at least ten years of service and
with ten years of service the employee may retire at age
55. This means that the government's contributions be-
come vested in the employee after ten years of service.
Vesting. If an employee leaves after ten years of
service and does not withdraw his contributions, he is
entitled to normal pension benefits at age 60 or early
retirement benefits at age 55. This means that the
government's contributions become bested in the employee
after ten years of service.
Disability benefit. A disability pension is provided
for those who have at least ten years of service. The
benefit is guaranteed to be not less than 25 percent of
final average salary unless that amount exceeds what the
employee would receive under normal retirement at age 60.
The service requirement is waived if the disability was
the result of a job-connected accident.
Death benefits. The typical plan includes a variety
of death benefits. If an employee dies after at least
one year of employment, his beneficiary is entitled to a
half year's salary. If he has been employed for ten years,
the benefit is usually a full year's salary. If the em-
ployee dies at a time he is eligible to retire, his widow
is entitled to an annuity equal to what she would have
received if he had retired just before his death.
Employee contributions. The employee contributes 5
percent of his pay; if he terminates employment, he can
get a refund with interest.
Social Security. The employee is covered by Social
Security, with no adjustment of benefits from the retire-
ment system on that account.
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The primary concern with respect to public pensions
is that of funding. In the private sector, the enjoyment of
certain tax advantages has been used as a vehicle for encour-
aging employers to meet certain funding objectives. This has
not been true in the public sector. Although governmental
contributions as made and investment income as earned are not
treated as taxable income for employees until disbursed, the
IRS has not tied this preferred tax treatment to any precon-
dition with respect to funding. As a consequence, public
plans, in the aggregate, are not as well funded as their pri-
vate sector counterparts.
When ERISA was signed into law in 1974, public plans
were exempted from coverage while a study of all such plans was
made with a view toward possible future federal regulation.
That study was formally begun in the summer of 1975 by the
subcommittee on Labor Standards of the House Committee on
Education and Labor.
At that time, John Dent, chairman of the subcommitte,
introduced H.R. 9155, a bill extending ERISA standards to
public plans. The bill was not intended as a serious legis-
lative vehicle, but one that would stimulate debate and the
introduction of alternative proposals. Between September 17
and November 15, 1975, the subcommittee on Labor Standards
convened hearings in four parts of the country. During those
days of testimony, questions and interchange, a full array of
issues and perspectives were aired with respect to federal
regulation of state and locally administered retirement systems.
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Causes of Public Sector Pension Underfunding
Interestingly, the causes of pension underfunding as
articulated in testimony before the subcommittee on Labor
Standards shows a high correspondence with the findings of the
regression analysis in Chapter V. To the extent that percep-
tions about the causes of retirement system underfunding can
be supported with empirical evidence, recommendations for re-
form will stand on firmer ground.
In Table 7.1 below, we juxtapose statements from Con-
gressional testimony with regression analysis findings. We
follow this with a fuller articulation of causes based both on
Congressional testimony and regression results. We then ex-
amine the likelihood that legislation regulating funding can
be successfully reported out, given the perspective of those
likely to be impacted by it.
TABLE 7.1
COMPARISON OF CAUSES OF PENSION UNDERFUNDING
Causes Described in Congressional Testimony
1.0 Failure to abide by funding methods
as prescribed by statute
1.1 Increased financial pressures
have led to deferred statutorially
mandated employer contributions.
2.0 The liberalization of benefits without
funds to assure their ultimate payment.
2.1 States mandate benefit improvements
without consideration for local
capacity to fund.
State legislatures have approved
locally initiated benefit increases
without considering implications
for funding.
2.2 Organized employee groups demand
increasingly generous benefits
Causes Indicated by Regression Analysis
1.0 The law does not matter
1.1 Legal requirements to fund and provisions
specifying the amount of annual contri-
butions are not significant.
1.2 State authority to enforce the timely
remittance of contributions from local
governments is not significant.
1.3 Employee power to seek employer compli.
ance with requirements to fund and
pay benefits through a writ of mandamus
is not significant.
2.0 High benefits are associated with low fund
viability.
2.1 Centralized administration of local
systems, which should allow closer
supervision, is not significantly cor-
related with better state overall
funding ratios.
2.2 Benefits are higher in states where
state and local employees are highly
organized
199
TABLE 7.1--Continued
Causes Described in Congressional Testimony
2.3 Arbitrators in labor negotiations
make decisions with respect to
benefit improvements with no
knowledge of their costs.
3.0 The use of general revenue sharing
funds which hides the cost of
benefits to the taxpayer.
4.0 The abuse of fiduciary responsibility
Causes Indicated by Regression Analysis
2.3 No corresponding variable
2.4 High (low) ratios of active to
retired employees are associated
with high (low) fund viability.
Early retirements result in a
disproportionate number of retired
to active employees.
3.0 High (low) fiscal capacity is associated
with high (low) fund viability.
4.0 No corresponding variable
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The Failure to Follow Funding
Methods Prescribed by Statute
Congressional testimony. Statues and ordinances dic-
tate the method of funding, but employer contributions often
fail to meet either statutory or actuarial minimum funding
requirements. In recent years, due to increased financial
pressures, there have been mounting instances of attempts by
state and local governments to defer, redirect, or simply not
pay all or a portion of the statutorially mandated employer
contribution. These actions have led to an increase in the
use of the courts as an arena for settling pension funds dis-
putes. Suits have been brought by employee groups against
the States of Illinois and Washington, and the Cities of
Detroit and Philadelphia to compel the level of funding pre-
scribed by statute. 1 7
Regression findings. Analysis of the relationship
between pension statutes and funding points to the existence
but non-use of available structures and/or powers to ensure
soundly financed systems. Thirty out of fifty state adminis-
tered systems cover 90 percent or more of all state and local
public employees enrolled in pension plans. This provides a
structural opportunity for these states to oversee the finances
of local plans under their jurisdiction. Forty out of fifty
state administered systems require funding by statute. Thirty
out of fifty states (not necessarily the game states) operate
under legislation that enables them to invoke penalties to
enforce timely payments from state agencies and local govern-
ments. And yet, none of these provisions is significant as
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a determinant of fund viability (Appendix A, Table A-l, sum-
marizes statutory provisions with respect to funding.)
Employees also have a power that is rarely used. In
29 states, actuarially determined employer contributions
appear to be legally compellable. That is, provisions are
either written in mandatory language, and/or benefits are
designated as part of a legally enforceable contract, and/or
benefits are defined as a general obligation of the government.
In such instances, statutes provide a basis for pension plan
members to seek a writ of mandamus to compel employer contri-
butions as prescribed by statute. The variable representing
this power is not significant.
We were able to document only six cases where employees
had sought to compel funding through a writ of mandamus. Of
these, only two cases were decided in favor of the plaintiffs.
In both instances, the resulting impact on employer contribu-
tions has been dramatic. Philadelphia's contribution to its
pension funds jumped from $14.5 million in 1967-68, the year
the suit was initiated, to $60.1 million in 1972-73. Table
7.2 identifies changes in Philadelphia's contributions and
associated court decisions. Table 7.3 shows similar changes
for the State of Washington.
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TABLE 7. 2
PHILADELPHIA: CONTRIBUTIONS TO PENSION FUNDS
BEFORE AND AFTER COURT ORDER, SELECTED YEARS
Governmental
Year Contribution Legal Action
(millions)
1967-68 14,5 Complain filed
1968-69 14.5 Writ of mandamus issued
1969-70 25.6 Order appealed; affirmed
1970-71 40.0 Request for modified
schedule of paymentsa
1972-73 60.0
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Finances of Employee-Retirement Systems of State and Local
Governments, related years; Dombrowski v. City of Philadelphia,
Court of Common Pleas, No. 2348 (1969); Dombrowski v. City of
Philadelphia, 245 A 2d 238 (1968); Dombrowski v. City of
Philadelphia, 57 D & D 2d (1971).
a The court approved the city's request to amortize $41.9
million, the amount of interest due on the unfunded liability for
1967 and 1968, over a period of 40 years. The modification of
the court's original order (full payment of interest for 1967 and
1968 plus current costs) places the city under the court's juris-
diction for the 40 year amortization period.
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TABLE 7.3
STATE OF WASHINGTON: CONTRIBUTIONS TO PENSION FUNDS
BEFORE AND AFTER COURT ORDER, SELECTED YEARS
Governmental
Year Contribution Legal Action
(millions)
1966-67 30.5
1971-72 37.6 Writ of mandamus issued
1973-74 68.2
1974-5 70.3
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Finances of Employee-Retirement Systems of State and Local
Governments, related years; Weaver v. Evans, Wash., 495 P. 2d 639
(1972).
Liberalization of Benefits Without
Funds to Assure Payment
Congressional testimony. In recent years, organized
employee groups have demanded increasingly generous benefits.
City officials have found it easier to grant pensions than to
meet salary increases, since appropriations for pensions can
be deferred while outlays for increased salaries cannot. State
assemblies which must generally7 pass on all locally initiated
pension plan changes involving an increase in cost to tax-
payers have performed this function in a perfunctory manner
without worrying about the implications for funding. In other
instances, state legislaturen have mandated benefit improve-
ments without concern for the funding impact on local units
affected, or providing funds for their cost. Further
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compounding the problem in those states with compulsory arbi-
tration are decisions with respect to benefit improvements
which are made by arbitrators with no knowledge of and little
concern for the cost implications.18
Regression findings. Our analysis provides clear evi-
dence that systems with high benefits over time are less well
funded than systems with low benefits. Therefore, to establish
sound financing, it would appear to be necessary to control the
factors that propel benefits higher. Although we were able to
show a correlation between the 1972 values of several variables
--high income, high labor activity, low fund viability--and
high benefits in 1972, we were not able to substantiate a be-
havioral relationship. In order to provide evidence of a be-
havioral relationship, we would have to find a significant as-
sociation between past values of a given variable and benefits
in 1972 (benefits in 1972 were determined at a prior date).
The only variable for which we can substantiate such a finding
is that representing the degree to which the administrative
function for all systems was centralized at the state level in
1962 (the approximate period during which 1972 benefits were
determined). States with highly centralized systems had clear-
ly lower benefits.
The Use of General Revenue Sharing Funds
to Hide the Cost of Benefits
Congressional testimony. Concern about the viability of
pension funds has been heightened by recently surfaced infor-
mation that some local governments have been using revenue shar-
ing funds to meet benefit payments. John P. Milliron, member
of the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania, gave testimony that:
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Over a third of the third-class cities last year
(1974) in Pennsylvania took Federal revenue sharing money
and put it into their pension funds because they were
near collapse. The City of Wilkes-Barre also put
$350,000 of revenue sharing money in to be able to meet
payments for last year... So the Federal government is
very much involved, whether they realize it or not, with
their moneys which were not intended under revenue shar-
ing, as far as I can tell, to bail out a pension fund.1 9
Regression findings. High (low) fiscal capacity, as mea-
sured by state percapita income, is correlated with high (low)
fund viability. One of the initial questions we asked was
whether pension underfunding was symptomatic of resource-poor
states, or symptomatic of fiscal irresponsibility. The regres-
sion results indicate that both forces are in operation. To
the extent that low fiscal capacity is associated with low fund
viability, pension underfunding is symptomatic of resource-poor
states. To the extent that state supervision does not result
in superior funding, we are dealing with the failure of states
to operate responsibly with respect to financial oversight duties.
The Abuse of Fiduciary Responsibility
Congressional Testimony. Abuses in fiduciary practices
do not appear to be as widespread in the public sector as they
were in the private sector. However, they do occur, and where
they do, they have implications for public plan viability. In
1973, it was learned that as much as $17.2 million in Maryland
State retirement funds were being held in non-interest bearing
accounts in a bank for which the former state treasurer was
chief executive officer. In Stratford, Connecticut, the pen-
sion fund was reduced by approximately $1.5 million over a two-
year period as a result of what appeared to be an illicit transfer
of pension fund moneys undertaken without prior authorization.2 0
207
In other instances, public officials have borrowed
from employee pension funds to obtain additional operating
revenues. This happened in Hamtrack, Michigan, where the
city administration used employee contributions to the pen-
sion fund as operating revenues from 1965 to 1970. Hamtrack
subsequently went into bankruptcy and for a period of time,
was unable to meet its payments to pensioners. More recently,
there has been concern about the pension fund investments of
the New York City retirement systems. Approximately 50 per-
cent of the assets of that city's retirement systems are
pledged to the purchase of New York City securities, despite
that city's near bankrupt status.
Regression findings. Our model did not contain a
measure of investment behavior.
Federal Regulation: Issues and Perspectives
It took almost ten years for Congress to work through
legislative standards for private pensions. There are many
indications that a similar neriod of time can be anticipated
for the evolvement of legislation regulating the public sec-
tor. In fact, the road may be even more tortuous because of
certain constitutional questions that did not have to be faced
with regard to private pensions. Other issues and tensions,
however, will be similar, e.g., the lack of popular support;
the lukewarm position of unions; and strong employer (state
and local government) opposition. In the narrative that
follows, we examine the positions of various interest groups.
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Little Public Support
The Non-publicly Employed Taxpayer
Public pension plans are primarily financed by tax-
payers. Those contributions in 1974 accounted for 47.3 per-
cent of the total bill. Employees contributed 25.5 percent
and earnings on investments provided 27.2 percent. However,
until the last three or four years, little information was
available on public employee pension plans and, of that avail-
able, even less was in a form digestible by lay persons.
Therefore, the average taxpayer knows little of the size,
scope, and cost to him or her of current pension arrangements.
However, if the non-publicly employed taxpayer were more aware
of the general superiority and growing cost of public employee
pension benefits, they well might vote to hold the line against
future benefit improvements.
The Public Plan Retiree
Few defaults on the payment of benefits to pensioners
can be documented. As long as pensioners receive their checks
regularly and there is no immediate threat of default, retired
public employees are unlikely to use their limited energy to
secure sound financing for future benefits. They are much more
likely to press for retention of purchasing power by demanding
cost-of-living escalators which, in turn, will increase pen-
sion costs.
The Unions
The role of unions is to improve salaries, benefits,
and working conditions. Therefore, little support can be
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expected from public sector employee unions for a funding
strategy that has the potential of limiting benefit improve-
ments. During the Congressional hearings, one union official
cautioned that "...dispassionate and careful analysis of pub-
lic pension programs is needed in the light of a growing ten-
dency of journalists to cite the 'avarice' of public employees
for the so-called 'uncontrolled' growth of pension benefits." 2 1
At the same time, there is evidence of union concern
for funding adequacy. The court cases brought to compel fun-
ding in the states of Washington and Illinois were both brought
by teacher unions. Unions also recognize that as future pen-
sion payments consume a larger percentage of current revenues,
the ability of those governments to provide adequate salaries
declines. This, however, is not an immediate concern. Under
current, partial funding practices, that day can be postponed
into the future. If, on the other hand, the federal govern-
ment should succeed in passing legislation mandating a full
funding objective, this would cause an immediate and signifi-
cant increase in current outlays and might well lead to an
immediate restraint on benefit and salary increases. It is
unlikely, therefore, that unions will support any general
move in that direction.
The Politician
Politicians are not likely to support the formulation
of federal standards for state and locally administered re-
tirement systems for several reasons:
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Peace in my Time
The turnover in public office is relatively rapid.
Key public officials are rarely in office long enough to have
to face the consequences of the financial negligence of their
administration. Further, accountability focuses relatively
little on pension matters. Within this context, it is under-
standable that policiticans adopt an attitude of what Profes-
sor Roy A. Schotland so aptly refers to as "peace in my time." 2 2
The alternative would be to face the political risk of in-
creasing taxes.
Financial Stress
For states and cities that have been funding their
plans on a regular basis, the proposed switch to a federally
mandated funding standard of the type embodied in ERISA will
not pose a problem. The State of Minnesota, for example,
alleges its statewide funds are already in compliance with
ERISA standards. However, the Municipal Finance Officers
Association warns that for public plans that have not taken
corrective measures, an immediate switch to the level of
funding stipulated in ERISA would require "many more dollars
with matching political and financial stress." 2 3
An example of what might occur is illustrated by the
experience of Ohio. In 1968, the State of Ohio consolidated
plans for all policemen and firefighters into, one state
administered plan. Initially, the Ohio legislature imposed
a 20-year funding period on each city and town to cover the
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past service costs related to preexisting local programs.
This time period was set without full knowledge of the extent
of local unfunded pension liabilities or resources. When an
analysis was made, most systems turned out to be totally un-
funded. Consequently, they were unprepared to meet the 20-
year funding period. It was necessary for the assembly to
24
extend the amortization period from twenty to sixty years.
A primary concern of many state and local government
representatives is that a federally mandated, 40-year funding
requirement will cause such severe hardship that many systems
will be forced to terminate. A September 1975 evaluation of
the ability of Pennsylvania's pension systems to meet ERISA
funding standards estimated that the median police pension
fund and the median firemen's pension fund have municipal con-
tributions that are only one-fifth of those required utilizing
a minimum actuarial requirement of normal cost-plus-interest.
Pennsylvania's Secretary of Community Affairs, William W.
Wilcox, testified
These cities have pension funds of negligible size
and are simply operating on a pay-as-you-go basis. Many
of these cities have, in fact, insufficient funds to
provide benefits for current pensioners and may have
even spent active member contributions to pay benefits
to retirees....
We have several pension funds in Pennsylvania that
would likely become immediate claims under any program
of plan termination insurance. The question then is what
would the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation seize for 25its 30 percent contingency liability? City Hall? A park?"
Issues of Federalism and Sovereign Immunity
The National Governors Conference and the Municipal
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Finance Officers Association hold that, constitutionally,
administration of state and local public retirement systems
falls to the states and not to the federal government. There-
fore, one of the primary questions to be resolved is whether
the legal relationship between the federal government and
states and/or local governments permits the federal government
to legislate mandatory standards for the pension plans of
state and/or local governments.2 6
The question of the legality of federal standards for
state and local governments has become more problematic in
light of the June 23, 1976, Supreme Court decision voiding
the application of federally mandated minimum wage and over-
time requirements to employees of state and local governments.
A 1974 amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act would
have required state and local governments to comply with the
same minimum wage, overtime, and reporting requirements ap-
plied to private firms. The Supreme Court declared the amend-
ment unconstitutional and an infringement on the federal
structure separating national and local governments. 2 7
The federal government based its authority to apply
the labor law to state and local governments on its power to
control matters affecting interstate commerce. Representatives
of state and local governments based their appeal on the Tenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which reserves
for the states all powers not delegated to the federal govern-
ment by the Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled that where
tension exists between Congressional powers to control commerce
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and state sovereignty, the question must be resolved in favor
of a limitation on Congressional power. 2 8
Chairman Dent's reading of this decision, commonly
referred to as the League of Cities decision, is that consti-
tutional prohibition exists only when the proposed federal
requirement is very expensive, or otherwise so burdensome to
states that the ability of states to function as sovereigns
is threatened. "In the pension context, it appears that only
a strict Federal funding requirement would even approach
[that] threshold." Any lesser requirement, he maintains,
would not present a constitutional barrier. 29
Federal Alternatives
The Carrot and the Stick
Chairman Dent concludes the above statement with the
observation that:
Congress clearly has other bases of jurisdiction
on which it could constituionally proceed.
string to revenue sharing, for instance, is one way in
which Congress could require state and local pension
plans to meet certain standards.
The Internal Revenue Code provides another basis of
jurisdiction. Congress could state that public plan
participants shall not enjoy their present tax benefit--
the deferral of recognition, for income tax purposes, of
their accrued vested benefits--unless their plans meet
certain standards.
Finally, Congress could find that participants'
interests in their public pension plans are property
rights and then enact federal standards to protect those
rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme
Court has consistently held that this is a valid basis
of Congressional power. 3 0
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Limited Federal Involvement
If Chairman Dent's reading of the League of Cities
decision is correct, i.e., that federal regulation under the
Commerce clause is prohibited only when the effects will be
extremely burdensome, then Congress might follow a more
limited path:
1. Congress might enact less stringent funding requirements,
e.g., extend the period for the amortization of unfunded
liabilities from the 40 year ERISA requirement to 60
years or longer
2. Congress might limit federal regulations to the reporting,
disclosure, and fiduciary areas
This latter is Chairman Dent's inclination. He feels that the
objectives of a government pension need to be more fully con-
sidered before federal vesting, funding, and termination in-
surance standards can be intelligently formulated.
On April 5, 1976, Chairman Dent introduced a revised
bill, H.R. 10340. The bill limits federal requirements to the
disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of
financial and other information; the establishment of stan-
dards of conduct for fiduciaries; and the ready access to
federal courts.
The intent of this version of the act is similar to
that of the Welfare and Pension Disclosure Act of 1958 which
sought to maintain the financial integrity of private plans
through more adequate disclosure of private pension plan
finances, and through easier access to judicial remedy. This
did not work in the private sector, and it is questionable
that it will work in the public sector. Rubin Cohen, attorney,
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academician, and member of the Illinois Public Employee Pension
Laws Commission, maintains that:
Absent any effective enforcement mechanism directed
specifically to the funding obligation, federal legis-
lation designed to protect the em loyees' interests will
be largely cosmetic and illusory.
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CHAPTER VIII
STATE REGULATTON
The National Conference of State Legislators (NCSL)
urges state legislatures to consider the following alterna-
tives to federally mandated standards for state and locally
administered retirement systems: (1) strict regulation of
locally administered systems; or (2) consolidation of state
and local systems into a single state-administered system
with substantial funding for all state and local systems
based on reliable computations for a full funding requirement.
In the absence of federal regulations, states must be
strongly urged to assume a leadership role in public employee
retirement system reform. In this chapter, we look at the
two alternatives posed by NCSL and conclude that consolidation
is the only viable alternative. Within this context, we make
specific recommendation with respect to the consolidation pro-
cess and suggest several roles the federal government might
play to both encourage and facilitate state efforts.
Alternatives
Supervision of Locally Administered Systems
State laws currently require state legislatures to
pass on all retirement system revisions that imply a change
in costs to taxpayers. To do this in a responsible manner
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would require regular valuations of all local systems, assess-
ments of the capacity of local jurisdictions to meet existing
obligations, and a statement of the fiscal impact of all newly
proposed legislation.
The charge has been leveled that state legislatures
do not currently perform this duty in a responsible manner.
The reality, given current structures, is that they cannot.
The number of local plans ranges from none in Hawaii and
Nevada, to 1,414 in Pennsylvania. Table 8.1 lists the number
of local plans by state.
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TABLE 8.1
NUMBER OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
BY STATE OR OTHER JURISDICTION (PRELIMINARY), 1975
State or Number State or Number
Jurisdiction of plans1 Jurisdiction of plans1
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
47
8
10
69
72
343
165
13
7
336
54
1
11
465
249
75
55
49
62
7
39
103
187
638
23
51
28
52
10
9
(31)
(32)
(33)
(34)
(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)
(39)
(40)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)
(45)
(46)
(47)
(48)
(49)
(50)
(51)
(52)
(53)
(54)
(55)
New Jersey 39
New Mexico 4
New York 117
North Carolina 58
North Dakota 21
Ohio 7
Oklahoma 435
Oregon 9
Pennsylvania 1,414
Rhode Island 22
South Carolina 13
South Dakota 7
Tennessee 27
Texas 95
Utah 12
Vermont 31
Virginia 28
Washington 53
West Virginia 69
Wisconsin 46
Wyoming 9
Puerto Rico 5
Virgin Islands 1
Guam 1
Washington Metro-
polican Area
Transit Authority 1
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19),
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
65
5,827
(56) Federal
Total
SOURCE: Interim report of Activities of the Pension Task
Force of the Subcommittee on Labor Standards, Committee on
Education and Labor, House of Representatives, March 1976, p. 8.
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Each system generatep numerous bills for changes dur-
ing every legislative session. During the 1960s alone, over
200 separate pension bills affecting New York City's retire-
ment plans were passed by the state legislature. Many more
were offered. In addition to the five plans of New York City,
that state has 112 additional plans, each offering bills.
The public employee retirement system of California
provides coverage for 944 local employee groups. Amendments
to existing contracts during the 1975-76 fiscal year totalled
211. Over 100 of these were for benefit improvements above
the basic state level, an option recently made available to
local member governments. 2
Ohio has a highly consolidated state system. Only
two local plans are not included in the state system. All
bills for pension improvements for employees covered by the
state system emanate from the state legislature. Even so, the
number of separate bills introduced increased from 59 in
1969-70 legislative session to 81 in the 1973-74 session.
Ohio monitors its systems more carefully than most states,
and its activities serve as a model of those required for
responsible state supervision. Every bill is reviewed, sum-
marized, and reported to the general assembly with recommen-
dations as to their cost and desirability.3
The volume of bills alone stands as a barrier to ef-
fective legislative supervision. The California Retirement
Board finds itself severely taxed in its efforts to keep up.
In addition to membership, benefits, and activities related
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to bringing new local plans under its jurisdiction, the board
finds itself subject to increased demands as a result of
(1) the substantial number of legislative bills introduced
and enactedeach year, (2) the ever-widening differences
in benefits, contributions, and related items between the
three major groups of System members--State, schools, and
other local public agencies, (3) the many optional fea-
tures available to contracting agencies (cities, counties,
districts) other than schools [parentheses added], (4) the
increase in appeals and court decisions expanding special
categories of membership or imoosing additional adminis-
trative burdens on the System.4
Consolidation of Local Systems
The second alternative offered by NCSL, consolidation
of all plans into one state-administered system, offers the
only possibility for effective state supervision, and the only
viable alternative to federal regulation.
Thirty out of fifty states have consolidated 90 percent
or more of all state and local employees into their state ad-
ministered plan already. For these systems, it would not
require a quantum leap to fully consolidate. For other sys-
tems, the change would require more adjustments with respect
to aligning benefits and unifying financing arrangements. The
assumption is that consolidation will eliminate competition
among systems for higher benefits, and open the opportunity
for states to provide closer supervision. Although states
have not performed this role well to date, they may respond
with greater efficiency under the scrutiny of national atten-
tion.
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Policy Recommendations
State Role
The Legal Aspects of Consolidation
At present, not all statutes provide requirements for
actuarial funding. Nor, where such is required, do they pro-
vide mechanisms to enforce conformity with scheduled contri-
butions. The first step toward establishing well-functioning
state systems is the passage of legislation with respect to
actuarial funding and enforcement procedures. Such legisla-
tion should provide for:
1. Regular pension plan valuations
2. Actuarially determined employee contributions sufficient
to cover the employee share of current costs
3. Actuarially determined employer contributions sufficient
to cover current costs plus interest on and amortization
of the unfunded liability over a specified number of years.
Contribution rates to be applied against current costs,
interest, and the unfunded liability should be specified
separately (This simplifies the job of monitoring.)
4. Penalties for late contributions
5. Clearly specified revenue sources and a mandate to
raise money from those sources to meet the requirements
imposed by statute
6. A clear mandate to retirement boards, chief executives,
and appropriating bodies to perform the duties necessary
to assure contributions to the fund in the amount and at
the time specified
Provisions 5 and 6 would enable employees to seek
relief through the courts by application for a writ of manda-
mus to compel the performance of duties as specified. History
shows, however, that this may be of limited success. Courts
have turned aside more cases seeking adherence to funding than
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they have supported. Affirmative decisions have turned on a
finding of pension agreements as contracts which impose an
obligation to ensure that money to pay pensions will be avail-
able when due. 5 In general, however, courts have been reluc-
tant to impose upon legislatures an immutable obligation to a
specific level of funding, preferring instead to leave legis-
latures with some leeway for revisions in the event of chang-
ing economic circumstances.6
Interestingly, the one legal variable found to be a signi-
ficant determinant of sound funding was "vesting," i.e. the degree
to which the pension benefit is protected by vested or con-
tractual status against legislative change. And yet, we would
not advise the adoption of benefit rights as contracts. This
binds legislatures in a way that may make it impossible to
establish solvent systems. Connecticut, which moved to a
funded system in 1970, found it necessary to cut benefits by
30 percent and increase retirement ages from 50 to 60. Under
a contractual arrangement, this would not have been possible.
The security of benefits must rest in funding rather than the
conferring of a legal title.7
The Structural Aspects of Consolidation
Consolidation requires structural revisions with
respect to the flow of funds and the division of administra-
tive responsibilities.
All costs for current benefits and all unfunded ac-
crued liabilities would be charged back to respective
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municipalities. Municipalities would be authorized to levy
annually such additional taxes as necessary to meet the finan-
cial requirements imposed by the pension law. (The Ohio sta-
tute for the State Teacher's Retirement System requires that
this tax be placed before and in preference to all other
costs, except for taxes to meet indebtedness. 8 ) Revenues col-
lected from employees and taxes for this purpose would be re-
mitted to the state and maintained in separate accounts by the
state for the purpose of making investments and paying benefits.
Local retirement boards would have the responsibility
for preparing annual reports with respect to the finances of
its systems. These reports would provide the basis for states
to audit local systems and make decisions with respect to en-
forcement procedures. They would also provide employees with
the necessary data to seek relief through the courts.
In order for the reports to serve this function, the
information must be presented in an understandable fashion and
include data relative to:
1. The anticipated and actual cost of benefits accrued during
the year
2. The anticipated and actual employer contributions for cur-
rent costs, interest, and amortization of the unfunded
liability, each specified as a percent of salary
3. The amount of shortfall, if any, and provisions to make up
the shortfall during the ensuing year (Overpayments
would go into a security reserve to cover fluctuations in
the market value of plan assets.)
Setting Benefit Levels
When consolidation occurs, it generally applies to
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all new employees on a compulsory basis, and to existing em-
ployees on an optional basis. All retired employees and exist-
ing employees not wishing to become members of the new system
continue to be the liability of the old local system which is
gradually phased out. Employees who transfer to the new sys-
tem, do so on the basis of perceived advantages. This per-
ception differs depending upon individual needs, age, years of
service, and other variables.
One of the findings of this study is that systems with
high benefits tend to be less well funded than those with lower
benefits. Consolidation provides an opportunity to bring all
benefits (within a particular state) in line. State adminis-
tered systems generally offer lower benefits than large,
locally administered systems. This applies to both the money
and age at retirement benefit. For these large cities, consolida-
tion might reduce benefit levels. For the majority of small
and medium size cities, however, consolidation would raise
benefit levels.
The difference between state and large city benefit
levels is the reason that most large cities have opted not to
join existing state plans to date. Under consolidation, this
option would be removed. It might be anticipated that few
current members of these systems would choose to make the
changeover and therefore that full state coverage of all em-
employees would not become a reality until many years into the
future, i.e., until all members of existing large city plans
have retired. This choice would be preferable to raising
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state plan benefit levels high enough to attract large city
employees and, in the process, place an intolerable burden on
all other jurisdictions.
Community Economic Capacity
Setting the initial benefit is a delicate operation.
Benefits should be high enough to attract employees, but low
enough to be affordable. Affordability must take into consid-
eration the capacity of communities to make contributions on
behalf of both current costs and the unfunded liability, while
simultaneously meeting the other costs of government.
In Chapter IV we identified 25 states with substan-
tially underfunded locally administered retirement systems.
Where local governments have substantial unfunded liabilities,
the reality is that they probably will not be able to meet
actuarial funding schedules without considerable difficulty.
Therefore, some method must be found to encourage and assist,
in cases of need, local governments fund their pension obli-
gations adequately.
State Aid
One alternative is for states to give relief only to
those governments whose plans are in the most serious finan-
cial difficulty. This would create an inequity in public
finance and penalize those who have maintained healthy accounts.
A second alternative would be to develop a sliding
scale that ties the level of financial support to the com-
munity's financial need. 9
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A third alternative, one offered by William B. Neenan,
economist at the University of Michigan, sharpens the basis
on which aid to local governments would be given and ties aid
to a continuity of the funding effort. He suggests that:
First, state and perhaps federal assistance should be
given to cities with notably unfunded pension claims.
Such aid should be given to those cities in which a large
fraction of the population--that once received services
from currently retired workers--no longer lives within the
taxing purview of the municipality.
Second, so that there is not an invitation to muni-
cipalities to make rash decisions today in anticipation
of being bailed out in the future, such assistance should
be tied to a city's agreement to fund pensions fully from
now on. 1 0
Professor Neenan's suggestion is attractive because it
targets aid rather than spreading it evenly to local areas
whether they need it or not. However, it might prove to be
politically unworkable. We would suggest an approach that
provides some measure of state aid to every jurisdiction based
on three factors: capacity, tax effort, and past funding
effort. This type of formula would reward jurisdictions that
have been making regular contributions, provide a sliding
scale of aid to cities in need, and limit the amount of aid
to jurisdictions that have the capacity but have not been
making the effort.
State-Mandated Cost
Once an equilibrium is set in place in terms of state
aid and local ability to pay, the challenge is to keep benefits
and capacity in balance. One complaint from local jurisdictions
about current state administered systems is that states pass
229
legislation which imposes a financial burden without consid-
eration for their ability to pay.
States can take several steps to guard against the
imposition of financial burdens on local jurisdictions.
First, a fiscal impact, statement should accompany all
proposed increases in retirement benefits. This statement
would provide a detailed estimate of the costs and probable
fiscal impact of proposed legislation on local expendi-
tures.
Second, states might provide reimbursement to local
governments for cost increases arising from state mandated
programs. This would make those setting benefits the same as
those who will have to raise taxes to pay for them. Alterna-
tively, states might allow local governments the option of
accepting or rejecting the state mandate.1 1
In Louisiana, certain programs relative to compensa-
tion, conditions of employment, and retirement systems are in-
operative unless funded by the state or accepted locally. In
Montana, the local government can choose not to comply if the
state does not provide the funds. In California, the state
has to reimburse local governments for state mandated costs.
Collective Bargaining
At present, employees bargain with local governments
for both wage and benefit improvements. Under a consolidated
system, all benefit increases would emanate from the state.
This would limit collective bargaining at the local level to
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wages. There is a danger in this arrangement: state legis-
lators may be inclined to make decisions with regard to pen-
sions without considering the full compensation package. To
guard against this, state legislatures need to have full infor-
mation on both benefits and wages.
State legislators, though vulnerable to pressures from
special interest groups, are better insulated from them than
political officials at the local level. The combination of
decisionmaking at the state level and the requirement to accom-
pany proposed legislation for benefit improvements with a fis-
cal impact statement, removes the onus of a negative decision
from local officials, and simultaneously provides state repre-
sentatives with a clearly defensible position. The success of
this arrangement is far more probable now than it would have
been prior to the current taxpayer rebellion.
Disclosure
Taxpayers should be enabled to play a larger role in
the benefit approval process. Public pension plans are pri-
marily financed by taxpayers, those contributions totalling
about 45.6 percent of the total bill. In addition, taxpayers
in most states must also contribute to social security on
behalf of public employees.
The public awareness of costs should be substantially
sharpened. One way to do this is to publish the total compen-
sation package of individual employee groups, separating the
amount attributable to salaries from that attributable to
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to benefits. Where applicable, the costs of both staff pen-
sions and social security should be itemized. In addition,
the combined retirement benefit, from staff plans and social
security, should be published relative to their level of after-
tax replacement income. This would prevent taxpayers from
being either overwhelmed by costs or, where the state is pick-
ing up a share, unimpressed by costs without taking into con-
sideration the adequacy of benefits. An additional safeguard
would be to subject all benefit improvements and associated
costs to voter referendum. This would sharpen the visibility
of benefit costs and place the decision for acceptance with
those who must pay the bill.12
Federal Role
Under a policy that lodges the responsibility for
local plan regulation with the states, the federal role can
be limited to one that encourages consolidation and effective
state supervision. Federal activities under this role fall
into three general categories: financial assistance,
federally sponsored research, and federally supported
court action.
Financial Assistance
Aid to Cities
To avoid increasing taxes on present residents to -
finance previously unfunded retirement benefits, Professor
Neenan suggests federal aid to cities "in which a large frac-
tion of the population--that once received services from
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currently retired workers--no longer lives within the taxing
jurisdiction. ,13
One of the theoretical constructs of local taxation is
that those who receive the benefit of services should pay
their costs. In the instance of unfunded pensions, this would
require a charge back to residents who received service but
did not pay the full cost of accruing pension benefits. The
only way to accomplish this, given our currently mobile popu-
lation, is to allocate a portion of the federally collected
income tax in the manner suggested by Professor Neenan, i.e.,
to cities that have lost a large fraction of their population.
This aid to cities, however, should be tied to a commitment
by states to establish consolidated systems with full funding
requirements.
Aid to States
The federal government should consider grants-in-aid
that lessen the burden of costs atterdant to consolidation and
effective supervision. First, in order to encourage states to
adopt plans of consolidation, the federal government should
underwrite the major costs of this process, i.e., an evalua-
tion of the unfunded obligations of all local plans and the
ability of these jurisdictions to support improvements that
might accompany consolidation. This would enable states to
avoid the error of setting unrealistic benefit levels and
amortization schedules.
Second, the system, once established, needs to be
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carefully monitored. Many states currently have retirement
commissions that study, monitor, and make recommendations with
regard to public pension systems within their state. States
that do not have such commissions should be encouraged to es-
tablish them. These commissions might be supported in full or
in part by federal grants.
Data Collection and Dissemination
Comparative Data
Good decisions require good information. State legis-
latures would be aided in making decisions with respect to
benefit improvements if they had comparative data on benefits
offered by other states as well as private industry. An ap-
propriate federal role would be to stimulate, collect, and
synthesize all such studies for ready availability to inquir-
ing governments. Some of this type of data is already being
collected. The Pension Task Force has undertaken a massive
study (soon to be published) that attempts to identify all
public employee retirement systems, benefits offered, and cur-
rent funded status. The Labor-Management Relations Service
has published the results of surveys on municipal employee fringe
benefits for 1970, 1973, and 1976. The United States Chamber
of Commerce regularly publishes similar data with respect to
private industry. The State of California has published a
study which compares benefits provided in private industry
and public agencies in the Los Angeles and San Francisco
greater metropolitan areas. Illinois has conducted a within-
14
state analysis of fringe benefits offered by that state.
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Prototypes
It is not enough for Congress to strongly urge states
to restructure their retirement systems and then to assume
that those that do not are unwilling. First, states need ex-
amples of how better retirement systems are restructured.
This study provides some information to the extent that it
identifies statutory funding and enforcement provisions neces-
sary to accomplish the goal of full funding. Findings of this
type, together with data collected by the Pension Task Force
and state pension study commissions, provide a basis for
states to evaluate current pension legislation and formulate
amended versions.
Second, the consolidation process is likely to have
stumbling blocks. Local banks and insurance companies have
profited from their role as investors of pension fund assets.
Local politicians have enjoyed the power associated with their
capacity to determine which banks and insurance companies
would hold and/or manage pension fund assets. These financial
and political advantages would be lost under a plan of consol-
idation. Consequently, resistance to consolidation can be
anticipated. In addition, there are the problems of setting
appropriate benefit levels and establishing effective manage-
ment systems.
States embarking on a program of consolidation can be
helped to avoid errors through documentation of the process
used by states that have completed the process. Ohio consoli-
dated its 453 local police and fire funds into one state
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administered system in 1967. Vermont consolidated all systems
within that state in July 1975. The lessons of these govern-
ments would provide invaluable input for states about to begin
the consolidation process. The federal government might stim-
ulate the documentation of such processes through grants to
states and/or universities.
Court Action
We have proposed that the language with respect to
all aspects of the funding process be stated in mandatory
terms, thereby providing plan members with a legal basis to
seek governmental compliance with funding regulations. The
cost of court suits is burdensome. Although most suits under-
taken to date have been brought by unions rather than indivi-
dual pension plan members, there are better uses to which union
funds can be put. A facilitating federal role would be a
provision for the Justice Department to bring appropriate
legal action, thus relieving individual litigants and unions
of the burden of expensive court proceedings.
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APPENDIX A
STATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
STATUTORY FUNDING AND ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS
Appendix Table 1 summarizes the funding and enforce-
ment provisions for all state administered plans. The notes
that follow are based on the Revised State Laws of each
state. The numbers below the state name indicate the articles
and section of the law. Where we refer to systems as "funded,"
the reference is to the statutory requirement to fund and not
to the financial condition of the system.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF STATUTORY FUNDING AND ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS
Funded gy
State Statute
Government
Contribution
Contributoryb Rate Specified
in Statutec
Provisions
State to Compel
Penaltyd Payments
Through
Courte
Degree to
Which pension
is vested
Against-
Legislative
Change
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
l1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
4
4
1
2
3
1
0
0
1
2
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
5
4
0
4
3
0
0
2
4
5
0
5
3
3
1
3
3
0
0
5
1
0
3
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APPENDIX TABLE 1--Continued
Government Provisions Degree to
Funded by Contribution State to Compel Which Pension
Statutea Contributoryb Rate Specified Penaltyd Payments is Vested
in Statutec Throuah Against
Court Legisl tive
Change
Montana I ±
Nebraska 1 1 2 0 3
Nevada 1 0 1 1 0
Hew Hampshire 1 1 1 1 0
New Jersey 1 0 1 1 1
New Mexico 1 1 4 1 0
New York 0 0 1 1 5
North Carolina 1 1 1 2 1 3
North Dakota 0 1 1 4 0 3
Ohio 1 1 1 3 1 0
Oklahoma 1 0 0 0 0 2
Oregon 1 1 0 2 1 0
Pennsylvania 1 1 0 1 1 3
Rhode Island 0 1 0 2 0
South Carolina 1 1 0 2 1 0
South Dakota 1 1 1 3 1 3
Tennessee 1 1 0 4 1 0
Texas 1 1 1 0 1
Utah 1 1 1 1 0 3
Vermont 1 1 1 4 0 0
Virginia 1 1 0 4 0 0
Washington 1 1 0 0 1 4
West Virginia 1 1 0 2 1 0
Wisconsin 1 1 0 0 0 3
Wyoming 1 1 0 1 1 0
NOTE: Column notes on following page
241
242
a. 1 = actuarial funding requirement; 0 = otherwise
b. 1 = contributory; 0 = non-contributory
c. 1 = government contribution rate specified; 0 = government
contribution rate not specified
d. o = no penalty; 1 = interest charge; 2 = withhold state
aid in the amount of contribution; 3 = interest charge
plus withhold state aid; 4 = dissolve system
e. 1 = basis for mandamus to compel payments; 0 = otherwise
f. 0 the statutes do not specify and there has been no
judicial interpretation, or the interpretation is unclear;
1 = purely statutory; 2 - vested against abolition upon
meeting all qualifications for retirement, but subject to
modification; 3 = vests absolutely at retirement;
4 modified vesting at employment, absolute vesting at
retirement; 5 = benefit rights are contractual, immune
from impairment either before or after retirement
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Alabama
55 2 456 et. seq.
The system was established in 1945 as a funded system.
Member contributions are set at 3.50. Employer contributions
are determined by actuarial formulae. Subdivisions or agen-
cies making late payments are held to be in default. After 90
days, dissolution begins. The employer must appropriate a
sufficient amount to cover the benefits of retired employees.
The balance in the fund, if any, is prorated among active
employees.
Alaska
39.35.010
Established in 1961, the system is funded. Members
contribute 4.25 percent, except police who contribute 5 per-
cent. Governmental contributions are determined by actuarial
formulae. Mebers are covered by Social Security. Subdivisions
must provide Social Security in order to belong. If contri-
butions are 15 days late, the state levies an interest charge
one and 1-half times the most recent actuarially determined
contribution rate. Continued lateness results in a declaration
of default and the distribution of proceeds.
Arizona
38-741 to 38-764
Established in 1952, the Arizona plan is supplemental
to Social Security. The plan is funded. The contribution
rate for employees is 5 percent and is matched by an employer
contribution of the same amount. Local units are authorized
to establish local plans which must be identical to the state
244
plan. Local plans are administered by the state. A late
penalty of 6 percent is charged for late payments. The obli-
gation of the responsible government is limited to the fund.
However, the statute provides that "employer contributions
. . . together with investmnent earnings. . . and required
employeed contributions shall be sufficient to guarantee that
the benefits provided under this plan shall not be reduced
or eliminated." (Emphasis added.) Thus, it appears that
benefits are guaranteed and mandamus can be brought to compel
sound financing. Pensions vest at employment.
Arizona has two additional provisions that add to the
security of the benefits. The "mandatory security valuation
reserve" and the "acutarial reserve." The first is a set-aside
designed to cover fluctuations in the market value of plan
assets. The second results from net actuarial and net capital
gains. The accumulation is to provide for an orderly increase
in benefits.
Arkansas
12-2501 et seq.
The Arkansas retirement system for state and local
officers and employees was established in 1952. The language
does not specify a plan set up according to actuarial formulae.
However, it specifies that employee contributions are to be
4 percent, and employer contributions are to be at least 1.25
times employee contributions. There is a penalty for late
payments from local units.
Arkansas reduces benefits if reserves relative to
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payments fall below a certain level. The plan stipulates that
if annuities paid during the fiscal year from the retirement
reserve account (of the state, county, or city) is more than
12 percent of the balance in the employer's accumulation
account and the retirement reserve account, "the annuities
payable to retirants and beneficiaries in the next ensuing
year shall be reduced pro rata, so that the total of the said
annuities so reduced shall not exceed twelve (12%) percent
of the sum of the said balances. . .
It is undetermined whether or when pension rights vest
vest in Arkansas.
California
2000 et seq.
Originally established in 1931, the plan was amended
and has continued as amended in 1945. The amended plan estab-
lished contributions on an actuarial basis, and explicitly
states that contributions shall be in an amount to accumulate
a fund sufficient at retirement to carry out the promise to pay.
Retirement benefits vest at employment, and are a general
obligation of the responsible government.
Colorado
24-51-100 to 24-51-1109
The plan was established as an actuarially funded
system in 1966, but contribution rates were not specified.
An amendment in 1973 established employee contributions at
7.75 percent and employer contributions at 10.64 percent of
salary, with the specified goal of establishing adequate
funding of retirement liabilities. Annual payments to the
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fund are compelled by statute. A penalty is applied against
late payments. It appears, however, that pension rights are
purely statutory and subject to legislative change either
before or after meeting all qualifications for retirement
benefits.
Connecticut
51-152 et seg.
This plan was established in 1939. Early statutes
gave no directions regarding employer contributions. The Act
as amended in 1971 sets up an actuarially funded system.
Pension liabilities are a general obligation of the responsible
government.
Delaware
295501 to 295544
The Delaware State Employees Pension Plan was estab-
lished in 1953 as an unfunded plan. In 1970 the plan was
amended and placed on an actuarially funded basis. Employee
contributions were set at 5 percent of monthly compensation
in excess of $500, up to a maximum contribution of $900 a
year. Employer contributions are to increase gradually begin-
ning in fiscal year 1970-71 so that by fiscal year 1975-76 the
state is appropriating sufficient money to cover normal cost
and amortize the unfunded past service cost over a 40 year
period.
Florida
121.011
The Florida Retirement System was established in 1970.
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At that time it consolidated several existing state systems
into one state system. Membership is open to subdivisions
on an optional basis. Member contributions of 4 percent are
matched by employer contributions. While the method of funding
is not prescribed in the state statute, the amount is. Up
until 1975 it was set on a matching basis. Both employee and
employer contributed 4 percent. Beginning in 1975, the system
became noncontributory for 95 percent of the membership, and
the employer contribution rates increased from 8 percent to
9 percent.
Georgia
40-2501
The Employees' Retirement System of Georgia, a funded
system, was established in 1949. Employees contribute 5 per-
cent of pay and employers 6.83 percent. A 1974 act authorized
an increase in governmental contributions up to 8.5 percent
should it be deemed necessary. The state is authorized to
whithhold funds in the amount of contribution from delinquent
participating subdivisions. Members are protected against any
dimunition of benefits as they existed at the time of employ-
ment. The requirement to fund is not written in mandatory
language and the obligation of the state or responsible local
governments is limited to the fund.
Idaho
59-1301 et seq.
The Public Employee Retirement System of Idaho was
revised in 1963 and integrated with Social Security. The act
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provided that member benefits could not be less than if the
system had not been integrated. Employee contributions are
4.5 percent of salary (5.4 for police and firemen). Employer
contributions are set by actuarial valuation.
In the event of late payments, the state treasurer is
authorized to withdraw the amount due out of the money in the
state treasury allocated to the use of such employers. If
such moneys are not available, the state treasurer is author-
ized to take any legal steps necessary to collect the amount.
If assets of a local system are ever less than the value of
accrued benefits, the employer may levy a special tax on all
assessed property within its corporate limits solely for the
purpose of paying all or a portion of the needed contributions.
Annuities and retirement benefits are a general obligation of
the responsible government.
In 1969 the legislature integrated the Teachers' Retire-
ment System into the Public Employees Retirement System. In
1969 it closed all local police retirement funds to any further
membership, requiring that persons joining the force after that
date become members of the state plan.1
Illinois
Chapter 108-1/2
The State Employees' Retirement System of Illinois
is controlled by statutues passed in 1963. The Illinois System
does not appear to be funded. "Government contributions must
equal at least the annual average of the project expenditures
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over the next ten years." No schedule is established for
the amortization of unfunded liabilities. Employees contri-
bute 6-1/2 percent of salary.
Employee benefits are secured by a number of provisions.
First, the 1970 Constitution of Illinois provides that
"Membership in the retirement system of the State . . . shall
be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of
which shall not be diminished or impaired." Second, the obli-
gation to make payments and contributions is a general obli-
gation of the state. Third, a specific directive is issued
to the comptroller of the state to issue the requisite warrants
for state obligations to the plan. Fourth, the treasurer of
the state is compelled by statute to pay on those warrants from
the general treasury of the state.
Indiana
5-10-1-13
Indiana's State Employees' Retirement System was
established in 1945 as a funded plan. Member contributions are
set at 5 percent of salary, employee contributions at a rate
determined by actuarial valuation. While this act appears to
provide considerable security for pensioner benefits on one
hand, it is replete with qualifiers on the other.
The act provides that benefits shall not be decreased,
revoked, or repealed, "except as otherwise provided by this
act." Annuities and benefits are a general obligation of the
State of Indiana and of participating municipalities "to the
extent specified in this act.
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The auditor is directed to draw warrants upon the
treasury of the state to pay retirement obligations of the
state. Amounts owed the fund by participating municipalities
may be recovered in a suit brought by action of the state's
attorney general. In addition, the statue allows participa-
ting municipalities to increase taxes above the limitation
imposed by law in order to meet the cost of participation.
On the other hand, the statute limits the tax to a
rate which will produce an amount not in excess of 15 percent
of total salaries. Operationally, then, a suit to compel pay-
ments might conflict with this statutory tax limitation. In
addition, municipalities may withdraw from the system upon
giving six years written notice. Employees of such systems
are entitled to a refund of contributions and an equitable
share of the remaining proceeds, but nothing in excess of
that. This nullifies the provision making benefits a general
obligation of the government, and the provision guaranteeing
benefits against dimunition.
Kansas
74-4901
The Kansas Public Employees Retirement System was
established in 1961. Employee contributions were set at 4
percent. Employer contribution are 5.35 percent pending
actuarial valuations. The language governing employer con-
tributions is stated in mandatory terms:
The division of the budget and the governor shall
include in the budget request for appropriations . . .
the sum required to satisfy the state's obligations under
this act. . . shall be met by appropriations . . . of
the legislature.
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Each participating employer shall appropriate and
pay to the system a sum sufficient to satisfy the obli-
gation under this act.
Further, the participating employer is authorized to levy
taxes for that purpose, not subject to any tax levy limit
which together with other funds available shall be sufficient
to enable the participaing employer to make the contributions
required by the act.
Pension benefits are a general obligation of the
responsible government. All meetings of the State Retirement
Board are open to the public. A financial statement is pub-
lished and distributed annually showing the status of the
system.
Kentucky
65.510
The Kentucky Retirement System was established in
1956. It is a funded system. Employees contribute 4 percent
of salary. The employer's normal contribution is determined
by the entry age normal cost funding method. Pension rights
are vested upon meeting all requirements for retirement. All
retirement board proceedings are open to the public.
Louisiana
42:541
Louisiana State Employees Retirement System was estab-
lished in 1946. The system is funded. Employee contributions
of 6 percent are matched by employer contributions of the same
amount. Provisions for contributions are stated in mandatory
terms.
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Maine
Article 9 i 18
Established in 1947, this statute specifies that
member contributions shall not exceed one-tenth of one per-
cent (.1%) of annual compensation. The state is required to
contribute an amount equal to the normal cost plus a percen-
tage of the accrued liability. Each year the percentage
contribution toward the accrued liability is to be increased
3 percent.
The executive branch of the government reduced funding
requests of the board of trustees of the Maine Retirement
System by $1 million for fiscal year 1975-76. During the
same year, the state failed to pay nearly $6 million into its
Teacher Retirement fund.
Maryland
Article 73B 3 et seq.
Established in 1941, member contributions are deter-
mined by tables to yield an annuity equal to a certain percent
of final salary. The state's contribution is determined by
actuarial valuation. The rate until the first valuation was
fixed at 1.94 percent of annual compensation. Payments due
reitrees are obligations of the state. "Payments into the
fund shall be paid annually . . . by the State." (73B:14)
Participating subdivisions are held to the same bene-
fit and payments structure. Local units may withdraw upon
one year notice.
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Massachusetts
Chapter 32
In 1945 an act was passed establishing a single con-
tributory law to govern the 100 retirement systems in the
state of Massachusetts. The act provides for local adminis-
tration, but a unitary benefit and financing structure. All
systems are required by law to be unfunded. Employees entering
the system prior to 1975 contribute 5 percent of salary, and
those entering after that date contribute 7 percent of salary.
Payments due retirees are the obligation of the responsible
unit. In 1971, Massachusetts wrote a section into its retire-
ment statue making the terms for superannuation retirement a
contractual obligation. Prior to that the obligation under
the statute was purely statutory.
Michigan
38 11
Enacted in 1943, this act does not specify the contri-
bution rate for either the employee or employer, but simply
states that such rates are to be determined by actuarial
valuation.
Directions regarding contributions to the fund are
stated in a manner that makes mandamus uncertain:
Upon determination of the amounts necessary to maintain
adequate reserves as provided in section 38, the retire-
ment board shall recommend the amount required to the
governor and the amounts appropriated by the legislature
shall be paid into the employer's accumulation fund
during the ensuing year.
Since the language does not direct the governor to include in
the budget the amount recommended nor stipulate that the
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legislature must appropriate the amount recommended, remedy
through writ of mandamus is questionable.
Minnesota
352.01 et seq.
The Minnesota State Retirement System, so named in
1967, is a continuation of the Minnesota State Employees
Retirement Association. Members contribute 3 percent if they
are covered by Social Security, 6 percent if they are not.
Employers contribute 4 percent for members also covered by
Social Security, 7 percent for those who are not. The lan-
guage pertaining to governmental contributions is not stated
in actuarial terms. The act provides that if the amount so
prescribed is not avialable from the funds of the various
departments and state agencies, "there is hereby appropriated
to such department or agency from any money in the state
treasury not otherwise appropriated, the money required to
meet such deficiencies."
Mississippi
25-11-1&1 et seq.
The Public Employees Retirement System of Mississippi
was estalbished in January 1953. Members contribute 4.50
percent of salary. In 1968, the rate for the state was set
at the same level. Prior to that, the statute required that
a rate be set by actuarial valuation, but did not provide a
specific rate.
The state is obligated to make annual payments to
the fund.
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Missouri
Act 39, "Chapters 37-40 Reserved as in Revised Statutes
1959 For Future Expansion"
Montana
Title 68, Chapters 1-27
The Montana Public Employees Retirement System is a
state plan which subdivisions may join. It was established
in 1945:
To effect economy and efficiency in the public service
by providing a means whereby employees who become super-
annuated or otherwise incapacitated may, without hardship
or prejudice, be replaced by more capable employees and to
that end providing a retirement system consisting of
retirement compensation and death benefits.
The member contribution is 6 percent. The contribution rate for
state and local employers is being systematically increased
beginning at 4.6 percent in July 1973, gradually raising to
5.90 by July 1978. The statute allows contracting employers
to levy a special tax upon assessable property to raise the
necessary amount to meet annual obligations. Members of the
retirement fund or beneficiaries "have the right to maintain
appropriate action to require performance of duty imposed by
the legislative body by this section."
Nevada
286.010
Nevada has a unitary retirement system, administered
by the state to which all full-time employees of state and
local governments must belong. The system was established
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in 1947. Beginning in 1975, the contribution rate
was set at 8 percent for general employees, 8.5 percent for
police and firemen. Employer contributions were set at 7
Percent, 8 percent for police and firemen. Local units may
elect to pay a share of member contributions, but the combined
contribution from employer and employee must total 15 percent
(16 percent for police and fire). The total for police and
fire will increase to 19 percent by 1978.
If the payments of state agencies or local govern-
ments are late, a penalty of 6 percent per annum is levied
after the first 15 days. If not paid within 90 days, a
penalty of 1 percent of the assessment per month is imposed
until the assessment is paid. Refusal to pay within 12
months is a misdemeanor on the part of the chief administrator
of the delinquent employer. Benefits as provided in this act
become fixed at 10 years or entitlement, whichever is first.
No change may impair a vested benefit. (286.680, added 1967)
New Hampshire
Chapter 100
The state system, established in 1967, is supplemental
to Social Security. Membership in Social Security is required
of all participating subdivisions. Member contributions are
determined from tables based on age and salary. A lower rate
is in effect for that portion of salary taxed for Social
Security purposes, and a higher rate for the portion above
that. Employer contributions are fixed by actuarial valua-
tion to cover normal cost plus amortization of the unfunded
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liability over a 20 year period. The rate specified in the
statute is 6.15 percent of employee salaries.
Statutory authorization for appropriations for annual
contributions is phrased in mandatory terms:
The board of trustees shall certify to the state comp-
troller the amounts which will become due and payable by
the state over the biennium next following . . . It shall
be the duty of the comptroller . . . to include in the
budget the amounts so certified which amounts shall be
appropriated by the legislature.
Each of these duties would appear within the scope of a writ
of mandamus.
The statutes provide for late penalties in the amount
of one-half of one percent (.5%) each month.
New Jersey
43: 15A-6 to 43: 15A-82
The New Jersey Acts of 1921 established the first
state public employee retirement system, In 1954 this act was
repealed and the current Public Employee Retirement System of
New Jersey was established. The 1954 Act calls for an actu-
arially funded system with valuation of the system'-s assets
and liabilities every three years. Member contributions are
set to produce an annuity equal to one-half the pension. The
state rate is set to cover current costs plus amortization of
40 years in 1971. County and municipal member governments are
subject to the same benefit and obligation structure.
Benefit payments are a general obligation of the state.
Authorization for appropriations to the fund as required by
statute are phrased in mandatory terms, Combined, these
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provisions appear to place both contributions and benefit pay-
ments within the ambit of a writ of mandamus.
Local cities, over 400,000 in size (Cities of lst
Class), which did not want to accept membership in the State
system, were allowed to continue the operation of systems on
a local basis. The 1954 Act, however, restructured those
systems and imposed the following requirements: Members were
not to contribute less than 5 percent, nor more than 7 percent.
The systems were to be subject to actuarial valuation every
three years. The city would pay an amount equal to the con-
tribution of the member. That amount would be met through
taxation. An additional amount would be levied,. if necessary,
to pay pensions or other benefits. In addition, in order to
retire the unfunded liability, the "city shall raise and place
in a fund, $1 million for a period of twenty (20) years. (1954)
Beginning in 1967, an amendment was passed which
stated, "The City shall increase its contribution by 1 percent
each fiscal year until the retirement system is fully funded
(1966).
An act of 1975 required annual actuarial reports for
Newark.
New Mexico
5-5-1
The Acts of 1947 established an actuarially funded
state system. Member contributions were set at 5 percent, and
employer contributions at 11.25 percent. Payments appear to be
compellable through mandamus. It is undetermined whether and
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when pension rights vest against legislative change.
Local public employers may affiliate with the state
system. They are not held to the same benefit and payment
structure. Contribution rates vary according to the particular
annuity type. Local units in default are subject to state
prosecution for sums due plus interest.
The retirement boards covering county, municipal, and
teacher retirement systems are required to hold open meetings.
Full financial accounts must be mailed to each and every legal
newspaper.
New York
Article 2
The New York State Public Employees Retirement System
was established in 1920. Annual valuations are required. The
New York State System became non-contributory in 1966. State
contributions are determined by annual actuarial valuations.
Participating employers are held to the same benefit and obli-
gation structure. If payments are 30 days late, interest
accrues at the rate of 5 percent per annum. The comptroller
has the power to bring suit to compel payments.
Members of the New York State Public Employee Retire-
ment System are protected against dimunition of benefits by
Article V, Section 7 of the New York State Constitution. That
article provides that:
After July first, nineteen hundred forty, membership in
any pension or retirement system of the state or of a
civil division thereof shall be a contractual relation-
ship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or
impaired.
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The statutory provision requiring contributions is mandatory
in language, as is the requirement that plan funding be
included in the comptroller's budget, Both may be enforced
by a writ of mandamus.
All records are open for public inspection.
North Carolina
Chapter 135
The North Carolina Teachers and State Employees
Retirement System was established in 1941. Member contribu-
tions are lower on that portion of the salary base that is
taxed by Social Security. The state contribution rate is
5.51 percent for teachers and 3.16 percent for other state
employees. Payments toward the amortization of the unfunded
accrued liability are to be increased by 3 percent each year.
Provisions regarding payments to the fund are stated
in mandatory language and thus appear to be within the ambit
of a writ of mandamus. Employers in excess of 90 days late,
are considered to be in default. The act provides that "any
distribution which might otherwise be made to such employer
from any funds of the State shall be withheld until . . . (the
employer) is no longer in default." (135-8(31)
North Dakota
54-52-10
The North Dakota State plan was established in 1965
for state employees and local employees not covered by other
plans. The plan is administered by a state board. Members
pay an annual fee of $5 which goes toward the payment of
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administrative expenses. In addition, members contribute 4
percent of monthly wages. This sum is matched by employers.
The plan is a money purchase plan. The statue provides for
distribution of plan assets on a pro rata basis, should sums
of money in the fund ever be insufficient to meet obligations.
The state and participating local units are not legally or
morally liable for any benefits resulting from the enactments
establishing this plan.
Ohio
145.01 et seq.
The Ohio State Public Employee Retirement System has
existed as a system which covered teaching and nonteaching
school employees, state employees, and employees of local
government since 1937. Police and fire systems were separate
until 1967, at which time the 453 local police and fire funds
were brought into the consolidated state system. The only
local systems are those covering certain salaried employees
in Cincinnati.3
From January 1960 until December 1966, the employee
contribution rate was 7 percent of wages. The employer con-
tribution rate was not stated. However, the employer was to
contribute a percentage sufficient to provide a pension reserve
equal to the accumulated contributions of members plus a per-
centage toward the prior service liability.
A 1967 amendment specified that any adjustment required
in the total rate of contribution computed by the actuary
"shall be divided equally between members and their employers
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and the contributions of each . . shall reflect such adjust-
ments." Employee contributions in 1974 were 8 percent of com-
pensation for non-uniformed personnel, and 7 percent for
uniformed personnel. Employer contributions ranged from a
low of 9.40 percent of compensation for local, non-uniformed
personnel, to 12 percent and 13 percent, respectively, for
police and fire personnel.
A 5 percent late penalty is levied after 90 days. In
addition, interest at 6 percent can be charged on past due
amounts and penalties. Upon certification by the public
employee retirement board of delinquent payments, the state
auditor is instructed to draw a voucher upon any funds held
by the state for the defaulting government in favor of the
public employees retirement system. Directives regarding
appropriations for contributions are stated in mandatory terms
and would appear compellable through a writ of mandamus. The
act further provides that:
Any appropriations for salaries to be paid to members of
public employees retirement system must (emphasis added)
be increased by the employer's contribution rate when
salary appropriations are made.
Oklahoma
74 901 et seq.
The Oklahoma system was established in 1963 as a
funded system. Prior to July 1976 employee contribution rates
were set at 10 percent of the first $1,000. After July 1976,
annual employee contributions will be 10 percent of the first
$1,250. Employers, beginning in July 1976, will contribute
10 percent of the first $1,250, plus an actuarially determined
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rate for amortization of the past service liability over a
period of 40 years.
Counties, cities, and town which are members contri-
bute 7 percent of the first $1,000, and members 7 percent
beginning in 1977 (prior to that they contributed only 4
percent of the first $1,000).
Oregon
237.001 to 237.315
The Public Employees Retirement Act of 1953 established
a retirement system for state employees and public employees
of political subdivisions. Employee contributions range from
4 percent on salaries of $500 or less a month, to 7 percent on
salaries of $1,500 or more a month. Employer contributions
are actuarially determined to cover current cost plus amortize
past service liabilities over a period of 30 years. If the
contributions of a state agency employer are late, the Executive
Department "shall draw a warrant for the payment of such . . .
obligations our of any state revenues or funds in the State
Treasury in which the public employer is entitled by law to share
and which has been apportioned to the public agency."
Pennsylvania
71 1711 to 1717, 1731 to 1751
The State Employees Retirement Code as originally
enacted in 1923 was replaced in 1959 by the State Employees
Retirement Code of 1959. This act covers only state employees.
Member contributions are actuarially determined to yield an
annuity equal to one-one hundredth of final average salary.
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The state's contribution must cover current costs plus a per-
centage contribution for past service costs. The statute
specifies that:
It shall be the duty of the General Assembly to make
an appropriation sufficient to provide for such obli-
gations to the Commonwealth, and the amount so appro-
priated shall be included in the general appropriation
bill and shall be paid by the State Treasurer through
the Department of Revenue into a fund upon warrants of
the Auditor General in accordance with requisitions
presented by the retirement board.
Rhode Island
36-8
State employee retirement systems and local employee
retirement systems are authorized under separate statutes.
Those covering the state were enacted in July 1936. Employee
contributions were set at 5 percent, and state contributions
at a rate sufficient to meet average annual anticipated
expenditures over the ensuing 5 years.
State enabling legislation authorizing the establish-
ment of local retirement systems was passed in 1951. (45-21,
Municipal Employees Retirement System of the State of Rhode
Island). The fund for local retirement systems is managed by
the State Retirement Board. Municipalities are liable to the
retirement system for the cost of funding the system, and
such funding is enforceable by the retirement board through
court action. In addition, the state can withhold from the
municipality the municipality's portion of any shared taxes
sufficient to satisfy the liability. Employees contribute 6
percent, and employers an amount sufficient to establish and
maintain a reserve equal to the accumulated contribution of
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members, the present value of all retirement and disability
allowances in force, and the present value of deferred
annuities. The maintenance of a reserve to cover the afore-
mentioned liabilities is guaranteed by participating
municipalities.
South Carolina
61-1 to 61-202
The South Carolina State Retirement System, established
in 1952, is open to teachers, employees of the state, and
political subdivisions or agencies or departments thereof.
[This system takes in members of earlier systems and allows the
transfer of funds.] The system is managed by the State Budget
and Control Board. Member contributions are a flat rate for
those not covered by Social Security, and a step-up rate for
those covered by Social Security. Employer contributions are
set by actuarial determination. If payments are 30 or more
days late, the state treasurer and comptroller general are
notified to withhold payments from the state which might
otherwise be made.
South Dakota
Chapter 3-12-46
Previous state, county, and municipal retirement
systems are consolidated under this Chapter. Existing plans
were given the option of continuing, or becoming part of the
consolidated system by vote. No new plans can be established
except as a participating unit of the system created by this
chapter. Member contributions are set at 5 percent or 6
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percent, depending on the employee class. The employer matcher
the employee contribution. "The Employer shall make an equal
contribution and the contribution shall be transmitted at least
quarterly."
Tennessee
8-3901
The Consolidated Retirement System of Tennessee,
established in July 1972, consolidates all state and local
employees including teachers (except those who are members of
local plans) into one state administered system. Employee
contributions vary by category of worker. Employer contri-
butions are determined by actuarial valuation.
Payments appear to be compellable by a writ of mandamus.
The statute provides that:
The general assembly shall make appropriations sufficient
to provide such amounts (as certified by the retirement
board), and the state treasurer shall make such funds
available to the board of trustees.
The benefit and financing structure for political
subdivisions is the same as that for the state. The State
Retirement System is not responsible for the payment of benefits
of any participating employer for which reserves have not been
set aside by the employer and its employees. In the event that
a system finds itself unable to make contributions because of
hardship, the act provides for the dissolution of the local
system and the division of plan assets. This provision is
reproduced below. It is typical of the default clauses of
most other states:
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Withdrawal of participating employer from retirement
system. The agreement of any employer participating under
this section to contribute on account of its employees
shall be irrevocable, but should an employer for any reason
become financially unable to make the contributions payable
on account of its employees, then such employer shall be
deemed in default, or in the event such employer shall find
the making of the required contributions burdensome to
itself or its employees, it may file with the board a reso-
lution legally adopted by its legislative body to the effect
that further participation will impose a hardship upon the
said employer and thereafter, with the consent of the indi-
vidual employees affected, such employees will no longer
be deemed to be members of this retirement system. Upon
the adoption by any employer of a hardship resolution, such
employer shall at once notify all employees thereof who are
members of the retirement system of such adoption. There-
upon any member of the retirement system who is an employee
of such employer may within ninety (90) days thereafter
withdraw from the retirement system. In case of withdrawal
of any such employee member, his accumulated contributions
shall be paid to him. Such payment shall operate as a full
acquittance and release of all rights of any such withdrawing
member against the retirement system. The actuary of the
retirement system shall determine by actuarial valuation
the share of the assets of the retirement system attri-
bution to contributions of the employer and its employees
which is allocable to each beneficiary and each member who
shall not have elected to withdraw from the retirement
system within the time prescribed herein. The allocation of
such assets shall be in the following order:
(a) First, each member shall be entitled to a share
equal to his accumulated contributions, and each beneficiary
shall be entitled to a share equal to any excess of the
accumulated contributions at the times of retirement or
prior to death of the member over the sum of benefits
received; and
(b) Second, each beneficiary and each member who as
of the date of adoption of the hardship resolution is
eligible to retire on a service retirement allowance or
an early service retirement allowance shall be entitled to
a share equal to the reserve computed to be required for
his benefit credits, reduced by his share under paragraph
(a) above; and
(c) Third, each other member shall be entitled to a
share equal to the reserve computed to be required for his
benefit credits accrued to the date of adoption of the
hardship resolution, reduced by his share under paragraph
(a) above; provided that
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(d) If the assets are insufficient to provide in full
for the shares under paragraph (a), each share thereunder
shall be reduced pro rata; and if the assets are insuf-
ficient to provide in full for the shares under paragraph
(b) or (c) after provision for all shares under previous
paragraphs, each share under such paragraph (b) or (c)
shall be reduced prorata.
The amount of assets so allocated to each such member
shall be used to provide for him a paid up annuity begin-
ning at his service retirement date, or beginning imme-
diately in the case of a member who has attained his ser-
vice retirement date, and the amount of assets so allocated
to each beneficiary shall be used in providing such part of
his existing retirement allowance as the amount so allo-
cated will provide. The rights and privileges of both
members and beneficiaries of such employers shall thereupon
terminate except as to the payment of the annuities so
provided and the retirement allowances, or parts thereof,
provided for the beneficiaries. If any assets remain
after providing in full for the shares under paragraphs
(a), (b), and (c) of this subsection, the excess assets
shall be returned to the employer. [Acts 1972 (Adj.S.)
ch. 814, 9 10.]
Texas
6228a
The Employee Retirement System of Texas was originally
enacted in 1947. The act as revised in January 1963 repealed
a substantial portion of the 1947 act. Member contributions
were established at 5 percent, and state contributions were
set at an amount equal to the contributions of members. The
statute provides that "The State of Texas shall pay each year
in equal monthly installments . . . an amount equal to the
contributions by members during such year. . . ." (Sec 8B:l(a))
It further provides that the State Board of Trustees submit an
estimate of the amount required to the Legislative Budget
Board and Budget Director of the Governor's office for review,
and that an amount equal to 5 percent of the employees' wages
shall be included in the budget submitted by the governor.
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The amount allocated by the legislature shall be paid to
pensioners in equal monthly installments.
Local systems which elect to join the state system
are bound by its regulations.
Records of the Board of Trustees are furnished to any
member upon request.
Utah
49-10-9
The original act of 1947 was amended in 1951. This
latter act was repealed as of June 30, 1967, and replaced
with the Utah State Retirement Act on July 1, 1967. The
purpose of the new act was to repeal prior acts and establish
a consolidated system. The new act provided for equal con-
tributions by the employee and employer. Provision was made
for contributions to begin in July 1967 at 4 percent, and
gradually increase to 5 percent by July 1975. A penalty of
6 percent was imposed for late payments, an amount which
could be forgiven under extenuating circumstances.
Vermont
3 § 371 et seq.
The Vermont Employees Retirement System was established
in April 1944. Member contributions were determined to yield
an annuity equal to that provided by the government. The mem-
ber could choose to have his or her rate reduced to 4 percent,
presumably with the recognition that this would make his or
her retirement allowance smaller by the present value of the
amount of the reduction. The state contribution is determined
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by actuarial valuation to cover the normal cost and amortize
the accrued liability over a period of 20 years. There is
nothing in this legislation that could be construed as a man-
date to the legislature to appropriate moneys to cover the
state's obligation to contribute.
Political subdivisions electing to become part of the
state system are subject to the same benefits and regulations.
The agreement to contribute is irrevocable, but should
systemsbecome financially unable to contribute, they are
deemed in default and subject to a default process. The state
stipulates that it is not liable for payments on behalf of
subdivisions.
(Vermont established a statewide system as of
July 1, 1975.)
Virginia
Chapter 3.2
Sec 51-111.9 to 51-111.67:20
The Virginia Supplemental Retirement Act established
a retirement system in 1952 supplemental to Social Security
for teachers, and employees of the state and political sub-
divisions. Member contributions were set at 5-1/2 percent.
Employer contributions are established by actuarial valuation,
to cover normal costs and amortization of the accrued unfunded
liability over a period of 40 years. Subdivisions unable to
meet payments must follow a default procedure similar to
that for Tennessee and Vermont.
Beginning in July 1975, every county, city, and town
with a population of 500 or more was compelled to provide its
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own retirement system with benefits at least comparable to the
state, or participate in the state plan.
The statute authorizes participating local units to
make appropriations from local funds, but nothing in that
language is compelling,
Washington
T 41.40.010
The Washington Public Employees Retirement System was
established in 1949. Members contributed 5 percent until
July 1, 1973, when the rate was increased to 6 percent for
new members. The employer rate is set to cover normal cost
plus the amortization of the unfunded liability over a 40 year
period. In December 1970 the governor reduced an appropria-
tion to the fund on the basis of fiscal hardship. In April
1972, pursuant to court order, the original appropriation
was restored. See Weaver v. Evans, 495 P. 2d 639 (1972).
West Virginia
5-10-1 to 5-10-50
The West Virginia Public Employees Retirement System
was esablished for employees of the state and other partici-
pating public employers in July 1961. The system supple-
ments federal Social Security. Member contributions are 3.5
percent on earnings taxed by Social Security and 4.5 percent
on earnings above that level. The employer contribution rate
is set to cover normal costs plus the accrued unfunded lia-
bility up to a maximum of 10 percent of wages. The language
covering appropriations by the legislature to the pension
fund is phrased in mandatory terms.
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When local employers are late in excess of 60 days,
the state auditor is authorized to withhold money due the
participating public employer until the delinquency is satis-
fied with the required interest.
Wisconsin
41.52
The act creating the Wisconsin Retirement Fund was
revised in 1971. Any public employer is eligible for member-
ship except first class cities (cities with populations of
500,000 or more). Employee contributions are 4-1/2 percent
on earnings taxed by Social Security, and 7 percent on
earnings in excess of that amount. The percent for employer
contributions is not specified, but the determined rate
should be sufficient to cover normal costs plus the accrued
liability over a period of 40 years.
Wyoming
9-277
The Wyoming Retirement Act was established in 1953
(the Act of 1949 was repealed). Employee contributions of
2 percent are matched by employer contributions of 2 percent,
plus an additional .75 percent for the accrued liability.
Employer contributions are subject to change as future
valuations are made. Late payments may be recovered from
participating employers, together with 6 percent interest
per year in an action brought-for that purpose in the district
court.
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APPENDIX B
VESTING
Vesting is the point at which a person, operating
under the statues of pension coverage, earns by dint of age,
service, and contributory requirements, the unforfeitable
right to a pension, a right that cannot be abrogated or
modified by future legislative change.
Listed below are the legal provisions on vesting by
state. The primary source for this information is the American
Law Reports' annotated entry entitled: "Vested Right of
Pensioner to Pension."1 Where the information is from
another source, that source is stated.
Alabama: Compulsory contributions to a pension fund create
no such vested rights to a pension as will bar the application
to an employee of a statute enacted after the employee's
retirement which, in effect, reduces the amount of the pension
payments.
Alaska: The pension right is protected against diminution
by constitutional amendment. 2
Arizona: Judicial interpretation grants-contractual status
to public employee benefit rights. The pension benefit is
deemed to be a condition of employment, and the employee is
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judged to have a "right to rely on terms of legislative enact-
ment. . . as it existed at time he entered service . . . ."3
California: Public employees secure a limited vested pension
right at employment. The vested right is limited in two
respects: (1) the designated period of service must be com-
pleted; (2) the pension right is subject to reasonable modi-
fication. To be sustained as "reasonable," modifications must
bear some material relation to the theory of a pension system
and its successful operation, and changes in a pension plan
which result in disadvantage to employees should be accompanied
by comparable new advantages." 4
Colorado: Statutes confer no vested rights in a statutory pen-
*sion system, notwithstanding that the system calls for compul-
sory contributions by participating employees. Nor does any
vesting to rights occur upon fulfillment of the conditions
which, under the pension statute, make the pension payable.5
Connecticut: There has been no judicial decision touching
directly on this issue.
District of Columbia: Statutes confer no vested right in a
continuance of the pension which the legislatuee might not
modify or take away absolutely. If entitled to a particular
installment, the employee is held to have a vested right to
that installment, but not to future installments.
Florida: Upon fulfillment of the conditions for retirement,
a vesting of the employee's right occurs. While the
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employee secures a right to a pension, he does not secure a
right to a pension in a specific amount. However, in the
State ex rel. Holton v. Tampa (1944), the court ruled that the
legislature could not entirely deprive the pensioner of rights
or reduce the amount to make the pension in name only.
Georgia: Compulsory contributions give the employee a vested
right such that any subsequent attempt to alter the pension
right is utterly void. This ruling does not render invalid
subsequent legislation increasing benefits.
Hawaii: Article XIV, Section 2, of the Hawaii State Consti-
tution provides that: "Membership in any employee's retire-
ment system of the State or any political subdivision thereof
shall be a contractual'relationship, the accrued benefits of
which shall not be diminished or impaired.6
Illinois: Pension rights were granted contractual status in
1970. Article XIII, Section 5, of the Constitution of the
State of Illinois provides that: Membership in any pension or
retirement system of the State, any unit of local government
or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof,
shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits
of which shall not be diminshed or impaired.
Indiana: When the statutory conditions for retirement have
been met, the pensioner's interest becomes vested and takes on
attributes of a contract which may not be legally diminished.
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Iowa: Pension rights vest at retirement.
Kentucky: The pension of nonretired employees is subject to
repeal or modification. The pension right vests absolutely
upon fulfillment of conditions for retirement.
Louisiana: No preretirement vested rights. Rights vest upon
fulfillment of the statutory requirements for the pension award.
Massachusetts: In 1956 the Massachusetts legislature amended
Chapter 32 of the Massachusetts General Laws to make membership
in the retirement system a contractual relationship. A proposed
increase in employee contributions from 5 to 7 percent was not
enacted in 1973 because, in the opinion of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, such legislation would be "presump-
tively invalid" as to persons who were members of the retire-
ment system prior to that date, "unless sufficient necessitous
circumstances could be shown." 7
Michigan: Courts in Michigan have held that there are no
vested rights either under contributory or noncontributory
systems. Thus, in Brown v. Highland Park (1948) 320 Mich 108,
30 NW 2d 798, a statutue enacted after a employee's retirement
decreasing the amount of the pension payable was held to be
valid.
Minnesota: Compulsory contributions are "vested," in the sense
that authorities administering the system cannot deny pension
payments without due process. In a pension system not calling
278
for employee contributions, there are no vested rights, except
as to a particular pension payment which has become due. With
respect to contributory pensions, contributors have no vested
rights in payments deducted from their salaries and no vested
right in pensions except as to payments due. 8
Missouri: The general rule is that state employees under con-
tributory plans have a vested right only to the continuance of
benefits existing at time of retirement.9 However, where a
specific statute exists (as in a local jurisdiction) which bars
alteration or reduction in accrued or potential benefits, the
court has held that such statutues render invalid any subse-
quent legislation removing coverage from employees formerly
covered.
Montana: Where there are no contributions, there are no vested
rights. Where contributions are voluntary, there are vested
rights, but not such that changes in interest rates, increase
in life span, and experience in operation may not be enacted
to insure that all members of the system have the benefits for
which they have contracted. Great latitude is permitted the
legislature in making alterations to strengthen the system.
No decisions have been rendered on benefit rights under
circumstances of compulsory contributions.
Nebraska: Where there are no contributions, there are no vested
rights. Likewise, there is no preretirement vesting merely
because the statute calls for compulsory contributions. When
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the particular event happens upon which the pension is to be
paid, the pensioner has a vested right to such payments.
New Jersey: Pensions are not vested against statutory change,
except in the case where a particular pension payment has
become due. Under statutes where contributions are optional,
the legal relationship between the employee and the Board of
Trustees of the retirement fund is contractual and cannot be
altered without the consent of both parties.
New York: In New York the question of whether pension rights
are vested has been settled by a constitutional amendment.
Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the New York Constitution specifies
that after July 1, 1940, membership in any pension or retire-
ment system of the state or of a civil division shall be a
contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be
diminished or impaired. While the constitutional amendment
prevents any change with respect to members of a pension
system, it does not bar the legislature from limiting the
rights of persons who may become members thereafter.
North Carolina: Eligibility for retirement vests pension
rights. Thus, were the system to be dissolved, retirement
members would be entitled to have their pension claims satis-
fied in full before active members of the system were
entitled to receive any part of their contributions.
North Dakota: Where membership and contributions are obli-
gatory, a contractual relationship is established upon
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acceptance of employment.
Ohio: There is no vesting prior to the pension grant, but
upon retirement, the right cannot be reduced or denied by sub-
sequent legislation.
Oregon: Pension rights vest upon fulfillment of requirements
for retirement.
Pennsylvania: The general rule is that employees' rights to
a pension vest absolutely when all requirements for retirement
eligibility have been met. Prior to that, the legislature may
"alter, change, amend, and render intact the actuarial sound-
ness of the system so as to strengthen its fibers in any way it
sees fit, since changes in details . . . to keep the fund on
sound actuarial practices, are essential."1 0
South Dakota: The right of public employees in statutory
pension systems vest upon the employee's fulfillment of the
right to retire.
Texas: Texas law clearly establishes the right of the legis-
lature to abolish the pension system or diminish the accrued
benefits of pensions. Thisholds whether the contributions
are voluntary or compulsory.
Utah: Pension rights are vested upon elibility for the retire-
ment. Prior to that, the legislature may validly abolish the
retirement system so long as the pensioner is permiited the
withdrawal of his contribution.
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Washington: The rights of public employees in a compulsory
contribution pension system vest upon the employee's rendition
of services under the pension statute. Thereafter, modifica-
tion is permissible before retirement only for the purpose of
keeping the system flexible and only where any disadvantage
embodied in the modification is accompanied by a comparable
new advantage. Pension rights are absolutely immune from
change when the employee has fulfilled the conditions
prescribed for retirement.
Wisconsin: Pension rights vest upon fulfillment of the
requirements for retirement.
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Footnotes: Appendix B
B.1 Vested Right of Pensioner to Pension, Annotated, A.L.R.2d 437
(1957).
B.2 The source of this information is a survery associated with
this study.
B.3 Yeazell v. Copins, 402 P.2d 541 (1965).
B.4 Allen v. Long Beach, 45 Cal. 2d 128, 287 P.2d 765 (1955).
B.5 Fugate v. Birdsall, 114 Colo. 116, 162 P.2d 214 (1945).
B.6 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Education and Labor,
Interim Report of Activities of the Pension Task Force of
the Subcommittee on Labor Standards, 1976, p. 201.
B.7 Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives,
303 NW2d (1973).
B.8 Slezak v. Ousdiqian, Minn., 110 N.W.2d 1.
B.9 A.L.R. 2d Later Case Service, Supplement, 49-55 A.L.R. 2d.
B.10 Retirement Board v. McGovern 316 Pa. 161, 174 A. 400 (1934).
APPENDIX C
QUESTIONNAIRE
The data used for this research is taken from the quinquennial
publication, "Employee Retirement Systems of State and Local
Governments." The periods covered are 1957, 1962, 1967, and
1972. Therefore, your responses should refer to the provisions
of statutes as they were during those periods.
[Arizona]
1. Date plan established in current form.
2. Includes subdivisions?
3. Majority of members covered by Social Security?
Yes
No
4. Funding method as prescribed by statutue.
Funded
Unfunded
5. Specified frequency of plan valuation.
6. Specified employee and employer contribution rate
(If statute simply states - contribution to be determined
by actuarial valuation, please enter the actual percentage
of wages contributed.)
Employee '57 , '62 , '67 , '72
Employer '57 , '62 , '67 , '72
7. Late penalty clause (for agencies and/or subdivisions)
Interest charge
Withholding state funds
Default and dissolution of plan
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8. Regular contributions by government compelled by
state statute?
9. Sources of and limitations on governmental contributions
General taxing powers
Taxing powers limited to a specified source, or a specified
amount? State source , and limit
Bonded debt powers
10. Can contributions be compelled through mandamus?
11. Limits of obligation
The fund
General Obligation of the sponsoring government
12. Vested status of pension rights
Purely statutory
Immume from abolition but otherwise subject to modification
Immune from abolition but extent to which subject to legis-
tive change is unclear
Undetermined as to whether or when pension rights vest
Modified vesting upon fulfillment
Vested upon fulfillment
Vested upon employment
Contractual relationship
13. Please comment on changes that have occurred either during
or after this period that you think have had, or will have,
a significant effect on the funded status of your plan.
THANK YOU VERY SINCERELY FOR YOUR EFFORT AND COOPERATION
GLOSSARY
A pension fund is an accumulation of assets which will
be used to meet present and future payments to retirees. With
few exceptions, both employees and employers contribute toward
the building of assets. The ultimate cost of each employee's
promised benefits is taken into consideration when establishing
a schedule of contributions by both parties. The amount and
schedule of contributions rests on anticipated experience. A
fully funded pension system exists when the assets equal the
present value of all accrued benefits. The typical beneficiary
of a state or local pension system can retire at age 60 and will
receive no less than 50 percent of his or her average pay for
the last five years of service.
Actuary: A person who calculates future financial requirements
and constructs asset accumulation schedules to meet future
cash needs.
Actuarial Assumptions: Projections of future experience based
upon past realities. Actuaries base their calculations of
a pension fund's future cash requirements upon this model of
the future.
Benefits: Payments either disbursed or promised to a member
of a retirement system. The amount bears a direct relation-
ship to the salary level of the employee and the number of
years employed.
Benefit Formula: Method by which payments to retirees are
calculated. Generally, state and local retirement systems
base retirement benefits on an average of the employee's
pay over the last five years of employment.
Consolidation: The unification of all plans under a single
state administered system.
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ERISA: The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 is
a Federal Law establishing minimum requirements covering
all aspects of private pension systems. The object is to
guarantee benefits to members participating in private
retirement systems.
Funding: A systematic schedule of payments designed to meet
a retirement system's present and future requirements.
Integrated System: A retirement plan under which employee
benefits are derived from a combination of the local govern-
ment's system and Social Security.
Normal Costs: Annual contribution requirements of a pension
system based on benefits accruing to active employees for
a given year's work.
Past Service Costs: Contribution requirements of a pension
system based on retroactive increases in benefits due
present employees for past years of work.
Pay-as-you-go: A system of meeting pension obligations only
on the basis of annual disbursements. No assets are
accumulated and employer contributions are based solely
on present cash payments to retirees.
Unfunded Liabilities: The gap between the present value of
all benefits owed to all members of a retirement system
and all accumulated assets.
SOURCE: John Nuveen & Co., Inc. Public Employee Pension
Funds
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